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Abstract 
In philosophy time is one of the most difficult subjects because, notoriously, it eludes 
rationalization. However, Bergson succeeds in presenting time effectively as reality that exists in its 
own right. Time in Bergson is almost accessible, almost palpable in a discourse which overcomes 
certain difficulties of language and traditional thought. Bergson equates time with duration, a genuine 
temporal succession of phenomena defined by their position in that succession, and asserts that time is 
a quality belonging to the nature of all things rather than a relation between supposedly static elements. 
But Rergson's theory of duration is not organised, nor is it complete - fragments of it are embedded 
in discussions of various aspects of psychology, evolution, matter, and movement. My first task is 
therefore to extract the theory of duration from Bergson's major texts in Chapters 2-4. In Chapters 5 
and 6 I consider duration and time on an abstract level, as general metaphysical concepts, developing 
arguments beyond Bergson's explicit discourse. In particular, Bergson proposes the idea of duration as 
heterogeneity wherein all elements entwine and influence each other, and where the past contributes to 
the present. I challenge this unidirectional view of temporal reality and suggest that if in heterogeneity 
everything influences everything else, then subsequent temporal phases produce retrospective changes 
in previous temporal phases. Also,! challenge the exclusion of temporal relations from the theory of 
time, and incorporate into the theory of duration both time as a quality and time as a network of 
relations. 
Chapters 7 and 8 exempli1' and concretise heterogeneous duration as self, examining various 
aspects of selfhood and its temporality. Chapter 9 deals with the problem of discontinuity within 
duration that emerges in chapters 7 and 8. Discontinuity comes through in various gaps and leaps 
involved in the existence of an individual consciousness and in the universal development of evolution, 
whereby the previous phase cannot account for the novelty of the following phase. I propose a way of 
saving the idea of the continuity of duration by changing one's observation point in regard to the 
observed process: the sense of discontinuity is due to our view of the past, contaminated by our 
knowledge in the present. Instead of examining temporal reality from the imagined present situated in 
the past to the actual present, we can look at it backwards, from the actual present into the past, 
descending from the new to the old, from the more complex to the less complex. 
4 
Table of contents 
Page 
Tables and diagrams 
.6 
Acknowledgments.............................................................................................. 7 
Introduction...................................................................................................... 8 
Chapter 1. Bergson's method and key concepts 	
........................................................ 13 
Chapter 2. Duration in Time and Free Will 	
............................................................... 21 
1. 	 Duration as succession 	
............................................................................... 2 I 
2. 	 Duration as movement 	
............................................................................... 23 
3. 	 Space: what duration is not 	
.......................................................................... 27 
4. 	 Duration as consciousness 	 ........................................................................... 28 
5. 	 Free will as growth of duration 
	
..................................................................... 30 
6. 	 Automatic acts 
	
......................................................................................... 33 
Chapter 3. Body, soul and the world in Matter and Memory .......................................... 35 
1. Duration as being .....................................................................................35 
2. Bond of mind and matter in perception ............................................................38 
3. Duration as memory ..................................................................................42 
4. The spatiality of time and the temporality of space ..............................................48 
5. Continuity of the past, present and future in memory, perception and action ................52 
Chapter 4. Consciousness, life and the universe in Creative Evolution .............................. 57 
1. Duration 	 as the universe 	
............................................................................. 57 
2. Duration 	 as evolution 	
................................................................................. 61 
3. Human consciousness as a fragment of evolution 	
................................................ 63 
4. Instinct and 	 intelligence 	
.............................................................................. 67 
5. Mailer and consciousness in evolution 
	
............................................................ 73 
6. Human consciousness prolonging the evolution 
	 ................................................. 75 
Chapter 5. Heterogeneous duration ........................................................................79 
I. 	 Heterogeneous duration: non-numerical multiplicity ............................................79 
2. Constructive negation: same and other ............................................................83 
3. Changing the past: backward causality ............................................................89 
4. Predetermined but changeable future ..............................................................96 
5. The present: temporal shift within the self .........................................................99 
Chapter6. Time 	
................................................................................................103 
I. 	 Time as a quality and as a relation 
	
.................................................................. 103 
2. Timeandspace 	
....................................................................................... 107 
3. Space and extensity.................................................................................... 110 
4. Three hypostases of time 
	
............................................................................ 113 
5. Thepast 	
................................................................................................ 118 
6. The 	 future 	
.............................................................................................. 122 
7. The 	 present 	
............................................................................................. 124 
8. Continuity of presents 	
................................................................................ 129 
5 
Chapter 7. Duration: from general idea to concrete self ...............................................13! 
1. Concretising duration as se!f 	 ........................................................................ 13! 
2. Imperfect duration in inanimate matter 	 ............................................................ 133 
3. Living matter 	 .......................................................................................... 
4. Psycho!ogical duration 	 ............................................................................... 144 
5. Heterogeneous se!f 	 ................................................................................... 146 
Chapter 8. The structure of rational selfhood ............................................................153 
1. The pre-reflective self 	 ................................................................................ 153 
2. Unity of the se!f in self-consciousness 	 ............................................................. 156 
3. Bergson: 	 intuition versus analysis 	 ................................................................. 158 
4. Intuition: knowledge by acquaintance 	 ............................................................ 161 
5. Three stages of cognition 	 ........................................................................... 163 
6. The self in 	 introspection 	 ............................................................................ 171 
Chapter 9. Evolutionary, historical and biographical continuity ................................178 
I. 	 The new within continuity: staggered temporal reality .........................................178 
2. The observer's position ..............................................................................182 
3. The continuity of evolution .........................................................................186 
4. Historical and biographical continuity .............................................................190 
5. The hypothetical temporality of the self ...........................................................!92 
Conclusion.......................................................................................................196 
Listof references ..............................................................................................198 
Tables and diagrams 
Page 
Table 1. Hypostases of duration . 20 
Table 2. Bergson 's view on time and space .......................................................................... 111 
Diagram I. 
	 Conceptualframework of Bergson 's philosophy................................................... 16 
Diagram 2. 
	 Emergence of volition....................................................................................... 32 
Diagram 3. The evolutionary development of consciousness..................................................... 65 
Diagram 4. 
	 Consciousness in the world ................................................................................ 77 
Diagram 5. 
	
The state of affairs at time t................................................................................ 98 
Diagram 6. 
	 The state of affairs at time ................................................................................ 99 
Diagram 7. Bergson 's view of temporal reality .................. .................................................... 179 
Diagram 8. 	 Our view of temporal reality ........................ ....................................... ............... 179 
Diagram 9. 
	 Planes of the past ....................................... ....................................... ............... 180 
Diagram JO. Temporal slicing of reality reveals leaps between earlier and later .................. ...... .182 
Diagram I). Temporal reality augmenting as time passes, and our observation positions ............. 183 
Acknowledgments 
First and foremost, I am deeply indebted to my supervisors - Professor Paul Crowther, Dr Andros 
Loizou and Dr Peter Lucas. I have benefited from their guidance, their talents and their expertise 
during the years of my research, and their influence on me as a scholar has been truly profound. 
Thank you to Dr Warwick Fox for being the first person to welcome me to the Centre of 
Professional Ethics as a prospective student and for the efficient organisation of the administrative side 
of things in his capacity as the research tutor. Thank you to Professor Doris Schroeder and to all other 
members of the staff at the Centre for their friendly support and advice, always readily given. 
I am very grateful to Rosa Bettess for commenting on the final version of the manuscript and to 
Anne McCann for proofreading and, of course, this project could not have been completed without the 
unfailing support of my husband Anthony who believes in me and always stands by me. Also, I must 
not forget my son Andrew whose arrival two years ago gave me a lot inspiration. 
A debt is owed to my parents and especially to my Father, a professional philosopher, who 
introduced me to philosophy from a very early age; to my teachers from St. Petersburg University, 
especially from the Chair of Ontology and the Chair of Contemporary Western Philosophy who 
encouraged my interest in the problem of time and who introduced me to the intriguing philosophy of 
Bergson. 
Introduction 
Although Bergson explores a wide range of philosophical problems, one could characterize his 
philosophy as a philosophy of time, where time is not addressed as an abstract notion but is examined 
as part of real processes, as real embodied time. Discussing the nature of those processes, Bergson 
inevitably looks at many other issues, and as a result, his reader is faced with a complex discourse 
where discussions on time are entwined with discussions of memory, matter, intuition, images etc. 
Some of Bergson's commentators have attempted to interpret his entire contribution to philosophy. 
Others have addressed particular issues, but undoubtedly, all components of his philosophy form part 
of the whole and cannot be fully comprehended in isolation from other components. 
Amongst those who addressed Bergson's philosophy as a whole, both Kolakowski and I. W. 
Alexander offer a useful and concise overview. More thorough accounts have been made, for example, 
by Cunningham, Lacey, F. C. T. Moore and Mullarkey. Cunningham embarks on the work of 
interpretation by arranging Bergson's theory into several topics, dealing separately with intuition, 
- intelligence, duration and finalism. Organising Bergson's philosophy is a necessary step towards the 
better understanding of it, but can only be accepted provisionally, because as Oapek observed about 
elements of Bergson's theory, "[l]t is almost childish to number each individual feature separately, 
since all of them are complementary and inseparable aspects of one single, though very complex, 
dynamic reality" . F. C. T. Moore's enthusiastic discourse offers clarifications of many difficult 
Bergsonian terms and employs examples taken from elsewhere to effectively illuminate and defend 
Bergson's position. Lacey's study goes further than a mere exposition and clarification: he approaches 
Bergson from the analytical standpoint and does not refrain from raising difficult questions. In 
particular, he queries Bergson's concept of pure change, suspicious of his assertion that movement 
does not require a moving thing - a theme that is important for the Bergsonian interplay of space and 
time. 
Altogether, these authors provide much needed explanations of Bergson's key arguments by 
systematising Bergson and elucidating links between parts of Bergson's philosophy. But this is not 
enough. The deeper one analyses Bergson, the more one feels the need to move beyond what he 
explicitly states into the realm of principles which are embedded in his work and which follow from his 
'Oapek, p.  91. 
arguments without, however, being referred to directly. Mullarkey is the author who aims at addressing 
the entire philosophy of Bergson whilst taking this next step. In particular, he treats Bergson's 
philosophy as dynamic in itself and even refers to it as "philosophies" of time, 2 rather than merely one 
philosophy, thereby offering a view that can accommodate certain inconsistencies in Bergson. 
Our contribution to the Bergsonian studies will consist in extracting Bergson's theory of time from 
his three main texts, Time and Free Will (TFW), Matter and Memory (MM) and Creative Evolution 
(CE), with references to his other works, The Creative Mind (CM), Duration and Simultaneity (DS), 
Mind-Energy (ME), The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (7SMR), An Introduction to 
Metaphysics (Introduction). This extraction, as well as offering a concise exposition of this theory, also 
reveals its incomplete and fragmentary nature, and the remainder of this study consists in an attempt to 
fill in the gaps and respond to questions which arise along the way. At that stage the debt is owed to 
those commentators who focus on specific Bergsonian issues. For example, our analysis and further 
development of heterogeneity was inspired by apek 3 , and the discussion of discontinuity would not be 
complete without references to Bachelard. 
his possible to read Bergson in different ways. One can dismiss his philosophy as Russell does 4 for 
his refutation of rationality and space; one can expect Bergsonism to be a complete and finished theory 
which should be able to resolve all sorts of philosophical questions; or one can take on board the 
Bergsonian idea that to exist means to change and, whilst analysing what Bergson explicitly said, allow 
his philosophy to evolve by working out what he would have said, and what else can be said. We take 
the latter approach, and the main aim of this project is to indicate a possible way in which the theory of 
duration can develop further. 
We find the biggest attraction of Bergson is in his attempt to grasp the nature of time and show a 
way of treating time as metaphysical reality, overcoming difficulties humbly admitted to by St. 
Augustine 5
. But Bergson's theory of duration is not a completed, finalised theory. Firstly, it is not put 
forward in a systematic way and needs to be retrieved from his more generalised discourse; secondly, it 
2 Mullarkey (1999), p.2 
apek, pp.83— 185 
4 See Russell. 1914 
St. Augustine, p. 264 
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contains inconsistencies and gaps. Thirdly, it does not address some obvious issues. Moreover, some of 
Bergson's claims are too strong and need to be examined carefully. 
In the expository chapters (Chapters 2, 3, and 4), we extract Bergson's theory of time, which can be 
called a theory of duration, from his major texts, Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory and Creative 
Evolution. In each book Bergson introduces duration anew, as if disregarding claims made in previous 
texts; thus each time duration is given a different, sometimes seemingly opposite, meaning. However, 
where an unsympathetic critic would see inconsistencies, we see phases of conceptual development of 
the idea of duration. This being said, Bergson's phases are not linked in a satisfactory way. A key 
strategy of this study, therefore, will be to fill gaps, raise further questions, and develop new 
arguments. 
We move from duration as a psychological process in Time and Free Will to duration as the 
universal movement in Creative Evolution, via the intermediate proposal in Matter and Memory that 
duration is a general principle of being. Duration in Bergson turns out to be an all-embracing concept, 
itself equivalent to the idea of being. Indeed, do we find in Bergson anything which is not duration? 
Spatial objects, we think, reading Time and Free Will. But as readers of Matter and Memory, we have 
to accept duration of matter and duration within matter. In Creative Evolution everything non-
durational is reduced to an illusion, and from this position we equate "duration" and "being". The main 
aspect in which the idea of duration differs from the idea of being is that duration already entails a 
characteristic of being as moving which, according to Bergson, is its necessary feature. 'What the term 
"duration" achieves is to weld motion onto being and demonstrate that being cannot be regarded in any 
other way than as being in motion, the being that has history. Also, it emphasises the omnipresence of 
motion and change, so that even in those cases when we struggle to find and define substance, such as 
in music or thought, we still find change and motion. 
We take on board Bergson's idea that duration is heterogeneous. The idea of heterogeneity emerges 
when Bergson analyses psychological continuity. Elements of such continuity (emotions, sensations) 
are not clear-cut, even though we commonly distinguish one emotion or sensation from another. This 
division, we agree with Bergson, is artificial and done for convenience, as in reality one state of 
consciousness flows into another and ultimately there is just the unity of the conscious process 
corresponding to the life of a concrete person. 
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But this idea of heterogeneity entails a paradox. Although its elements are inseparable, they are 
different and diverse, so on the one hand Bergson wants us to accept that we cannot individualise them 
as if they were autonomous units, but on the other hand he does not allow them to be merged into a 
homogenised stream. In Chapter 5 we attempt to resolve this paradox by claiming that the identity of 
elements within duration, not given ostensively, is nevertheless manifested through their unique effects 
on the world. Bergson says very little about the structure of heterogeneity, and later in Chapter 5 we 
analyse its composition on a general metaphysical level. 
In Chapter 6 we address time as such and, in particular, Bergson's claim that time must be 
understood exclusively in qualitative terms. We argue that temporal ordering, pastness and futurity 
cannot be reduced to qualities, and that time cannot be understood without relations. Also, we dispute 
Bergson's attempt to consider time in separation from space, as there is no purely temporal reality 
totally free from spatial features. 
Chapter 7 marks a transition from duration as a general metaphysical term to its concrete 
manifestations. Concrete examples of duration, given by Bergson, include psychological and biological 
processes, movement of a physical body and, as an all-embracing duration that includes all worldly 
processes, the universe. We propose the duration of a concrete human being as such an all-embracing 
duration, because a human self involves all layers of being, from minerals to mind, which can 
acknowledge any worldly phenomena and account for them in an epistemic process. Of course, if the 
universe could be said to contain all worldly processes, the self merely represents them. 
In Chapter 8 we look at epistemic processes and begin to analyse the perception of one's own 
selthood in self-consciousness. According to Bergson, an epistemological act is defined either by its 
analytical or intuitive component, but we contest his opposition of intuition and intellect and present 
the epistemological act as a three-fold process of primary (pre-conceptual) intuition, intellectual 
rationalisation and secondary (post-conceptual) intuition. We emphasise that the perception of one's 
self, acquired in this way gives a picture of an all-embracing unity of human existence, from various 
manifestations of matter and life to the complexities of mind. 
Bergson presents duration as an uncontroversial and harmonious continuity, but Chapters 7 and 8 
demonstrate that, inevitably, duration entails discontinuity in various senses. In Chapter 9 we attempt a 
view on reality which reinstates its continuity. We suggest that when we observe continuity from the 
past to the present, in actual fact we remain in the present, retaining knowledge of the consecutive 
12 
events. This knowledge interferes with our view of the past and prevents us from seeing it as a fresh 
present with an indefinite future. On the other hand, if we look backwards into the past, we can get a 
sense of continuity, moving from the latest and more complex to the earlier and less complex, without 
making different temporal periods overlap and interfere with one another. 
13 
Chapter 1. Bergson's method and key concepts 
Bergson strives for precision at the level of description, but does not commit himself to rigid 
definitions. As a result, the meaning of his terms changes as his theory evolves. 
Before we delve into Bergson's texts, a few remarks are necessary to introduce and orientate the 
reader. In particular, the Bergsonian reader must be warned against expecting clear definitions - 
Bergson deliberately avoids them - and also against accusing Bergson of being inconsistent, as the 
change of meaning of his terminology is not an oversight but a result of this reluctance to commit. 
The Creative Mind, Bergson's last book, offers a retrospective view on the maxims that he set for 
himself and which he complied with in the earlier texts. It begins with a criticism of non-Bergsonian 
philosophy which gives us an insight into what characteristics, in his opinion, a true philosophy should 
be able to demonstrate. 
What philosophy has lacked most of all is precision. Philosophical systems are not cut to the 
measure of the reality in which we live; they are too wide for reality. Examine any one of 
them, chosen as you see fit, and you will see that it could apply equally well to a world in 
which neither plants nor animals have existence, only men, and in which men would quite 
possibly do without eating and drinking, where they would neither sleep nor dream nor let 
their minds wander; where, born decrepit, they would end up as babies-in-arms, where energy 
would return up the slope of its dispersion, and where everything might just as easily go 
backwards and be upside down. The fact is that a self-contained (vrai) system is an 
assemblage of conceptions so abstract, and consequently so vast, that it might contain, aside 
from the real, all that is possible and even impossible. (CM, p. II) 
Bergson is against systems which are so "vast" that they can include "all that is possible and even 
impossible" (CM, p. II), and himself strives to get away from the generalities in favour of concrete and 
particular things. The subsequent statement confirms that: 
The only explanation we should accept as satisfactory is one which fits tightly to its object 
with no space between them, no crevice in which any other explanation might equally well be 
lodged; one which fits the object only and to which alone the object lends itself. (CM, p. II) 
For Bergson, a philosopher must get close to the reality that he endeavours to study, prior to any 
assumptions as to what that reality might be: "Metaphysics becomes, in Bergson's hands, a remedial 
technique in perception, not a form of ethereal contemplation." 6 
6 Mullarkey (1999), p.  157 
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Rather than naming the Bergsonian method "intuition", as Deleuze does, 7 for example, we compare 
it with phenomenological reduction. But there is one feature which is distinctively Bergsonian: his 
language stops where data stops, presenting us with a deliberately inconclusive philosophy, a 
philosophy where the 'i's are not dotted and 't's are not crossed, a philosophy where we find ostensive 
demonstrations rather than final conclusions and rigid definitions. Striving to gain precision at the level 
of description, Bergson is reluctant to commit himself to definitions, because a definition would dictate 
what the nature of the phenomenon should be. He prefers extensive descriptions. As a result, the reader 
who may have hoped to find a clear theory of time and self, encounters a seemingly vague discourse, 
with changes of meanings throughout the texts, and a refusal to commit to clear-cut concepts. 
In Mind-Energy he says of consciousness: 
There is no need to define so familiar a thing, something which is continually present in every 
one's experience. I will not give a definition, for that would be less clear than the thing itself; I 
will characterize consciousness by its most obvious feature." (ME, p. 7) 
There are other places where he openly refuses to define: 
Neither intelligence nor instinct lends itself to rigid definition: they are tendencies, and not 
things. (CE, p. 143) 
Let no one ask me for a simple and geometrical definition of intuition. (CM, p. 34) 
Do not expect of this metaphysics simple conclusions or radical solutions. (CM, p. 45) 
In the realm of experience ... with incomplete solutions and provisional conclusions, it 
[metaphysics] will achieve an increasing probability which can ultimately become the 
equivalent of certitude. (CM, p.46) 
This reluctance to commit himself to fixed definitions allowed Bergson to talk of duration in a 
variety of contexts and made it possible to change the direction of his discourse as necessary. For us, 
however, a similar reluctance to commit is unnecessary. We can tease out definitions from his 
discourse. It could be argued that an attempt to systematise Bergson's philosophy would go against his 
own intentions. However, despite first impressions, Bergson is not an unsystematic thinker. His 
philosophy is not a collection of random insights. Rather, his ideas developed naturally over four 
decades. It is possible to extract and organise his ideas on various topics without doing damage to his 
philosophy as whole and in fact helping his readers to capture and appreciate its distinctiveness and 
originality. Our objective then is not to systematise an unsystematic discourse, but to organise a 
systematic but disjointed discussion. 
See Deleuze (1991), Chapter I, pp.  13-36 
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In Diagram / we attempt to show the conceptual interlacing between elements of Bergson's 
philosophy at a glance and further on we list key concepts which appear in this work and which change 
their meaning as the theory of duration evolves. 
Diagram 1. Concepzualframework of Bergson 's philosophy. 
Matter 
Matter resolves itself in 
vibrations of particles 
Matter is 	 Material objects 	 Matt r seems 
ultimately 	 exist as perceivable 	 to tend 
temporal reality 	 images 	 towards space 
Time 
Time equals continuous 
flowing reality 
Time is best represented 
by the life of consciousness 
and accessed by intuition 
Memory 
Unrecalled memory is 
the past that survives but 
is inactive; recollection 
accesses that past 
Images 
Images are shared by material 
objects and by the mind that 
perceives them 
Consciousness accesses matter as 
images in memory and perception 
Consciousness 
Consciousness functions in three 
cognitive modes, intellect, instinct 
and intuition 
Perception 
Perception accesses the 
present via the interaction 
with images 	 - 
Space 
Space misrepresents 
continuous flowing reality 
Intellect misunderstands 
temporal reality and 
presents it as spatialised 
Will 
The future is intentionally 
addressed by the will; future 
volitions are uncertain, and 
uncertainty equals freedom 
The past 	 The present 	 The future 
The past is disembodied 	 The present is embodied 
	
The future is nonexistent 
temporal reality 	 temporal reality 	 and uncertain 
Tenses are dissolved in the heterogeneity of total time 
Heterogeneous duration 
Time in its totality is duration, which is identical with the life of consciousness, biological life and, 
ultimately, with all temporal reality understood as a complex heterogeneity of interdependent elements. 
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Duration is introduced in Time and Free Will as conscious processes, time and motion. In Matter 
and Memory, it is presented as any manifestation of being, either material or spiritual. In Creative 
Evolution it refers to consciousness, concrete manifestations of life, biological evolution and the 
universe. We accept duration as being in general and as concrete manifestations of being, equating 
being with temporal reality. We also take on board the Bergsonian idea of novelty, whereby each 
temporally new manifestation of duration is ultimately original and unprecedented. 
Heterogeneity is the term that reflects the nature of duration: its elements are individualised and yet 
bound, so that their identity depends on relations with other elements. Duration perpetually changes 
and, we claim, not just by adding new elements in the present, but also by modiing its future 
projection and its past content, and we introduce the term "constructive retrospectivity". 
For l3ergson, duration is total affirmation, and the nought is secondary to affirmation, because 
before we negate something, we affirm it first. We include the nought in duration as constructive 
negation, whereby sameness of some qualities is opposed to the otherness of other qualities via the 
quality x not being the quality y. We also introduce vectorial properties into qualities, which are their 
directedness towards other qualities and their ability to emanate relations with ihem. 
For Bergson, real time equals pure duration with all of its elements permeating each other. 
According to him, regarding it as a homogeneous medium in which elements succeed one another is a 
false picture of time and is its spatialization. Space in Time and Free Will appears as an empty 
homogeneous medium, and in Matter and Memory, as an artificial framework. In Creative Evolution, 
the form of knowledge which spatialises is identified as intelligence, aimed at the construction of 
manmade tools. It follows the cinematographical approach to reality, taking snapshots of it rather 
than following its movement. Instinct, the form of knowledge aimed at the creation and functioning of 
organs, grasps duration on the level of biological life, and intuition, derived from instinct, can grasp 
the duration of one's own being and of other objects. 
We equate time with temporal reality, but refuse to divorce it from space. Spatial markers, we argue, 
define and locate duration, and duration itself is embodied time, events, not pure time and pure motion. 
As for the epistemological faculties, we assert a three-fold process, beginning with primary (pre-
conceptual) intuition - conscious but pre-verbal grasp of sensory data - continuing with intellectual 
processing of it, and possibly finishing with secondary (post-conceptual) intuition which synthesises 
what intellect has provided. 
Perception, happening in the present, is movement that provides stimulus for our actions with the 
participation of the brain, which is for Bergson a conductor and converter of movement, and affection 
in this context means receiving information about one's body. 
The concept of memory in Bergson is associated with the surviving past, with the process of 
accessing that past and with the recalled past itself. More specifically, pure memory is the past per se 
when it is not recalled. When the past is recalled, it becomes either representational memory that 
translates the past into images or motor memory that corresponds to skills, or, most often, a mixture of 
both. The role of motor memory in relation to pure memory is, according to Bergson, such that the 
former disciplines the latter, ensuring that only useful recollections are brought into the light of 
consciousness. "Of these two memories that we have distinguished, the second, which is active, or 
motor, will, then, constantly inhibit the first, or at least only accept from it that which can throw light 
upon and complete in a useful way the present situation." (MM, p. 85) 
The process of recalling a memory amounts, for Bergson, to the following sequence: "Ideas - pure 
recollections summoned from the depths of memory - develop into memory-images more and more 
capable of inserting themselves into a motor diagram." 9 (MM, p. 125) We understand that an idea (a 
generalised image) is a vague recollection, and a memory-image (an image that corresponds to a 
singular object), is a more precise and definite one. As for a motor diagram, it must be a disposition to 
acknowledge and assimilate the recalled memory-image with a greater focus, "to the degree that these 
recollections take the form of a more complete, more concrete and more conscious representation, they 
tend to confound themselves with the perception which attracts them or of which they adopt the 
outline." (MM, pp. 125- 126) 
At the end of Chapter 2 Bergson emphasises his claim that memory and perception are not self-
sufficient and complete processes in themselves. He talks of a "dynamic progress by which the one 
passes into the other." (MM, p. 127) An account of this progress is summed up in the following 
passage. 
In Mind-Energy Bergson shows the united work of motor memory and representational memory. In 
learning to dance, for example, we use an image ("scheme") which is both visual and motor at the same 
time, and which shows us a new combination of the basic motor images which our body is familiar 
with already. (ME, p. 216 - 217) 
9As noted by Worms, pure recollections are not images, but they are always given as memory-images 
(which are not the same as images of perception: memory-images are subjective). (Worms (1997), P. 
105. 
19 
On the one hand, complete perception is only defined and distinguished by its calescence with 
a memory-image, which we send forth to meet it. Only thus is attention secured, and without 
attention there is but a passive juxtaposing of sensations, accompanied by a mechanical 
reaction. But, ... the memory-image itself, if it remained pure memory, would be ineffectual. 
Virtual, this memory can only become actual by means of the perception which attracts it. 
Powerless, it borrows life and strength from the present situation in which it is materialised. 
Does not this amount to saying that distinct perception is brought about by two opposite 
currents, of which the one, centripetal, comes from the external object, and the other, 
centrifugal, has for its point of departure that which we term "pure memory"? The first 
current, alone, would only give a passive perception with the mechanical reactions which 
accompany it. The second, left to itself, tends to give a recollection that is actualised - more 
and more actual as the current becomes more marked. Together, these two currents make up, 
at their point of confluence, the perception that is distinct and recognized." (MM, pp. 127-
128) 
Attention, despite being an effort that brings together pure memory and motor memory, reveals the 
difference between them: even if motor memory stops being purely pragmatic and becomes more 
cognitive, it is confined to indicating invariable physical, motor schemes. On the other hand, if motor 
memory brings into pure memory pragmatic elements, pure memory will still retain its depth.' ° 
Freewill, as discussed in Time and Free Will, for Bergson amounts to ultimate self-expression, as 
against a predictable response to circumstances. It is a continuation of the creative impetus, which in 
Creative Evolution means the force that creates life, and is the same as God, life-drive, or life. (The 
opposite tendency to remain immobile, realised in plants, is torpor.) 
Matter is defined in Matter and Memory as an aggregate of images, and as the source of inertness 
in Creative Evolution. Image means not just an object, but a perceivable object. The nature of duration 
in Bergson is defined by its rhythm, the rate and speed of its processes, with matter being the slowest, 
and consciousness, the fastest duration. 
The present in Matter and Memory is that which is being made or that which is acting, and the past 
is that which has ceased to act. The future, as indicated in Creative Evolution, is non-existent and the 
future reality is undetermined until the very moment of its emergence as present. We claim that the past 
is changeable because consecutive events add to it new dimensions; that the future is predetermined as 
a direct projection of the current reality but is nonetheless changeable because the current reality 
changes; and that the present is elusive because of the temporal shift within the self, due to our 
consciousness perceiving the just past reality whilst existing in the new present. 
'° Worms (1997), p.  123 
Concrete manifestations of duration are summarised in Table I. 
Table I. Hypostases of duration. 
Duration Internal vibrations maintaining the integrity of the particular type of 
in inanimate matter matter 
Locomotion of material bodies 
Duration in organic Evolutionary movement 
matter 
Life of an organism 
Instinctive behaviour of an individual organism 
Duration in Psychological processes 
consciousness 
Action 
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Chapter 2. Duration in Time and Free Will 
I. Duration as succession 
"More" and "less" imply spatial relations, with "more" being a potential container for "less ". This is 
not applicable to conscious states, which form a non-numerical qualitative multiplicity. 
In chapter 1 of Time and Free Will, Bergson prepares the reader for his views on time and the self 
by pointing out a problem in our conventional understanding of states of consciousness. "It is usually 
admitted that states of consciousness, sensations, feelings, passions, efforts, are capable of growth and 
diminution." (TFW, p.1) Bergson argues that the terms "more" and "less", normally used to describe 
the intensity of our emotions, imply spatial relations in the way that what is "more" is greater in 
magnitude than what is "less", and can be regarded as a container for the latter. Bergson argues that 
these terms are not applicable to states of consciousness, since one such state could not serve as a 
container for another. Psychic states are not extended as they do not occupy a certain portion of space, 
and we can only talk of them as intensity and cannot possibly regard them in terms of quantity and 
magnitude. However, when using terms "more" and "less", we treat unextended psychic states as if 
they were extended, confusing intensity, which does not involve any space-occupancy, and extensity, 
which is identical to a physical body occupying a concrete portion of space. As a result of this 
conibsion, the specific nature of the intensive is ignored - we regard it in terms of the extensive. 
"Common sense agrees with the philosophers in setting up a pure intensity as a magnitude, just as if it 
were something extended" (TFW, p.3), which for Bergson (as we will see later) is the major problem 
underlying all other epistemological problems in philosophy!' 
What we take to be a change in magnitude in a feeling or a sensation, is, according to Bergson, a 
change in quality: not, say, a feeling that has increased in intensity, but different feelings altogether. An 
li lt is important to note that Bergson does not wish to confirm common sense. Mentioning common 
sense in Matter and Memory (MM, pp. 10 - II) and in An Introduction to Metaphysics (Introduction, p. 
49), he discusses an alternative faculty, good sense in "Good Sense and Classical Studies" (See Henri 
Bergson, Key Writings, Continuum, New York, London, 2002, Mélanges, trans. Melissa McMahon, pp. 
354 - 353) In this lecture he talks of good sense, an inclination to open oneself for the other, and 
common sense thus appears as a spatialised, restrictive view of reality that impedes the genuine "spirit 
ofjustice" (Ibid, p.  348). 
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apparent change in magnitude is nothing but an alteration of the nature of the emotion or a sensation, 
an addition of new elements, a qualitative progress, as in the following example. 
It could be easily shown that the different degrees of sorrow ... correspond to qualitative 
changes. Sorrow begins by being nothing more than a facing towards the past, an 
impoverishment of our sensations and ideas, as if each of them were now contained entirely in 
the little which it gives out, as if the future were in some way stopped up. And it ends with an 
impression of crushing failure, the effect of which is that we aspire to nothingness, while 
every new misfortune, by making us understand better the uselessness of the struggle, causes 
us a bitter pleasure. (TFW, p. 1  1) 
Similarly, in the increasing intensity of pity Bergson finds the following stages that constitute a 
qualitative progress: it is "a transition from repugnance to fear, from fear to sympathy, and from 
sympathy itself to humility." (TFW, p.19) 
The reason why we ascribe quantity, or magnitude, to conscious phenomena is that the latter are 
often accompanied by a muscular effort, "as if intensity were being developed into extensity". (TFW, 
p.20) Thus the greater the number of muscles that accompany a conscious state, the greater intensity is 
ascribed to the corresponding conscious state. "Consciousness, accustomed to think in terms of space 
and to translate its thoughts into words, will denote the feeling by a single word and will localize the 
effort at the exact point where it yields a useful result: it will then become aware of an effort which is 
always of the same nature and increases at the spot assigned to it, and a feeling which, retaining the 
same name, grows without changing its nature." (TFW, p.26) 
In other words, Bergson believes that we confuse a feeling with the extended area of our body 
which is involved in our experiencing the feeling. For instance, we may say of fear that it is more or 
less great by our heart beating more or less fast. 
Thus Bergson arrives at a dual definition of intensity. On the one hand, it reflects the idea of 
extensive magnitudes coming from without, while on the other hand it reflects the nature of an inner 
multiplicity, coming from within consciousness itself. Bergson claims that whereas an externally, 
spatially posited multiplicity contains countable units, the inner multiplicity presents itself as a 
qualitative diversity and cannot be considered in numerical terms.' 2 
The reason for that is that enumeration implies countable units, which must be items, identical in 
nature but distinct from one another in their spatial position; otherwise they would merge into a single 
unit. Thus, Bergson argues, the idea of number involves juxtaposition of units, setting them alongside 
12 Lacey offers a thorough discussion of this, pointing out the necessity to compare sensations, which 
are more or less significant depending on their intensity, and difficulties that Bergson's position 
presents. See Lacey, pp.  3— 16. 
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one another - the procedure only being possible in space and not in time. This is introduced by Bergson 
as the domain where we should consider unextended and intense states of consciousness. This time is 
presented in Time and Free Will as "pure duration". 
Bergson states, "[T]here are two kinds of multiplicity: that of material objects, to which the 
conception of number is immediately applicable; and the multiplicity of states of consciousness, which 
cannot be regarded as numerical without the help of some symbolical representation, in which a 
necessary element is space." (TrW, p.87) 
Another important feature of counting juxtaposed objects is the assumption of their impenetrability, 
which Bergson finds inappropriate in relation to psychic states. "Feelings, sensations, ideas" in fact 
"permeate one another", he observes. (TrW, p.89) Our counting distorts their permeating one another, 
and this also leads to a false understanding of time: "Now, let us notice that when we speak of time, we 
generally thinic of a homogeneous medium in which our conscious states are ranged alongside one 
another as in space, so as to form a discrete multiplicity." (TFW, p.90) 
This serves Bergson as evidence in demonstrating that our view of time is corrupted by space. "For 
if time, as the reflective consciousness represents it, is a medium in which our conscious states form a 
discrete series so as to admit of being counted, and if on the other hand our conception of number ends 
in spreading out in space everything which can be directly counted, it is to be presumed that time, 
understood in the sense of a medium in which we make distinctions and count, is nothing but space." 
(TFW, p.91) "It follows that pure duration must be something different," Bergson deduces. (TFW, p.91) 
This notion, evolving as his theory develops, at this initial stage, can be understood as a succession of 
moments as opposed to points in space existing simultaneously. 
2. Duration as movement 
Duration becomes associated with movement. Zeno 's confusion of motion and space. Merging time, 
movement and consciousness in the notion of duration. Pure duration as a mode of being for the self in 
its non-reflective state. The error of spatial ization. 
As Bergson's theory develops, the notion of duration becomes enriched with extra meaning, and 
the next idea that is added to duration is the idea of movement. When we perceive oscillations of a 
pendulum, Bergson says, we do not think of each oscillation as isolated from the preceding one - we 
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perceive them all, "each permeating the other and organizing themselves like the notes of a tune, so as 
to form what we shall call a continuous or qualitative multiplicity with no resemblance to number." 
(TFW, p.105) Just like psychological life, movement too, appears to be pure duration with no spatial 
features such as divisibility. (TFW, p. 110) 
To reinforce the above assertion, Bergson offers his own solution to the three Eleatic paradoxes, 
created by Zeno in the fifth century BC. Zeno aimed to prove the totality of being, which, omnipresent 
and hence immobile, does not allow for movement, as the latter would imply nothingness as a void to 
be filled. 
Zeno's paradoxes 
I. Dichotomy. 
A runner has to run a given length. Before running the whole length, he must have run half 
of it. But, before completing the second half, he must have run half of that half, and so on. The 
division never terminates, as the whole stretch is composed of infinitely many successive 
pieces. Therefore the runner cannot complete the task, because he cannot finish traversing 
infinitely many substretches in succession. 
2. A chilies 
Achilles has to catch up with the tortoise, but he will fail to do so, because as he makes his 
first step, the tortoise also makes a step, and so on, so Achilles has to traverse infinitely many 
successive stretches. 
3. Arrow 
A flying arrow is, in fact, at rest. At any indivisible instant of its flight, the arrow occupies 
as much space as when it is at rest. Therefore, it is always at rest. 
Bergson's response to the above paradoxes is best presented in his own words 
It is to this confusion between motion and the space traversed that the paradoxes of the 
Eleatics are due; for the interval which separates two points is infinitely divisible, and if 
motion consisted of parts like those of the interval itself, the interval would never be crossed. 
But the truth is that each of Achilles' steps is a simple indivisible act, and that, after a given 
number of these acts, Achilles will have passed the tortoise. The mistake of the Eleatics arises 
from their identification of this series of acts, each of which is of a definite kind and 
indivisible, with the homogeneous space which underlies them. As this space can be divided 
and put together again according to any law whatever, they think they are justified in 
reconstructing Achilles' whole movement, not with Achilles' kind of step, but with the 
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tortoise's kind: in place of Achilles pursuing the tortoise they really put two tortoises, 
regulated by each other, two tortoises which agree to make the same kind of steps or 
simultaneous acts, so as never to catch one another. Why does Achilles outstrip the tortoise? 
Because each of Achilles' steps and each of the tortoise's steps are indivisible acts in so far as 
they are movements, and are different magnitudes in so far as they are space: so that addition 
will soon give a greater length for the space traversed by Achilles than is obtained by adding 
together the space traversed by the tortoise and the handicap with which it started. This is 
what Zeno leaves out of account when he reconstructs the movements of Achilles according to 
the same law as the movement of the tortoise, forgetting that space alone can be divided and 
put together again in any way we like, and thus confusing space with motion. (TFW, pp. 1  12 - 
114) 
Bergson's solution demonstrates that duration does not only refer to perception of movement, as this 
would only mean an example of a psychological state. Such an assumption, however, would be 
possible and even inevitable, following from Bergson's pendulum example. In connection with this, 
Bergson stresses the point that "duration properly so-called cannot be measured" (TFW, p.107), and 
when we think that we measure duration whilst observing oscillations of the pendulum, we, in fact, 
measure simultaneities. "Outside of me, in space, there is never more than a single position of the hand 
and the pendulum, for nothing is left of the past positions." (TFW, p.108) 
At this stage it may seem indeed that the notion of duration is solely applied to the self's perception 
of movement, and that outside the self there is no duration, which means no movement or time. This is 
the impression that the reader would get reading the following extract in particular: 
Within myself a process of organization or interpretation of conscious states is going on, 
which constitutes true duration. It is because I endure in this way that I picture to myself what 
I call the past oscillations of the pendulum at the same time as I perceive the present 
oscillations. Now, let us withdraw for a moment the ego which thinks these so-called 
successive oscillations: there will never be more that a single oscillation, and indeed only a 
single position of the pendulum, and hence no duration. Withdraw, on the other hand, the 
pendulum and its oscillations; there will no longer be anything but the heterogeneous duration 
of the ego, without moments external to one another, without relation to number. Thus, within 
our ego, there is succession without mutual externality; outside the ego, in pure space, mutual 
externality without succession: mutual externality, since the present oscillation is radically 
distinct from the previous oscillation, which no longer exists; but no succession, since 
succession exists solely for a conscious spectator who keeps the past in mind and sets the two 
oscillations or their symbols side by side in an auxiliary space. (TFW, pp.108 - 109) 
This is superseded by Bergson's treatment of the paradoxes, when he claims that the Eleatics' 
mistake was based on the misinterpretation of movement. Instead of treating an occurrence of 
movement as indivisible duration, they confused it with the space traversed and divided that space. 
That is why they came to a conclusion that, logically, Achilles could not catch up with the tortoise 
because if he takes a step, the tortoise also takes a step, and so on.' 3 
' Our view is that Bergson considers all types of movement as essentially the same. We are inclined to 
side with Mullarkey who, aiming to unite the ideas of consciousness, motion and time talks of 
"subjectivisation of movement or time" (John Mullarkey, "Introduction: La Philosophie Nouvelle, or 
PTI 
This apparent contradiction between Bergson's own ideas is significant in the way that it, in fact, 
reveals the development of the idea of duration, which continues throughout all three of the major 
Bergson texts. As the notion of duration acquires more and more new meanings, comprising ideas of 
psychic states, time, and movement, we begin to realise that the idea of consciousness and of the self 
will be connected to these terms as well. 
Having laid the foundations for merging time, movement and consciousness, Bergson makes the 
following claim: "Pure duration is the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when 
our ego lets itself /ive, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states." (TFW, 
p.100) In this definition Bergson comes very close to identifjing pure duration with the self, as pure 
duration, pure time uncontaminated with spatial features, is presented as a mode of being for the self in 
its non-reflective state of simply "letting itself live". This involves (a) avoiding being entirely 
absorbed in the subject matter, "the passing sensation or idea" (TrW, p. 1  00) and (b) not forgetting the 
self's former states which should not be set alongside its actual state but merged with it. This way both 
the past and the present states would form an organic whole similar to a recollection of a tune where 
notes merge together, producing the heterogeneous unity of melody, and retaining their own 
individuality at the same time. 
According to Bergson, an adequate perception of pure duration is something like this: "We can thus 
conceive of succession without distinction, and think of it as a mutual penetration, an interconnection 
and organization of elements, each one of which represents the whole, and cannot be distinguished or 
isolated from it except by abstract thought." (TFW, p.101) We would be able to achieve this if we were 
"a being who was ever the same and ever changing, and who had no idea of space." (TEW, p.10 I) 
But we tend to spatialise everything, and the above perception of pure duration which Bergson 
claims to be adequate is contrasted with what he believes to be a false representation of it: "We set our 
states of consciousness side by side in such a way as to perceive them simultaneously, no longer in one 
another, but alongside one another; in a word, we project time into space, we express duration in terms 
of extensity, and succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or a chain, the parts of which 
touch without penetrating one another." (TrW, p.101) 
Change in Philosophy" in Mullarkey (ed.) (2000), p.7.)  For an altemative approach to Bergson, where 
the intemal psychological movement and the extemal movement in space are distinguished and 
analysed separately, see Angéle Marietti, Les Formes dii Mouvement che: Bergson, Paris, Les Cahiers 
du Nouvel Humanisme, 1953. 
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The idea of order in succession is also regarded by Bergson as a false representation of a temporal 
sequence, because by arranging elements in some order we necessarily imagine them as exisiting 
simultaneously and thus spatialise the temporal. With the idea of order removed from the temporal 
domain, the nature of pure duration receives further clarification: "In a word, pure duration might well 
be nothing but a succession of qualitative changes, which melt into and permeate one another, without 
precise outlines, without any tendency to extemalise themselves in relation to one another, without any 
affiliation with number: it would be pure heterogeneity." (TFW, p.104) 
3. Space: what duration is not 
Space can be considered both as extensity of individual things and as their common medium. Time 
should only be considered as duration of individual entities but not as a medium. When time is treated 
as a medium, it is homogenised and thus spatialised. 
In Bergson's philosophy, heterogeneous duration is contrasted with space which, on the contrary, is 
"an empty homogeneous medium." (TFW, p.95) A more detailed definition is this: "Space is what 
enables us to distinguish a number of identical and simultaneous sensations from one another; it is thus 
a principle of differentiation other than that of qualitative differentiation, and consequently it is a 
reality with no quality." (TrW, p.95) 
Bergson is persistent in his effort to expose and counteract our habitual mistake of treating time in 
spatial terms. "It is generally agreed to regard time as an unbounded medium, different from space but 
homogeneous like the latter: the homogeneous is thus supposed to take two forms, according as its 
contents co-exist or follow one another. It is true that, when we make time a homogeneous medium in 
which conscious states unfold themselves, we take it to be given all at once, which amounts to saying 
that we abstract it from duration. This simple consideration ought to warn us that we are thus 
unwittingly falling back upon space, and really giving up time." (TrW, p. 98) 
So, whereas space, the medium uniting all beings, exists as a homogeneous medium without quality, 
time exists as a duration of beings taken as processes. Bergson observes that a common view on time 
and space is that they are both homogeneous media: in the first one, objects succeed one another and in 
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the second, objects exist simultaneously. Also, we commonly believe that objects that exist in time and 
space are not outside time and space, but contain time and space within themselves. Bergson 
distinguishes between time and space as supposed media and time and space occupied and appropriated 
by objects: the latter are modified space and time, extensity and duration, part of the things' makeup. 
They appear as much a quality as, say, colour or weight. But whereas space can appear as both 
medium and extensity of individual objects, time can only be duration of concrete instances of motion 
and consciousness, and should not be considered as a medium, because this would bring about its 
inevitable spatialization. " 
4. Duration as consciousness 
Conscious ljfe can be perceived as duration only through introspection and in the absence of external 
social factors which prompt us to individuate and spatialise our conscious states for the sake of making 
them communicable. 
Duration appears to be the key term defining conscious phenomena and consciousness per se, but it 
also refers to time and motion, and we need to find out how time, motion and consciousness participate 
in each other's existence. Another idea that is added to that of duration in this respect is that of 
incompleteness: "[l]t is of the very essence of duration and motion, as they appear to our 
consciousness, to be something that is unceasingly being done." (TrW, p.1 19)15 
14 
 Naturally, Bergson's treatment of space attracted a lot of criticism. Russell refuses to take Bergson's 
theory of time and space seriously: "His doctrine of space is required for his condemnation of the 
intellect, and if he fails in his condemnation of intellect, the intellect will succeed in its condemnation 
of him, for between the two it is war to the knife." (Russell, 1914, pp: 12— 13) 
H. Wildon Can, by and large sympathetic to Bergson, nevertheless disapprovingly comments: "[1]n 
this theory the idea of the reality of time excludes the possibility of the reality of space". (Can (1908-
1909, p.48.) Merleau-Ponty points out that to condemn spatialization is unnecessary and insufficient 
for the comprehension of time. (Merleau-Ponty, p.4 15) 
For a very critical and thorough discussion of time and space in Bergson see S. Alexander Space, Time 
and Deity: The G jiford Lectures at Glasgow 1916— 1918, Vol. 1, Macmillan, London, 1966 
It will become obvious in later chapters that the relationship between time and space in Bergson is 
more complex than simply a mutual exclusion. Bergson's refusal to accept time as a medium gives rise 
to a problem of temporal coexistence (see Chapter 12). 
15 H. Wildon Can criticises Bergson for attributing various meanings to the concept of duration, but we 
insist that this is due to the fact that this notion develops gaining new layers of meaning. (Can (1908-
1909), p.45) 
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The primary experiencing of the self in its fundamental and most true form occurs in dreams, or in 
inattentive perception of sounds. In other words, at a pre-reflective stage, when the self is relaxed and 
mostly detached from the external world, and is able to just be itself without co-odinating its fleeting 
elements with points in the external world. But as soon as we "wake up", we align the events of our 
inner life with the external phenomena, breaking duration into segments representing it in the same 
way as the external elements. In this way we arrive at our habitual understanding of the self and its 
states as materialized and set out in space. Bergson mentions that there is a gradual passage between 
the public, spatialised self, and pure duration: the deeper into the self we go, the more vague and fluid 
states of consciousness are. There are, however, ideas which are not incorporated in the fluidity of our 
self; ideas that are not generated by the self but brought in from outside our self, offered to us by other 
people, and which remain within us without being assimilated by us. These are, for instance, commonly 
held beliefs imposed on us by society as against those bom within our own soul. (TFW, p. 135) 
Bergson summarises his ideas of the self, developed up to this pOint, in the following terms. We can 
in principle perceive our conscious life either refracting it through space or directly. If we perceive it 
directly then we access our own deep-seated conscious states which ought to be understood in terms of 
quality and not quantity. This means that, although they are qualitatively different, we cannot tell 
whether this is one state or several, and we cannot individuate them without changing something in 
their nature. These deep-seated conscious states constitute a duration whose elements form a non-
numerical multiplicity and cannot be distinguished from one another. However, this view of one's self 
is only possible in a hypothetical individual who, immersed in his or her own being, would live a 
socially isolated life, where society and language would not force him or her to interpret his or her 
conscious flow as a series of individualised phenomena. (TFW, pp. 137-138) However, we inevitably 
spatialise duratipn under normal circumstances, as "the intuition of a homogeneous space is ... a step 
towards social life." (TFW, p.138) Bringing our conscious states outwards, we separate them from one 
another and express them in words - a precondition for communication. 
Thus, as Capek observed, whereas philosophers were traditionally concerned with subjectivity 
affecting the account of objective data, Bergson raises the converse issue, namely that of our awareness 
of introspective data being affected by elements borrowed from sensory experience.' 6 Below we shall 
16 
 apek, p.  84 
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summarise the characteristics of the true self and of its symbolic representation as they appear in Time 
and Free Will. 
I. The self per se is true duration with psychic states melting in one another ("melting" here is 
the Bergsonian term, which means that elements permeate one another but do not become 
slurred), whereas the represented self appears as a collection of separate psychic states. 
2. The self is a qualitative multiplicity, pure quality, although it appears as a discrete multiplicity 
and is represented as quantity. 
3. The elements of the self are processes, but they are treated as solidified objects, extemal to 
each other. 
4. The elements of the self are never identical, and any new element changes the nature of the 
whole, by virtue of every new element happening at a different time. However, our common 
sense (which Bergson disagrees with) regards the elements of the self as identical units: it is 
supposed that one can experience one and the same sensation more than once. 
5. In its fundamental form the self is locked within itself and is incommunicable, because any 
attempt to externalise psychic events involves their juxtaposition and spatialization. This also 
means that the spatialization of the self and solidification of its elements aids social life 
because the clarity that the process of externalisation entails helps communication. 
6. As for its mode of existence, duration in its pure form can only exist in isolation from other 
selves, and its spatialised representation is essential for social existence, which is 
communication with other selves. 
5. Free will as growth of duration 
Acts of will are at least one way in which the content of the dynamic selfgrows. Freedom of the will 
does not consist in the independence from preceding causes but in the unpredictability and originality 
of the willed act. 
The primary characteristic of the self as it is depicted in the first two chapters of Time and Free Will 
is that the self in its essence is dynamic. The Bergsonian self does not endure through time preserving 
some stable core of its identity - it is time in the way that it captures inner processes as they are and 
incorporates them into itself Therefore it is understandable why Bergson is concerned with the 
31 
problem of free will in the final chapter, for the relation of the self to its immediate actions is essential 
for the dynamic side of the self, for its growth. Stating in the previous two chapters that the self is 
dynamic, in the final chapter Bergson tries to ascertain how the self is dynamic. Are its actions 
predetermined by circumstances or are they free?' 7 
In analysing free wilt, Bergson is not concemed with ethical issues: in Time and Free Will, will is 
solely tied with the problem of the ontology of selthood.' 8 Havhig demonstrated that the mode of 
existence for the self is growth consisting in the addition of new psychic states, Bergson is 
investigating how the growth occurs. Not being interested in the will's externalisation as events in the 
world, as willed action, Bergson is concerned with the psychological state that lies behind the willed 
action - the making of a decision. The psychic state of willing, we observe, is but one of a multitude of 
psychic states that the self consists of, but willing, if it is indeed, free willing, would represent the 
element of growing by itself, as against states such as hunger or sadness caused and controlled by 
external influences. The question Bergson is faced with is whether our acts of will also belong to the 
category of externally conditioned states, or whether they are really free and constitute the self's 
growth from within. 
It needs to be emphasized that Bergson's understanding of the freedom of the will is different from 
the conventional approach: opposing freedom to non-freedom, he associates freedom not with breaking 
causal links with preceding phenomena but with unpredictability resulting from radical novelty of 
genuinely free decisions. Thus whereas non-freedom means for him predictability which is not unlike a 
rehearsal of the old (rather than determinism), freedom is equated with indeterminacy and a promise of 
original and new reality. 	 - 
As for causal links that bring an act of freedom to life, Bergson connects acts of freedom with the 
emanation of the entire self, in an act of ultimate self-expression, opposing free volitions to predictable 
' Herman believes that, according to Bergson, "to become oneself in duration is to be free so that 
duration and freedom are one and the same thing." (Herman, p.  6) We find that although free sprouting 
is the ideal state for duration, it is not the only way in which it exists and grows: duration can continue 
in other conscious states, for example, in expectation and contemplation. 
"
8 We agree with Herman when he says that Bergson's freedom "does not go beyond the self; it neither 
reaches for the world not for values". (Herman, p.  7) But this is true only in respect of Time and Free 
Will. In The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, Bergson applies his ontological findings to the 
realm of ethics, where ultimately free acts are portrayed as deeds of extraordinary people such as 
saints. Also, for the ethical implications of Bergson's ideas see lJna Bernard Sait, The Ethical 
implications of Bergson c Philosophy, Kessinger Publishing, 2005. 
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automatic actions which are prescribed by the expectations of social demand and are produced 
mechanically. 19 
The conventional view, as it is understood and criticised by Bergson, and Bergson's own view, are 
illustrated by Diagram 2 copied from Time and Free Will, p. 176. 
	 - 
Diagram 2. Emergence of volition. 
(M 
0 
X 	 Y 
Diagram 2 presents a situation whereby we start an action at the point M and face two possible 
outcomes, X and Y. At the stage MO we hesitate between directions X and Y, and this very hesitation 
between two tendencies contributes to the development of the self at the stage MO, "until the free 
action drops from it like an over-ripe fruit." (TFW, p. 176) However, our common sense which 
mistakenly understands reality in mechanical terms, as Bergson says, strives to define voluntary 
activity using clear-cut distinctions. Our mistaken view of this situation is that our consciousness has 
traversed the series MO, reached the point 0 and now needs to choose between directions OX and OY 
which are equally available. In reality, Bergson says, there is hesitation between two tendencies, and 
neither path is made at the point 0. When the choice is made, only one path, say, OX, will thus be 
created, but our mind will still see the other path as well as an option that we did not choose. Bergson 
qualifies this as solidification of what is in reality continuous development. (TFW, pp.176 - 177) 
The difference between the genuine freedom and its spatialised, mechanical image can be 
summarised in the following terms. 
19 Bergson's interpretation of the free act as unpredictable and original makes Bachelard say that it is 
accidental and lacks intellectual causality. (Bachelard, p.  28) In regard to the first remark we must point 
out that on the contrary, the free act appears to be the conclusion of the existence of a concrete self at 
the time, uncontaminated by outer circumstances, and in regard to the second remark, that the causal 
links involved supersede intellectual causality: the driving forces behind the free act include all our 
unconscious past. 
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I. Regarding the path that the self takes whilst making a decision, in genuine voluntary activity 
the self creates its own path - there is no path, or paths existing beforehand. According to the 
spatialised view, however, the self follows one of the available paths. 
2. Regarding the causal link that connects existing conditions and the act of will, Bergson's view 
accommodates an idea of continuity of the past and present phases of the self: the self is not 
independent from the action it is about to take. The decision to take this action and even the 
predisposition to make this decision contributes to the nature of the self But the traditional 
view of the free wilt, according to Bergson, is that the self, distanced from the situation, 
decides which option to take. 
3. Considering the issue of choice involved in free decisions, Bergson says that there is no 
neutral activity prior to the moment of making a particular decision - all of the previous life of 
the self would have contributed towards that decision. He disagrees with the spatialised view, 
according to which before the self has made the decision, its activity is neutral, so that the 
decision can be one or the other, before it is made. 
Asserting the idea of unpredictability in free decisions, Bergson argues against the very possibility 
of asking whether it would be possible to predict some future decision, provided we know everything 
about the person who will make that decision. To have the perfect knowledge of the mental condition 
of another person would mean knowing, at the deepest level, all of his or her psychic experiences, and 
also following them at a given moment as any new experiences alter our self by adding new elements 
to it. Ultimately, having complete knowledge of somebody would mean being that somebody as it 
would necessarily involve experiencing all his or her experiences. Thus Bergson concludes that it 
would be absurd to even ask such a question. 
6. Automatic acts 
Genuinely free acts are rare, and often duration grows in automatic acts which conform to social rules 
and expectations. Whereas free acts, as active self-expression of the individual, put the self at risk of 
social ostracism, passive automatic acts aid social integration. Normally duration oscillates between 
the two extremes. 
34 
Bergson's account of free acts demonstrates a way in which duration grows, or exists, for "to exist" 
and "to grow" are synonymous for duration. Voluntary acts are primarily growth from within, where 
the new act is a continuation of all the experiences and memories of all previous acts. 
However, our decisions do not always spring solely from our personality. This happens very rarely, 
and only in critical situations, Bergson says. Most of our actions are a response to some trivial 
circumstances and do not come from the depth of our being. In our usual occupations, we perform 
automatic actions resembling reflex acts, engaging the surface of our ego rather than its core. 2° 
But in this case too, we have to admit that duration exists and grows, being conscious all the time 
and accumulating new experiences. There is a difference between the two modes of existence and 
growth, however. Whereas the free act originates solely from the self and in accordance with its inner 
nature as its very continuation, the automatic act is a response to trivial circumstances and is performed 
by the superficial strata of the ego and does not touch its depth. In a free act, the growth of duration can 
be understood as a leap outwards, an active externalisation of the self in the act. In automatic actions, 
the growth ofthe self, as we can see it, is a passive accumulation of sensory data and information about 
one's own acts. In terms of relations with the world, in free actions, the self confronts the established 
order whereas in automatic actions, the self maintains the established order. As a result, the free self is 
at risk of being ostracised as its unique and unpredictable actions may threaten social rules, whereas the 
self that conforms to the rules secures the support of others. In reality, however, duration would 
oscillate between these extreme patterns of existence and growth. 
20 Deleuze points at the possibility of the transformation of automatic acts into voluntary acts in 
Bergson (see Gilles Deleuze, "Bergson's Conception of Difference" in Mullarkey (ed.) (2000), p.60), 
but our understanding of this dichotomy is that the two types of psychic activity are mutually exclusive, 
and that a voluntary act can emerge only through the refutation of automatic acts. 
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Chapter 3. Body, Soul and the World in Matter and Memory 
I. Duration as being 
Material world is a moving continuity but, interacting with it, we mentally break it up into manageable 
stable units. Parts of objective reality are not things but processes defined by their rhythms. The 
rhythm of conscious existence is very intense, and the rhythm of matter is very relaxed 
Next Bergson presents duration as being in general, with the distinctive nature of concrete 
phenomena defined by the specific rhythm of their temporal existence, as a process, and where rhythm 
could be understood as a rate at which events unroll. The relation between time, consciousness and 
movement becomes clearer: everything is duration and exists in motion; consciousness is a case of 
being, understood as duration; what makes consciousness different from other types of being is its 
specific, very intense rhythm. 
In Time and Free Will Bergson argued that we misunderstand and immobilize psychological events 
and movement, which are flowing and indivisible in reality. In Matter and Memory, he asserts that this 
misunderstanding concerns physical reality as well, because everything real is, in fact, in the state of 
becoming and, consequently, in the state of motion, whereas we always regard the reality as a 
compilation of solid things. (MM, p.  191) 
Bergson refuses to regard motion as relative, as merely a change of place. Real movement is 
absolute, he maintains, because "it emanates from a force". (MM, p. 195) One could even interpret 
Bergson's idea of real movement as an action close to the creation of something new, or as a process 
close to the act of willing, which could indicate a certain link with consciousness. "I am assured of the 
reality of the movement when I produce it, after having willed to produce it, and my muscular sense 
brings me the consciousness of it. That is to say, I grasp the reality of movement when it appears to me, 
within me, as a change of state or a quality." (MM, pp. 195- 196) l3ergson compares the perception of 
movement with the perception of changes in the qualities of things such as the change from sound to 
silence, from light to darkness, from one colour to another colour. 
He asserts that the material world exists as "a moving continuity", " in which everythiiig changes and 
yet remains." (MM, p.  197) According to him, this is evident from the fact that in our field of vision we 
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detect no intervals void of coloured objects. "And, since solids are necessarily in contact with each 
other, our touch must follow the surface or the edges of objects without ever encountering a true 
interruption." (MM, p. 197) Thus as something necessarily changes in this totality of the real, we must 
admit that the whole is constantly changing. 
However, we follow "the irresistible tendency to set up a material universe that is discontinuous, 
composed of bodies which have clearly defined outlines and change their place, that is, their relation 
with each other." (MM, p. 197) The reason why we do that is that "besides consciousness and science, 
there is life," and consciousness, which manifests itself in acts, needs to distinguish a "material zone" 
that corresponds to its living body. (MM, p. 198) By analogy with one's own body, others are 
distinguished as well and as the living being requires nutrition, it is forced to distinguish objects with 
definite outlines that can serve as food. This subdivision of the real "answers much less to immediate 
intuition than to the ftndamental needs of life", Bergson observes (MM, p. 198), as though in this kind 
of division we "prolong the vital movement, but ... tum our back upon true knowledge." (MM, p. 199) 
Bergson claims that the apparent solidity of matter is due solely to the work of our mind, because 
"the preservation of life no doubt requires that we should distinguish, in our daily experience, between 
passive things and actions effected by these things in space." (MM, p. 200) But, the closer science 
moves to the ultimate elements of matter, Bergson observes, the farther it moves away from the idea of 
solidity and discontinuity. Thus he is inclined to regard objective matter as ultimately consisting of the 
vortices of atoms, energy fields - in a word, as, primarily, motion. 
We are getting a picture of the world where everything is defined by motion - in fact, everything is 
motion - and where differences between various fragments of reality amount to the differences of rates 
at which processes, comprising the given durations, unroll. These rates, faster or slower ones, are 
defined by the speed at which vibrations, comprising the movements of duration, take place. This 
intensity of movement of each being defines its relations with other beings: 
May we not conceive, for instance, that the irreducibility of two perceived colors is due 
mainly to the narrow duration into which are contracted the billions of vibrations which they 
execute in one of our moments? If we could stretch out this duration, that is to say, live at a 
slower rhythm, should we not, as the rhythm slowed down, see these colors pale and lengthen 
into successive impressions, still colored, no doubt, but nearer and nearer to coincidence with 
pure vibrations? In cases where the rhythm of the movement is slow enough to tally with the 
habits of our consciousness - as in the case of the deep notes of the musical scale, for instance 
- do we not feel that the quality perceived analyses itself into repeated and successive 
vibrations, bound together by an inner continuity? (MM, p. 203) 
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A particular quality, then, is determined by the rhythm of vibrations that constitute the flow of 
duration of the given object (here Bergson means vibrations of the ultimately small particles of the 
body). Thus we may conclude that if duration is movement, it is not a uniform process but one which 
comprises repetitive mini-processes whose amplitude, constant each time, defines the outer view of the 
object perceived for the perceiving mind which lives its life in line with its own rhythm of duration. We 
can understand that, according to Bergson, all objects should be in themselves identical to each other at 
the level of a single vibration; it is the number of vibrations per unit of time that makes things look 
different, of whose objectivity Bergson says: "Motionless on the surface, in its very depth it [matterJ 
lives and vibrates." (MM, p. 204) 21 
As for human consciousness, Bergson describes it here as "a duration with its own determined 
rhythm, a duration very different from the time of the physicist, which can store up, in a given interval, 
as great a number of phenomena as we please." (MM, p.205) Bergson exemplifies it by comparing the 
perception of red light, which lasts one second, and 400 billion physical vibrations of waves that 
constitute red light and which correspond to one second of psychological perception: it would take at 
least 25,000 years if these vibrations were to be perceived separately, separated by 0.002 seconds, 
necessary to distinguish them. (MM, pp.  205 —206) 
Bergson maintains that the independent existence of a red light and our perception of it constitute 
different durations with different rhythms, with consciousness contracting the enormous number of 
physical vibrations into one moment of conscious life. We can point out, though, that whatever inner 
differences there are in the intensity of their rhythms, both our perception of the red light and the red 
light emitting 400 billion successive vibrations, happen simultaneously and both last the same length of 
z Commentators are baffled by Bergson's apparent attempts to eliminate substance for motion. See, for 
example, Russell (1914), pp.  18— 19; Lacey, p.  101; Marietti, p.31; Carr(1908 —1909), p.45.  In The 
Creaiive Mind however Bergson explains that that he does not deny substance but analyses it in terms 
of movement, referring to "things in the making" rather than "things made" (CM, p.  188). He also 
remarks: "Let me insist 1 am ... in no way setting aside substance. On the contrary, I affirm the 
persistence of existences." (CM (hardback), p.305) 
We are inclined to interpret Bergson's earlier apparent anti-substantialism as a claim that substance 
exists but is never at rest and always changing. Density and motion thus constitute one and the same 
reality of matter, and the universal movement of movements is not a void, but a process where the 
element of volume and density and the element of motion are both necessary predicates of material 
reality, and neither one nor the other can be abstracted from it without destroying the integrity of 
matter. Substance cannot be imagined still, a-temporal and motionless, nor can motion be imagined 
empty of volume. Both components are inseparable from each other. For more on this point see 
Chapter 7, Section 2. 
time equal to one second. So the temporal difference must lie in the speed at which the phenomena 
unroll in our consciousness and outside it, and not in the actual length of the processes involved. 
Bergson continues: "In reality there is no one rhythm of duration; it is possible to imagine many 
different rhythms which, slower or faster, measure the degree of tension or relaxation of different kinds 
of consciousness and thereby fix their respective places in the scale of being." (MM, p.207) Within this 
context, Bergson says about perception that "to perceive consists in condensing enormous periods of an 
infinitely diluted existence into a few more differentiated moments of an intenser life, and in thus 
summing up a very long history. To perceive means to immobilize." (MM, p. 208) 
Thus the radical difference between mind and matter seems to amount to the difference in intensity 
and concentration of the movement involved in their makeup: the mind, able to contract in what is our 
present the multitude of events and conceive them in their connection with each other, is able to join 
them in a meaningful unity. "My perception ... contracts into a single moment of my duration that 
which, taken in itself, spreads over an incalculable number of moments." (MM, p.208) 
But, unperceived, matter exists as it is, relaxed, and "sensible qualities, without vanishing, are 
spread and diluted in an incomparably more divided duration." (MM, p. 208) And here we arrive at 
Bergson's ultimate definition of matter per se: "Matter resolves itself into numberless vibrations" 
(AIM, p.208), where the particles that vibrate are so small that the solidity of the object apparent at a 
macro-level, disappears when we start talking of atoms and electrons. 
2. Bond of mind and matter in perception 
Physical world as images shared by subjects and objects in perception. Perception does not supply 
disinterested knowledge but facilitates interactions with the world in perception, the subject is not 
opposed to the object but both are involved in the same current of being. 
By declaring everything to be duration, Bergson lays grounds for the unity of matter and mind as 
versions, or parts, of one and the same being, and by introducing diverse rhythms, he tries to account 
for the difference between them. His next task is to investigate how they come together in human 
existence. As we have seen from Bergson's example of perceiving a colour, when fragments of being 
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with different rhythms affect each other, they translate the rhythm of another being into their own. 
According to Bergson, in perception we impose our own, very intense, rhythm of duration onto the 
reality which exists and moves at a different, much more diluted and relaxed rate so that what appears 
to our eye to be a simple and brief event is, in itself, a multitude of events. If we could free ourselves 
from the organizing power of our consciousness, we would be able to distinguish all of the micro-
events that constitute what seems to us to be a single one. 
Material objects do not merely exist in themselves, undetectable and imperceptible, but can be 
heard, felt, seen and smelt. Bergson finds this a decisive feature of physical bodies and defines matter 
as "an aggregate of images." (MM, p. 9) As Bergson says, "by "image" we mean a certain existence 
which is more than that which the idealist calls a representation, 22 but less than that which the realist 
calls a thing - an existence placed halfway between the "thing and the "representation" ... [T]he object 
exists in itself, and, on the other hand, the object is, in itself, pictorial, as we perceive it: image it is, but 
a self-existing image." (MM, pp.  9 - 10) 
The concept of image is complicated. However, it seems that by introducing this term Bergson tries 
to dissolve the subject-object ontology. Placing an image between a representation and a thing, 
Bergson supplies a term, which explains the continuity, of the object and the subject. Whereas 
representation belongs exclusively to the subject as a private mental process, and a thing is a fragment 
of physical reality with no reference to the subject, an image is a feature that belongs to both: the 
perceivable object is an image for the subject, and the subject accesses and appropriates this image. 
An image belongs to the mind because it is what we find in ourselves when we see, hear or touch: 
pictures, sounds and sensations. But it also belongs to the object inasmuch as the latter appears at the 
superficial level as a picture, sound and touch. If our perception is to be compared with a photograph of 
things, then we must realise that this photograph "is already taken, already developed in the very heart 
of things." (MM, p. 38)23 
22 The translators of Matter and Memory Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer point out that 
representation ("representation") which is, in French, very often used to mean "perception", is used 
throughout the book as meaning a mental picture. (MM, p.  251) 
23 A more detailed exposition and interpretation of images in Bergson, close to our position, can be 
found in F. C. T. Moore, pp.23  —32. For a clearer understanding of the issue, it may be useful to 
compare and contrast Bergson's theory with alternative accounts of images and imagination. Whereas 
for Bergson, imagery is the result of the filtering of reality, Crowther's analysis, for example, 
emphasises the creative aspect of imagination and the ability of images to be detached from the 
immediacy of their origin. (Paul Crowther, "Imagination and Objective Knowledge" in his Philosophy 
after Postmodernism: Civilized Values and the Scope of Knowledge, Routledge, 2003, pp.  66 - 77, 
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In the light of Bergson's claim that everything exists as movement, perception too must be 
understood as a process. In particular, Bergson refuses to treat perception as a faculty of acquiring 
knowledge for the sake of knowledge (MM, p.28). Instead, he invites us to regard perception as a phase 
of the interaction between the subject and the object, whereby perception informs the subject of the 
range of one's possible actions connected with the object. "We note ... that a strict law connects the 
amount of conscious perception with the intensity of action at the disposal of the living being." (MM, p. 
3 I) Presumably, Bergson has in mind that organisms' fields of perception vary, and this coincides with 
the limitations of their acting power, whereby bodies receive as much information as they can utilise. 
The diversity of knowledge available to the individual is correlative with the range of his or her choice 
of action. Sight and hearing allow us to perceive objects found at a distance which, according to 
Bergson, can serve as a measure of indetermination that surrounds the activity of a living being as it 
indicates the range of objects that the living being can contact deliberately. 
Given the utilitarian character of perception, we must also accept that the object is perceived 
according to our potential interest in it. In Bergson's terms, this amounts to the fitting of the perceived 
object into the stream of continuous movement which would involve both the object and the subject. 
However, the adaptation of the object for perception dOes not involve its modification or the addition of 
any new elements but is a selection of the existing ones. "There is for images merely a difference in 
degree, and not of kind, between being and being consciously perceived." (MM, p.  37) 
The object as it is perceived is less than the object itself because "being bound up with all other 
images, it [the object] is continued in those which follow it, just as it prolonged those which precede 
it." (MM, pp. 35 - 36) In other words, what we perceive is the superficial image taken out of the context 
of the relations it has with other objects. So, "a present image" is the real object taken in the totality of 
its existence and "a represented image" is an extraction of what is relevant to our potential action. 24 
especially pp.73— 75) 1-lusserl opposes imagination and perception (Husserl (1964), p.54), and J. J. C. 
Smart refuses to believe that images exist at all (J. J. C. Smart, "Mind and Brain" in Richard Warner 
and Tadeusz Szubka (ed.), The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate, Blackwell, 1997, 
p.20). For an explanation of various usages of the term "imagination" see Ryle, pp.245-79. 
24 The Bergsonian version of perception generated the following criticism. Russell accuses Bergson of 
confusing the mental act of knowing with the material thing which is known and blurring the 
distinction between mind and matter. (Russell (1914), p.21) By saying that, Russell is plainly ignoring 
the key Bergsonian idea that, albeit different in nature, both mind and matter are processes and that 
perception is the area of their fusion. Alexander, on the other hand, accepts this: "In pure perception 
contact between subject and object is absolute to the extent of transcending spatial and temporal 
relations wholly." (1. W. Alexander, p.  38) Moore questions what exactly we do select in perception 
and Lacey struggles to individuate images in Bergson: if two people can perceive the same wind as 
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Bergson says, for a present image to become a represented image, "it would be necessary, not to 
throw more light on the object, but, on the contrary, to obscure some of its aspects, to diminish it by the 
greater part of itself, so that the remainder, instead of being encased in its surroundings as a thing, 
should detach itself from them as a picture." (MM, p. 36) To reinforce this view, Bergson makes the 
following explicit declaration. "We are too much inclined to regard the living body as a world within a 
world, the nervous system as a separate being, of which the function is, first, to elaborate perceptions, 
and, then, to create movements. The truth is that my nervous system, interposed between the objects 
which affect my body and those which I can influence, is a mere conductor, transmitting, sending back 
or inhibiting movement." (MM, pp. 44 - 45) 
Bergson shows that we learn about our self through perceptions (the images that we know from 
without) which become affections (the images that are delivered from within one's body). (MM, p. 17) 
Our body which we do not identify with our self and our personality, is, nevertheless, a means by 
which we gain evidence about our own being. Through our body, so to speak, we learn about our self 
from outside, and this serves us as the first step towards our apprehension of our inner nature. 
Perception necessarily becomes affection since no influence from outside_can reach our mind except 
via our body. Having analysed disturbances we receive from light and sound, Bergson remarks: "[T]he 
sensations here spoken of are not images perceived by us outside our body, but rather affections 
localized within the body." (MM, p. 52) Bergson affirms: " [TJ here is no perception without 
affection", characterising affection as "the impurity with which perception is alloyed." (MM, p. 58) 
In connection with this he offers his version of the transitory connection from matter to mind 
stating: "[W]e pass by insensible degrees from the representative state, which occupies space, to the 
affective state which appears to be unextended." (MM, p. 52) Affective states, we learn, are "vaguely 
both hot or cold, it is puzzling when Bergson says that images exist without being perceived. (Lacey, p. 
90) Lacey's query, leading directly to the issue of primary and secondary qualities, can be easily 
resolved: a concrete image, we understand, is the making of the subject and object, where the subject 
picks up that aspect of the object which is relevant to its needs and senses, and so the wind entails more 
than just one image, and can be perceived as both hot and cold by different subjects: an image is "an 
object in its specific relation to a particular body capable of action."(F. C. T. Moore, p.31) Regarding 
primary and secondary qualities, we agree with Mullarkey's explanation: "The qualities of sounds, 
colours, tastes and smells are objective ... in principle if not in fact, not because they pre-exist their 
actual sensuous state in some virtual form (for that would assume that they are not the product of 
omission), but because perception begins with the object dejure." (Mullarkey (1999), p.  44) 
WO 
localized" and are "intermediate states" between images and ideas, "the former extended and the latter 
unextended." 25 (MM, p. 53) 
Bergson detaches perception and affection as processes different in degree, placing perception 
outside one's body, and affections within it. "Just as external objects are perceived by me where they 
are, in themselves and not in me, so my affective states are experienced where they occur, that is, at a 
given point in my body." (MM, p. 57) 
Thus the continuity of existence is seen by Bergson in the following terms. Physical reality enters 
our mind as images by means of perception and affection, and the existence of the real is continued in 
our mind where physical things are stripped of their physicality but are retained as images. 26 
 The role 
of our mind consists not in confronting reality as a subject but prolonging it in a de-materialized form 
as known and, later, as remembered. 
3. Duration as memory 
Perception, which supplies new content to duration, is necessarily accompanied by memory, which 
comprises the past. Motor memory and recollections. Recognition involving perception and motor 
memory. Memories are not located in the brain, and brain lesions do not destroy them. Inactive as the 
past, memories are actualised in the present. 
As we have observed, the principal role of perception in Bergson is to provide a stimulus for one's 
actions. But the action effected in response is not the only possible action but the action chosen by the 
individual as the most suitable under the given circumstances. The possibility of making a choice 
would require more than just sensory data presented to the mind; the mind must be able to know of 
possible options, which would be based on the previous knowledge that the individual has accumulated 
about the world, as "this choice is likely to be inspired by past experience, and the reaction does not 
take place without an appeal to the memories which analogous situations may have left behind them." 
25 Whereas image is a singularity that corresponds to each individual perception, idea is a 
generalisation and corresponds to a type of a certain image, not to a concrete perception. 
26 Here the image that belongs to both subject and object in perception becomes diluted temporally: its 
materal base and its existence as a mental picture belong to different times. 
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(MM, p. 65) Therefore perception does not exist in its pure form as described above - real perception 
necessarily involves memory: "[W]hen perception, as we understand it, is once admitted, memory must 
arise." (MM, p.43) The role of memory in perception is clearly defined: "We assert, at the outset, that 
if there be memory, that is, the survival of past images, those images must constantly mingle with our 
perception of the present and may even take its place." (MM, pp. 65 —66) 27  Our perception, Bergson 
argues, is always enriched by memories to such an extent that "perception ends up by being merely an 
occasion for remembering." (MM, p. 
Although perception and memory "always interpenetrate each other" (MM p. 67), they are 
qualitatively different processes. Perception corresponds to the actuality of the present whereas 
memory belongs to the domain of the past. In regard to action and movement, perception is active and 
memory is not: "the past is only idea, the present is ideo-motor" (MM, p. 68), and Bergson's definition 
of the past and the present is this: "The past is essentially that which acts no longer", and the present is 
"that which is acting". (MM, pp.  68 - 69) 
Chapter 2 of Matter and Memory is an attempt to reveal how new content, delivered to our 
consciousness via perception, becomes welded onto the previous content via the faculty of memory. 
Bergson's theory of memory comprises three theses. 
(I) The first thesis concerns two forms of memory: "The past survives under two distinct forms: 
first, in motor mechanisms; secondly, in independent recollections." (MM, p.  78) 
Bergson uses the example of leaming a lesson to demonstrate the presence of two distinct forms of 
memory in our daily actions. He distinguishes between (I) remembering the content of a lesson, an 
achievement which has occurred as a result of repeating the lesson several times, and (2) remembering 
each successive instance of repeating the lesson. He termed the first type of memory "motor memory" 
and the second, "pure recollection". The characteristics of the two types of memory are summarised 
below. 
27 To compare Bergson's views with contemporary findings in memory research, see Endel Tulving, 
Fergus Craik (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Memory, Oxford University Press US, 2000. 
28 For a brief overview of ideas relating to the division of memory into primary memory (awareness of 
the present) and secondary memory (recollection of the past), with references to William James, Hebb, 
Shannon and Weaver, Broadbend, Atkinson and Shiffiin, as well as to Braddeley and Hitch working 
memory model, see Andrade, pp.  5— 17. 
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1. The apparent difference between pure recollection and motor memory is that the 
memory of learning a lesson is remembered as an event - it is unique and cannot be 
reproduced. Motor memory, on the other hand, is the ability to recite the lesson by 
heart. 29 
2. Pure recollection is a representation and as such it is grasped intuitively: in pure 
memory, we imagine. Motor memory is like a habit: it requires repetition and effort. 
It is stored in a motor mechanism which is set in motion by an impulse; in motor 
memory, we repeat. 
3. A memory image recalled in pure memory can be remembered instantaneously in its 
entirety or in part. On the other hand, motor memory requires a definite time for all 
movements to unroll as one remembers the content of the lesson. It is an action rather 
than a representation, and as such it is a part of one's present rather than of one's 
past. It can only be realised when it is lived and acted. 
4. Whereas pure recollection represents our past to us, conserving images of the past, 
motor memory acts our past in our present, prolonging the effect of past images into - 
the present. 
5. Recollections occur involuntarily, effortlessly and spontaneously, as against motor 
memories which are acquired voluntarily and with an effort. 
6. Recollections have a fixed date in our personal history; they are unique and cannot be 
repeated, as each new recollection is a different event. Motor memories are taken out 
of their temporal co-ordinates and are impersonal; they are essentially built by 
repetitions. 
7. Bergson's view is that only pure memory deserves to be considered as true, genuine 
memory and that motor memory is a habit interpreted by memory rather that memory 
itself. It is only by mistake that it has been taken as true memory in psychology. 
8. The two types of memory do not function in isolation but constantly interact: pure 
memory records memory images of all events of our life. As every perception is 
29 For a useful summary of the key features of habit memory in Bergson and an illuminating link with 
the Merleau-Pontian study of body in The Phenomenology of Perception see Edward S. Casey, 
"Habitual Body and Memory in Merleau-Ponty" in Man and World, 17: 278 —297 (1984), and a very 
brief but to the point illustration of habit memory can be found in F. C. T. Moore, pp.37— 38. 
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prolonged in a potential action, the movements which accompany pure memory, 
modi& the organism and create in it new dispositions toward action. The disposition 
toward action facilitates the formation of new mechanisms of action which are 
activated in the present and directed to the future. 
The key role of pure memory in relation to motor memory, according to Bergson, is such that the 
latter disciplines the former, ensuring that only useful recollections are brought into the light of 
consciousness. "Of these two memories that we have distinguished, the second, which is active, or 
motor, will, then, constantly inhibit the first, or at least only accept from it that which can throw light 
upon and complete in a useful way the present situation: thus, as we shall see later, could the laws of 
the association of ideas be explained." (MM, p.  85) 
(2) The second thesis concerns recognition in general, and, in connection with this, memory- 
images and movements. 30 
 "The recognition of a present object is effected by movement when 
it proceeds from the object, by representations when it issues from the subject." (MM, p.  78) 
Recognition is described by Bergson as "the concrete process by which we grasp the past in the 
present." (MM, p. 90) It seems as though, Bergson begins, that first there occurs perception. Then we 
search our memory for a similar image which would aid perception and result in recognition. But "in 
most cases recollection emerges only after the perception is recognized", the philosopher observes 
(MM, p.91), because we recognize, at the same time as we perceive, without necessarily having in our 
mind similar images of the past. 
Bergson distinguishes, first of all, "an instantaneous recognition, of which the body is capable by 
itself, without the help of any explicit memory-image. It consists in action and not in representation." 
30 
A more recent discussion of images in memory and nonimage representation for single visual-special 
inputs can be found in W. F. Brewer and J. R. Pani "The structure of Human Memory" in G. H. Bower 
(ed), The Psychology of Learning and Motivation: Advances in Research and Theory, New York, 
Academic Press, 1983, Vol. 17, pp.  I —38. The authors raise the issue of difficulty in creating the 
mental "video recording" of a complex event. For a discussion of repeated events, generic event images 
and generic nonimage representation, see R. C. Schank and R. P. Abelson, Scripts, Plans, Goals and 
Understanding, Hillsdale, NJ, Erlbaum, 1977. 
(MM, pp.92- 93) An example of such recognition, as it appears in Matter and Memory, is an 
automatic action of moving about in a familiar place, as opposed to (say) hesitating at every corner in a 
strange town. 
Now, between these two extremes, the one in which perception has not yet organized the 
definite movements which accompany it and the other in which these accompanying 
movements which are organized to a degree which renders perception useless, there is an 
intermediate state in which the object is perceived, yet provokes movements which are 
connected, continuous and called up by one another. (MM, p. 93) 
Thus we shift from the state where our conscious awareness is at its highest to the state where our 
conscious awareness is superfluous, depending on our familiarity with the surroundings. 
Bergson sees a close colmection between motor reaction and recognition. "At the basis of 
recognition there would thus be a phenomenon of a motor order", he concludes, because "to recognize 
a common object is mainly to know how to use it." (MM, p. 93) 
(3) The third thesis is about the gradual passage of recollection into movement, about recognition 
and attention: "We pass, by imperceptible stages, from recollections strung out along the 
course of time to the movements which indicate their nascent or possible action in space. 
Lesions of the brain may affect these movements, but not these recollections." (MM, p. 79) 
Bergson proposes the hypothesis that memories, just like perceptions, are neither the function of the 
brain nor are they contained inside it. He maintains that movement can produce only movement, and 
that stimulation of the brain can only produce "a certain attitude into which recollections will come to 
insert themselves" (MM, p. 99) and that brain damage affects only the person's ability to access 
recollections and not recollections themselves since the latter are not found in the brain. 
Sometimes they [lesions of the brain - E. F.] would hinder the body from taking, in regard to 
the object, the attitude that may call back its memory-image; sometimes they would sever the 
bond between remembrance and the present reality; that is, by suppressing the last phase of 
the realization of a memory - the phase of action - they would thereby hinder the memory 
from becoming actual. But in neither case would a lesion of the brain really destroy memories. 
(MM, P. 99) 31 
3! Clinical cases of recovering memories after amnesia following a head injury could be used to 
illustrate Bergson's point that if memories were stored in parts of the brain, they would be lost due to 
the physical damage to those parts. See, for example, Herbert F. Crovitz, "Loss and Recovery of 
Autobiographical Memory after Head Injury" in David C. Rubin (ed.) Autobiographical Memory, 
Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp.273  —289, for one complete case of successful memory 
retrieval. However, contemporary literature also supports a sceptical position that such recovered 
memories are not strictly speaking remembered but confabulated. For examples of confabulation of 
memories after an injury see Baddeley and Wilson, pp.  225 - 252; Nelson Butters and Laird S. Cermak 
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Naturally, the reader of Bergson would want to ask: if memories are not located in the brain, where 
are they located? But as it is clear from Chapter 3 of Matter and Memory, Bergson dismisses the 
legitimacy of such a question. Memory is itself the past, and we cannot ask where something which is 
past is. Physical location is a characteristic of things present, since "the past is only idea, the present is 
ideo-motor". (MM, p.  68) Spatiality and physicality are the features of actuality, and it is what a thing 
loses by becoming past. 
The process of recalling a memory amounts, for Bergson, to the following sequence: "Ideas - pure 
recollections summoned from the depths of memory - develop into memory-images more and more 
capable of inserting themselves into a motor diagram." (MM, p.  125) We understand that idea (a 
generalised image) is a vague recollection, and a memory-image (an image that corresponds to a 
singular object), is a more precise and definite one. As for a motor diagram, it must be a disposition to 
acknowledge and assimilate the recalled memory-image with a greater focus, "to the degree that these 
recollections take from the form of a more complete, more concrete and more conscious representation, 
they tend to confound themselves with the perception which attracts them or of which they adopt the 
outline." (MM, pp. 125 - 126) 
At the end of Chapter 2 Bergson emphasises his claim that memory and perception are not self-
sufficient and complete processes in themselves. He talks of a "dynamic progress by which the one 
passes into the other." (MM, p.  127) An account of this progress is summed up in the following 
passage. 32 
"A Case of Study of the Forgetting of Autobiographical Knowledge: Implications for the Study of 
Retrograde Amnesia" in David C. Rubin (ed.) Autobiographical Memory, Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 253 —272; For an illustration that pseudomemories occur when subjects are under pressure to recall 
the past, see J. Dywan and K. Bowers, "The Use of Flypnosis to Enhance Recall" in Science, 222, pp. 
184-185. 
32 Russell accuses Bergson of confusing "the present occurrence of a recollection and the past 
occurrence which is recollected" and, forgetting that perception and recollection are both present facts, 
claiming to have accounted for the difference between the present and the past, and then, confusing the 
present cognitive act of remembering with the past object of remembering, blurring the distinction 
between past and present. (Russell (1914), p.21) We would agree with Russell that Bergson uses the 
term "memory" in more than one sense. According to Endel Tulving, "memory" has the following 
meanings: (I) neurocognitive capacity to encode, store and retrieve information; (2) a hypothetical 
store in which the data are accumulated; (3) information in that store; (4) property of that information; 
(5) retrieval of that information; (6) phenomenal awareness of remembering something. (Endel 
Tulving, "Concepts of Memory", in Endel Tulving, Fergus Craik (ed), The Oxford Handbook of 
Memory, Oxford University Press US, 2000, p.  36). Bergson denies (2), ignores (6) and (4), and 
throughout his texts applies the term "memory" to either (1), (3), or (5) without warning, which may 
give an impression that these meanings are interchangeable. However, despite this shortage of suitable 
On the one hand, complete perception is only defined and distinguished by its coalescence 
with a memory-image, which we send forth to meet it. Only thus is attention secured, and 
without attention there is but a passive juxtaposing of sensations, accompanied by a 
mechanical reaction. But, ... the memory-image itself, if it remained pure memory, would be 
ineffectual. Virtual, this memory can only become actual by means of the perception which 
attracts it. Powerless, it borrows life and strength from the present situation in which it is 
materialised. Does not this amount to saying that distinct perception is brought about by two 
opposite currents, of which the one, centripetal, comes from the external object, and the other, 
centrifugal, has for its point of departure that which we term "pure memory"? The first 
current, alone, would only give a passive perception with the mechanical reactions which 
accompany it. The second, left to itself, tends to give a recollection that is actualised - more 
and more actual as the current becomes more marked. Together, these two currents make up, 
at their point of confluence, the perception that is distinct and recognized. (MM, pp. 127- 128) 
4. The spatiality of time and the temporality of space 
For its growth, supposedly inert ensive duration requires a material input of new content The passage 
between the inextensive and the extensive in the human body. Image that eliminates the opposition of 
subject and object 
We realise that duration, although depicted in Time and Free Will as purely inextensive and 
spiritual, could not exist as such in reality because its existence presupposes growth, the addition of 
new content, and the material for new content which comes from the physical world. Data about it is 
delivered to the consciousness by our senses so that we experience the very materiality of the world - 
we partake of it as recipients of the direct influence that weight, size, colour or sound produce on our 
body. In this sense, we shall have to conclude, duration partakes of the materiality and extensity of the 
physical world since its content comprises our sensations originating from a physical cause. 
In Chapter 4 Bergson narrows the problem of the relation between the inextensive and the extensive 
to the very point where their union occurs - the human body. If in Time and Free Will duration was 
presented as pure intensity, pure temporality, considered separately from anything spatial and physical, 
in Matter and Memory Bergson explicitly talks of one's body participating in the formation of duration. 
Body, as Bergson puts it, "represents the actual state of my becoming, that part of my duration which is 
in process of growth." (MM, p. 138) Later he adds: "It is in very truth within matter that pure 
perception places us, and it is really into spirit that we penetrate by means of memory. But, on the other 
terminology and contrary to Russell, Bergson does not lose the thread of his argument, and we can 
clearly understand the different meanings of the term according to the context. 
hand, while introspection reveals to us the distinction between mailer and spirit, it also bears witness to 
their union." (MM, p. 180) 
Bergson talks about "reconciliation between the unextended and the extended." (MM, p. 181) This 
reconciliation takes place in pure perception: "We place the perceived images of things outside the 
image of our body, and thus replace perception within the things themselves. But then, our perception 
being a part of things, things participate in the nature of our perception. Material extensity is not, 
cannot any longer be, that composite extensity which is considered in geometry; it indeed resembles 
rather the undivided extension of our own representation. That is to say, the analysis of pure perception 
allows us to foreshadow in the idea of extension the possible approach to each other of the extended 
and the unextended." (MM, p. 182) 
What the above observation seems to mean is this. It is clear from our every day experience that 
mailer (the extended) and the mind (the unextended) constantly interact in perception. The mind is not 
some entity locked within itself and impenetrable by physical influences. On the contrary, we observe 
that it is, in fact, open to influences from the material world. And this means that (a) they must have 
some common basis which would allow interaction between them, and (b) there must be a channel 
through which the work of interaction is effected or a mediating agency that effects the communication 
between them. 
We observe that our mind is aware of the physical qualities of things in such a way that it does not 
just know ofthem - our mind has a direct experiential knowledge of physical things. Unextended, it 
experiences their extensity in sensations delivered to it by the nervous system of the body. Thus, 
extensity and inextensity must partake of each other: inextensity as a recipient of the physical influence 
and extensity, as a bearer or producer of a visual, audio or tactile image that can be detached from it 
mentally. This is how we interpret Bergson's position regarding the unity of spirit and mailer occurring 
in perception. B  Pure memory, too, should help us in this reconciliation: "Our conception of pure 
memory should lead us, by a parallel road, to attenuate the second opposition, that of quality and 
quantity." (MM, p. 182) 
Bergson believes that he has found an answer to the problem of spirit and mailer: there is a gradual 
passage or transition between them. The "function of spirit is to bind together the successive moments 
B Alexander suggests that, in Bergson, one's body is both the object and the subject, when one knows 
it from inside, which then presumably makes it the domain where the object and the subject are 
merged. (I. W. Alexander, p.31) 
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of the duration of things", and "it is by this that it comes into contact with matter and by this also that it 
is first of all distinguished from matter", and if the above assertions are correct, then "we can conceive 
an infinite number of degrees between matter and fully developed spirit - a spirit capable of action 
which is not only undetermined, but also reasonable and reflective. Each of these successive degrees, 
which measures a growing intensity of life, corresponds to a higher tension of duration and is made 
manifest extemally by a greater development of the sensory-motor system." (MM, p. 221) 
Bergson takes a further step in trying to reconcile spirit and matter by demonstrating that there is no 
difference in nature between them. In Summary and Conclusion of Matter and Memory the universe 
itself is declared to be a kind of consciousness: "The material universe itself, defined as the totality of 
images, is a kind of consciousness, a consciousness in which everything compensates and neutralizes 
everything else, a consciousness of which all the potential parts, balancing each other by a reaction 
which is always equal to the action, reciprocally hinder each other from standing out." (MM, p. 235) 
What makes an individual consciousness different is that it continues and retains the past in the 
present and escapes the law of necessity, "the law which ordains that the past shall ever follow itself in 
a present which merely repeats it in another form and that all things shall ever be flowing away." (MM, 
p.235) 
Bergson summarises his view on the mind / body problem as "the threefold opposition of the 
inextended and the extended, quality and quantity, freedom and necessity." (MM, p. 244) The 
explanation of the union of spirit and matter thus amounts for him to "suppressing or toning down these 
three oppositions." (MM, p. 244) 
I. The inextended and the extended. 
"That which is given, that which is real, is something intermediate between divided extension and 
pure inextension. It is what we have termed the extensive." (MM, p. 245) 
The extensive participates both in things (when they are taken out of an abstract space) and in our 
consciousness as we perceive extensity. Also, extension admits of degrees, which implies degrees 
between the inextended and the extended. 
2. Quality and quantity. 
Mark Antliff makes an interesting suggestion that, since Bergson distinguishes matter and spirit as 
phenomena with different rhythms, it is rhythm that is a connecting link between extensity and 
intensity. (See Antliff, p.  100) 
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The opposition of quality and quantity is the same, Bergson asserts, as that of consciousness and 
movement, inasmuch as the latter represents a series of calculable changes. Concrete movement is in a 
way like consciousness, since it can prolong its past into its present. Also, movement, like 
consciousness, can give rise to sensible qualities, Bergson claims, as it is the rhythm of our duration 
that contracts diluted reality into distinct sensible qualities. Thus the idea of tension of a particular 
movement helps Bergson to overcome the opposition between quality and quantity. 
3. Freedom and necessity. 
Absolute necessity, which is a property of matter, consists, for Bergson, in "a perfect equivalence of 
the successive moments of duration, each to each." (MM, p.247) However, the duration of the material 
universe does not follow this pattern of existence precisely. The material universe allowed the 
apparition of living beings, "capable, even in their simplest forms, of spontaneous and unforeseen 
movements." (MM, p. 248) Thus necessity and freedom are present in the universe in the form of 
mutual dependency. "Freedom always seems to have its roots deep in necessity and to be intimately 
organized with it. Spirit borrows from matter the perceptions on which it feeds and restores them to 
matter in the form of movements which it has stamped with its own freedom." (MM, p.249) 
Bergson attempts to reinforce his claim that the integral connection of spirit and matter can be 
explained by showing that they both originate ontologically from the same source and share the same 
basic feature: they both partake of motion to such an extent that motion becomes their primary 
characteristic. 
We understand that the passage between spirit and matter is effected in concrete instances of 
perception where image plays the crucial role of an intermediary element that belongs to both subject 
and object. What Russell understood in decidedly negative terms as the "confusion of subject and 
object" in Bergson , we interpret as the purposeful weakening of the traditional opposition of subject 
and object. Whereas the traditional opposition is based on the subject and object being separate entities, 
standing on different ontological platforms, on the subject confronting the object and on that fact that 
the epistemological contact between them is a subjective process taking place in the subject's mind, 
Bergson demonstrates by the use of the term "image", that the epistemological act, involving both the 
subject and the object, is an objective process. Instead of the opposition of subject and object we are 
presented with two objects, one of which generates an image, and the other which perceives it, and the 
"Russell (1914), p.23 
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ontological roles of the perceiving mind and perceived matter are levelled out. Both members of the 
former opposition become objectified, and perception is no longer a private process, hidden in one's 
mind, but an externalised process, the flow between two objective positions which were formerly 
known in philosophy as subject and object. Synonymising "subject" with "mind" or "spirit", we de-
subjectifj the inextensive, and deprive it of its mysterious, private character. Open to the objective 
process of perception, mind becomes merely a destination point for imagery emitted by the extended 
object. 
5. Continuity of the past, present and future in memory, perception and action 
The present is continuous, not instantaneous. Space is ultimately a part of time. Duration goes through 
cycles of grow/k comprising perception, recognition, processing information, volition and action. All 
our past manifests itself in our present tense performance, although we are conscious only of a fraction 
of what is happening. 
Comparing the past and the present, and correlating them with memory and perception, Bergson 
finds that the past and the present have a qualitative difference: "There is much more between past and 
present than a mere difference of degree. My present is that which interests me, which lives for me, and 
in a word, that which summons me to action; in contrast, my past is essentially powerless." (MM, p. 
137) 
The real, concrete present, Bergson continues, is necessarily of some length. 
What is, for me, the present moment? The essence of time is that it goes by; time already gone 
by is the past, and we call the present the instant in which it goes by. But there can be no 
question here of a mathematical instant. No doubt there is an ideal present - a pure 
conception, the indivisible limit which separates past fromiuture. But the real, concrete, live 
present - that of which I speak when I speak of my present perception - that present 
necessarily occupies a duration. (MM, p. 137) 
So, "what I call "my present" has one foot in my past and another in my future". (MM, p. 138)36 
Inasmuch as it is in my immediate past, it is a sensation, and in the sense of it being my immediate 
future, it is action or movement. "Whence I conclude that my present consists in a joint system of 
36 For an example of a complete theory of continuous present, see Andros Loizou, Time, Embodiment 
and the Se/f Ashgate, 2000, Chapter 2 "The Dynamic of Time", pp.  22— 56. 
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sensations and movements. My present is, in its essence, sensory-motor." (MM, p. 138) What this 
means is, of course, that he is talking about the content that fills our being in a present situation, which 
consists in "the consciousness I have of my body." (MM, p. 138) 
An attempt could be made to keep body and duration apart by saying that what constitutes growth of 
duration in the present is not sensations and actions themselves, heavily loaded with materiality, but 
our own inner thoughts and feelings accompanying sensations and actions. But all of the preceding 
discussion on perception and memory indicates that Bergson takes the opposite direction. He attempts 
to bring materiality into the life of the mind, to incorporate, so to speak, space into time. We read on: 
In that continuity of becoming which is reality itself, the present moment is constituted by the 
quasi-instantaneous section effected by our perception in the flowing mass, and this section is 
precisely that which we call the material world. Our body occupies its centre; it is, in this 
material world, that part of which we directly feel the flux; in its actual state the actuality of 
our present lies. If matter, so far as extended in space, is to be defined (as we believe it must) 
as a present which is always beginning again, inversely, our present is the very materiality of 
our existence, that is to say, a system of sensations and movements and nothing else. And this 
system is determined, unique for each moment of duration, just because sensations and 
movements occupy space, and because there cannot be in the same place several things at the 
same time. (MM, p. 139) 
In Time and Free Will, the self was described as ever-growing duration which appeared as a 
heterogeneous but not numerical multiplicity of all the psychic states one has ever experienced. Acts of 
volition which added their content to duration were the only examples of its growth. In Matter and 
Memory, we are presented with growth of duration via perception enriched by memory. Perception is 
the conductor of new content being incorporated into our conscious life, and memory is the previously 
acquired content which gives meaning to what is new. An act of volition, in this context, is the process 
that follows perception and memory as a stage preceding action. 
Thus we can understand that the process of growth is of a cyclical nature, each cycle comprising 
perception, recognition, processing information, volition and action. All these stages present a 
continuity of the inextensive past flowing into the material present and looking into the future. 
Perceptive knowledge is impossible without the involvement of the physical world. On its own, 
duration cannot produce material for its growth - it needs material from outside. Matter reaches our 
mind via the agency of our body. Via the senses, we become acquainted with colours, shapes, weights 
and sizes, and we feel that this acquaintance is direct to the extent that we ourselves partake of matter-
not identiing ourselves with the material object, but as direct recipients of its influence resulting from 
its combination of physical properties. 
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Memory aids perception in the form of recognition which occurs as soon as perception has taken 
place. Our past experiences are in our mind in a dormant state, and as soon as the process of perception 
begins, they anticipate the further moment of perception and rush to our mind in order to accompany 
perception as it progresses. Bergson insists that in remembering, we literally return to the past: ". . . the 
truth is that we shall never reach the past unless we frankly place ourselves within it." (MM, p.  135) 
The willed decision is made at this stage - the decision that seems to be a leap in our conscious 
life, something radically new with an element of creation ex nihilo. However, it is possible that this 
decision is but a summary of the process of remembering and recognising where possibilities had 
already presented themselves to our mind as various combinations of memory-images and actuality. 
These possibilities could have appeared before our mind as potential decisions and it is only with a 
slight effort on our part that we choose one of them to become actualised. 
As far as our conscious awareness of action is concerned, it occurs as a direct effect of our act of 
volition by means of our body and with restrictions imposed on it by physical laws. In relation to 
matter affected by our actions and movements, our decision acts as a kind of a physical law - a law 
with unique application, perhaps, but obeyed automatically by the material object just as any physical 
law would be obeyed. 
In action we, of course, perceive, and so we come back to stage one of what we called the cycle of 
growth of duration. This cycle of growth constitutes the existence of duration in the present. It is the 
present of duration where present perceptions, revived past memories and physical movement directed 
towards the future are actualised in their full intensity. By contrast, what is purely past in duration, is 
inextensive, powerless and does not interest our mind. It is pure memory, for Bergson: memory in the 
state when it is not remembered. " 
But we remember that duration comprises all of the psychic experiences which we have ever had. 
We have summarised the mode of performance for duration at the time of its growth, the present 
moment, which follows from the past and looks into the future but the whole of duration must also 
include those experiences that we do not explicitly remember. Also, because every component of 
"For a more recent discussion of conscious (explicit) and unconscious (implicit) memory, see, for 
example, Stephan Lewandowsky, John C. Dunn, Kim Kirsner (ed.), Implicit Memory, Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 1989. 
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duration is connected with every other component of that duration, the past which is not remembered 
must still be connected with our present state which contains present perceptions and recalled 
memories. 
Even when we do not remember most of our past, it nevertheless enters our every action and every 
thought because the manifestation of our self at every moment is a result of the totality of our past 
experiences. For when we make a decision and engage ourselves in action, what we decide and what 
we are conscious of in our action is but a fraction of what is actually happening when we act. 
When carrying out an action, we have voluntary control over the pursuit of an end. But much of our 
act is not under our control - the manner of our speech, the way we walk, feelings we have - all these 
components just happen as we engage in the realisation of our plans and must represent that very past 
that we do not remember but which nevertheless forms part of our duration, of our self 
Bergson comes to reconsider the role of the unremembered past and, even though in Chapter 2 he 
treats the unremembered past as inactive, in Chapter 3, he admits that "our character, always present in 
all our decisions, is indeed the actual synthesis of all our past states. In this epitomized form our 
- previous psychic life exists for us even more than the external world, of which we never perceive more 
than a very small part, whereas, on the contrary, we use the whole of our lived experience." 
(MM,p. 146) 
Further on he writes: "The whole of our past psychical life conditions our present state, without 
being its necessary determinant; whole, also, it reveals itself in our character, although none of its past 
states manifests itself explicitly in character." (MM, p. 148) 
Whereas our waking existence gravitates towards perception, matter and the present, in dreams we 
become liberated from the pressure of the present situation. Sleep, Bergson observes, breaks the 
connection between the necessity of the actualand our memories. When we dream, "memories, which 
we believe abolished, then reappear with striking completeness; we live over again, in all their detail, 
forgotten scenes of childhood; we speak languages which we no longer even remember to have 
leamed." (MM, pp. 154- 155) 
The opposite to a person in a sleeping state would be the impulsive personality of someone who 
lives "only in the present" and responds "to a stimulus by the immediate reaction which prolongs it." 
(MM, p. 153) The normal self, Bergson points out, never stays in these extreme positions - it adopts 
intermediate positions, borrowing from memory what is useful for the present action. 
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Referring to the problem of the selection of images, Bergson does not believe that images, present in 
our mind, trigger other images and bring them forth to our consciousness. He insists that the totality of 
our memories, even those not remembered, is present for us, and it is by expanding our entire 
consciousness which explores its own depths, that the access to memory-images is effected. Our 
consciousness oscillates between the actuality and the domain of pure memory, resulting in "an infinite 
number of possible states of memory." (MM, p. 168) 
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Chapter 4. Consciousness, life and the universe in Creative Evolution 
I. Duration as the universe 
Despite the fact that change is dtfferent  in things and beings, the universe and al/processes therein are 
synonymous with duration. Reasons for misunderstanding reality: the idea of the nought and the 
cinematographical approach. 
In Chapter 1 of Creative Evolution, Bergson compares psychological duration with inanimate things 
and living bodies. Existing as a human being for Bergson is, first of all, passing from state to state, 
from being warm to being cold, from working to doing nothing. "I change, then, without ceasing." (CE, 
p. 1) Our states constantly change even if only by passing through time and becoming an instant longer. 
Consequently, "there is no essential difference between passing from one state to another and persisting 
in the same state." (CE, p.  2) 
Duration is irreversible because it consists of an accumulation of our ever-growing experiences, and 
this makes it impossible for any state to occur more than once. A person now is not the same as he or 
she was a moment ago and therefore cannot have the same physical state as in the past. So, "for a 
conscious being, to exist is to change, to change is to mature, to mature is to go on creating oneself 
endlessly." (CE, p.  8) 
Whereas change for psychological duration is an accumulation of memories, Bergson maintains, for 
material objects it is "a displacement of parts which themselves do not change": atoms. (CE, p.  8) 
Change here is reversible: "When a part has left its position, there is nothing to prevent its return to it. 
A group of elements which has gone through a state can therefore always find its way back to that 
state, if not by itself, at least by means of an external cause able to restore everything to its place. This 
amounts to saying that any state of the group may be repeated as often as desired." (CE, pp.  8 —9) 
Nothing new is created in the realm of the material world and what "will be is already present in what 
it is." (CE, p.  9) 
In this way Bergson assigns to duration and to inanimate things distinct modes of existence: in 
duration, change is an accumulation of memories, but for material objects, it is a displacement of 
unchangeable parts; duration ages, has a history and therefore it is irreversible, whereas in material 
objects change is reversible and repeatable; also, every moment brings novelty to duration, and its 
future is unforeseeable, whilst in material objects there is no novelty and the future is calculable. 
But what about a living organism? A material object does not grow, but a living body does. The 
body's current state is to be explained by all of its past and its heredity as against the material object, 
whose present moment depends exclusively on the previous one. This means for Bergson that a living 
body, unlike a material object, does have duration. "Continuity of change, preservation of the past in 
the present, real duration —the living being seems, then, to share these attributes with consciousness", 
Bergson observes. (CE, p. 24) 
Bergson becomes more and more convinced that "organic evolution resembles the evolution of a 
consciousness, in which the past presses against the present and causes the upspringing of a new form 
of consciousness, incommensurable with its antecedents." (CE, p. 29) Like consciousness, evolution is 
unpredictable and, like consciousness, life is creating something new at every moment. 
Refusing to associate a living, organized body with an object, an unorganised body, Bergson 
nevertheless finds it appropriate to compare the living organism to "the totality of the material 
universe", founding this comparison on "the essential character of organisation" common to both the 
living organism and the universe itself: they both grow and endure; their "past, in its entirety, is 
prolonged into present, and abides there, actual and acting." (CE, p. 16) 38 
Besides, despite the initial opposition of duration versus material objects, we are beginning to see 
that reality in general, and not just the reality of the self and the living organisms in particular, is 
understood as a process rather than a static thing, with time being an integral part of the makeup of 
each process. But, as Bergson says, obeying our intellect in dealing with reality, we freeze in our mind 
the flowing eventuality of the world and present it to ourselves as solid spatialised segments. 
It seems at first as though, for Bergson, the difference in the mode of being of duration and material 
objects affects their temporality in the following way: duration lives its time and the latter has absolute 
significance for it, whereas for an object, its length does not matter. As Bergson asserts, time is 
absolute for duration, but for objects as we see them, it is a relation between the elements involved. 
38 In line with Bergson's thought which treats the universe as an organism albeit discriminating 
between organisms and things on the macro level, Russell observes that the radical difference between 
living matter and inanimate matter is that the former is chemically dynamic and the latter, chemical}y 
static but also that if, distinguishing evolution from mere change, we define it as an "increase of 
complexity and heterogeneity", then "there is reason to believe that there has been evolution also in the 
inanimate world", given the development of the solar system which "accounts admirably for the 
development of galaxies." (Russell (1992), pp. 45-46) 
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However, we later realise that what Bergson means is that it is merely our view of the inanimate reality 
and that we, in order to help our understanding of the world, distort reality, real systems, and construct 
artificial systems which do not reflect the actual state of affairs and are a product of our intellect. 
Real processes take some real, concrete time to happen, and these periods of time can only be 
regarded as absolute because they cannot be contracted or stretched. The latter is, in our view, one of 
the key statements of Bergson's philosophy of time. He illustrates it by giving an example of sugar 
being dissolved in a glass of water. 
Even in the material world, he says, 
history ... unfolds itself gradually, as if it occupied a duration like our own. If I want to mix a 
glass of sugar and water, I must, willy-nilly, wait until the sugar melts. This little fact is big 
with meaning. For here the time I have to wait is not that mathematical time which would 
apply equally well to the entire history of the material world, even if that history were spread 
out instantaneously in space. It coincides with my impatience, that is to say, with a certain 
portion of my own duration, which I cannot protract or contract as I like. It is no longer 
something thought, it is something lived. What else can this mean than the glass of water, the 
sugar, and the process of the sugar melting in the water are abstractions, and that the Whole 
within which they have been cut out by my senses and understanding progresses, it may be in 
the manner ofa consciousness? (CE, p.  10) 
Obstacles which lie in the way of the philosophy of duration involve two illusions, as stated in 
Chapter 4 of Creative Evolution: the idea of the original void which stands between consciousness and 
duration, and the cinematographical nature of our perception which means that we grasp snapshots of 
reality at intervals. 
All action is directed at an absence or a void, Bergson remarks, either getting something we want or 
creating something that does not yet exist. Whereas he finds this way of looking at things legitimate in 
the sphere of action, he declares it a mistake to apply this view to the sphere of ontology. 
An attempt to annihilate objects leaves us with an idea of, at least, a place that they had occupied, 
which is in itself something positive. If we think of an object as non-existing rather than annihilated, 
we still think of an object as existent first, so thinking of it as non-existent is adding the idea of 
exclusion to the idea of an object. Hence Bergson's assertion that "there is more, and not less, in the 
idea of an object conceived as "not existing" than in the idea of this same object conceived as 
"existing"; for the idea of the object "not existing" is necessarily the idea of the object "existing" 
with, in addition, the representation of an exclusion of this object by the actual reality taken in block" 
(CE, p.  302) This amounts to saying that the idea of the non-existent is not negative enough. 
Bergson disagrees with the view that being has a beginning and that initially there was a complete 
void, later replaced by being. If we pass from the idea of the nought to the idea of being, being is 
r'J 
presented as a logical or mathematical, non-temporal essence: it is a static conception of the real where 
everything is given once and for all, in eternity. Being appears as a logical construct because one 
cannot observe the continuity of nought and being in reality. Bergson invites us to see being directly, 
without the imagined nought coming between us and the real being, so as to preserve the continuity of 
being and prevent the need to explain the inexplicable leap from nothing to something. (CE, p.  315) 
As for the cinematographical view of reality, Bergson's considerations are as follows. Before we 
distinguish bodies around us, we distinguish qualities, such as colours, sounds, resistance etc. (CE, p. 
317) They present themselves to us as immobilities succeeding each other, but close analysis will 
confirm that they are nothing but vibrations, so that ultimately, "every quality is change" (CE, p.  317), 
because what we regard as immobile matter is, in fact, a continuous movement. Unable to represent 
moving reality as moving, we take snapshots of it and string them onto an abstract idea of becoming. 
Thus Bergson compares the mechanism of our knowledge to the cinematograph: both attempt to 
reconstruct movement out of immobilities, perceived from outside, whereas movement is indivisible 
and is articulated inwardly, from within. Taking the same cinematographical view regarding transitions 
within the development of a human being, we talk of childhood, adolescence and adulthood as if they 
are stops, ignoring the transition from one to another, thereby creating a wrong picture of the self. (CE, 
p. 329) ° 
For more on the nought see Chapter 5, Section 2 
40 Bergson here could have been inspired by the early history of fllmmaking. For example, Muybridge 
arranged to take photos of a moving horse and used the magic lantem to project the sequence of still 
images presenting the horse as galloping on the screen. (Barnouw, p.  3) Most importantly, he was able 
to present the horse as racing at various speeds, the feature which may have given rise to the 
Bergsonian idea that moving reality in cinema and in perception in general is manipulated to the point 
of breaking it down to still images, and reconstructing motion at will and not as it really is. 
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2. Duration as evolution 
Just like reality in general, evolution is also misunderstood A psychological cause of evolution - the 
impetus ofljfi. 
Satisfied that a conscious process is similar in essence to a living process of a body, Bergson begins 
a search for their common ontological origin, which, complementing his theory of images, leads 
eventually to the merging of ontology and epistemology, where knowing is regarded as part of being. 
Bergson suggests that we should regard "life in general' as a "current", flowing from one body to 
another and from one generation to the next, rather than an abstraction, "a mere heading under which 
all living beings are inscribed." (CE, p.  27) This current is seen by the philosopher as ever intensi'ing 
as it advances, organizing bodies and dividing itself amongst species and individuals: "Ltfr is like a 
current passing from germ to germ through the medium of a developed organism." (CE, p. 28) "The 
essential thing is the continuous progress indefinitely pursued, an invisible progress, on which each 
visible organism rides during the short interval of time given it to live." (CE, pp. 28 —29)' 
Turning to the theories of evolution developed by the time of his writing of Creative Evolution, 
Bergson rejects radical finalism, which implies a reality•where "things and beings merely realize a 
programme previously arranged." (CE, p. 41) If there is nothing unforeseen, no invention or creation in 
the universe, time is useless, for predetermination, in Bergson's view, devalues the time that it actually 
takes for an evolutionary process to unroll. 
The idea of a pre-existing model is contrary to the reality enduring through time, Bergson claims, 
where there is no ontological foundation for repetition, for "if everything is in time, everything changes 
inwardly, and the same concrete reality never recurs." (CE, p.  48) Everything that emerges in the living 
process is new, and what we see as repetitions has been extracted from reality by our mind. "[W]e do 
not think real time. But we live it, because life transcends intellect." (CE, p. 49) 
For our acts we can always find antecedents that caused them, such as intentions, Bergson observes. 
"In this sense mechanism is everywhere, and finality everywhere, in the evolution of our conduct." 
(CE, p.  50) But that is an external view of our inner life, because intention aims at nothing but 
'" The present state of the study of evolution is represented by the synthetic theory which accepts 
mutations as raw material for evolution and natural selection which determines the direction of 
evolution. See, for example, Julian Huxley, Evolution: a Modern Synthesis, London, George Allen and 
Unwin, 1942. 
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rearranging the past whereas action is a new reality, which the intellect can "resolve indefinitely into 
intelligible elements without ever reaching its goal." (CE, p. 50) Bergson claims to propose a 
philosophy of life which deals with evolution itself rather than with its result - the evolved. 
Bergson's theory presents the organized world as a harmonious whole. But for Bergson, harmony 
exists not as a fact but as a principle: different forms of life conflict with each other, because each 
individual retains a certain impetus from the universal vital impulsion and uses its energy to thrther its 
own adaptation. Thus harmony, in the shape of complementarity, appears only in tendencies. Also, this 
harmony is not an end and is not in front of us - it is rather behind "due to an identity of impulsion and 
not to a common aspiration". (CE, p.  54) Bergson does not believe that life pursues an end. While the 
process of evolution is taking place there is only a direction to follow, but no final destination. We can 
talk of an end only retrospectively, tracing back the development that led to a particular result so that 
there is an end as a result but not as a pre-existing, i.e. already given, model. 
Bergson needs to find the principle responsible for the evolutionary changes which ultimately 
constitute the evolutionary progress. He remarks that adaptation of an organism to the outer conditions 
consists in replying to those conditions rather than repeating them and this, the philosopher warns, 
implies an intelligent or quasi-intelligent activity in evolution. Therefore, he concludes, we must 
introduce into evolution the idea "of an original impetus of life, passing from one generation of germs 
to the following generation of germs through the developed organisms which bridge the interval 
between the generations." (CE, p.  92) It is this impetus - élan - that causes the variations which create 
new species. Élan has a psychological dimension, though for Bergson "psychological" does not 
necessarily mean "anthropomorphic". It is a cosmological force, which is not tied to human form. 
Bergson maintains that in order to understand the work of evolution, we ought to consider the 
creation of an organ, the complexity of its structure and the simplicity of its function. These two 
aspects belong to different levels of reality. Whereas "the simplicity belongs to the object itself, ... the 
infinite complexity [belongs] to the views we take in turning around it, to the symbols by which our 
senses or intellect represent it to us, or, more generally, to elements of a different order, with which we 
try to imitate it artificially, but with which it remains incommensurable, being of a different nature." 
(CE, pp.  94 -95) For instance, whereas nature created an eye in one simple act, we conceive this act as 
a complex feat of manufacturing, consisting of a multitude of stages. Bergson maintains that in reality 
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nature's act of constructing the eye is as simple and effortless as our raising our hand: it is one 
undivided process that has no parts. 42 
3. Human consciousness as a fragment of evolution 
Division of all living things into plants and animals: instinct, intelligence, torpor. From lower animals 
to humans. 
Bergson's claim that the evolutionary movement is the movement of duration means to us that 
firstly, an individual duration and the evolutionary movement are modelled in the same way, and 
secondly, that an individual duration, which does not appear ex niliilo each time a person is born, must 
be a prolongation of the evolutionary movement. In particular, Bergson is interested in the principal 
direction of the evolution that leads to man. "Our main business is to determine the relation of man to 
the animal kingdom, and the place of the animal kingdom itself in the organized world as a whole." 
(CE, p. 111) 
According to Bergson, two causes explain the diversity of the evolutionary development: "the 
resistance life meets from inert matter, and the explosive force - due to an unstable balance of 
tendencies - which life bears within itself." (CE, p.  103) Unlike an individual who has to choose 
between different tendencies, as he or she cannot realize them all, nature preserves different tendencies 
and "creates with them diverging series of species that will evolve separately." (CE, p.  105) However, 
only one tendency has been filly developed in nature - the one that leads through the vertebrates up to 
a man.4 
Bergson suggests distinguishing lines of evolution not "by the possession of certain characters, but 
by [their] tendency to emphasise them." (CE, p.  112) Vegetables and animals can be distinguished by 
their method of alimentation: a vegetable derives its nutrients, carbon and nitrogen, directly from the 
42 Mullarkey makes a useful point that Bergson, unlike Richard Dawkin, is against "graduism" in 
evolution. (Mullarkey (1999), p.71) 
' Bergson's discussion of the human evolution must have been fuelled by Haeckel's exemplification of 
evolutionary development founded on the claim that the development of the embryo (ontogeny) is a 
speeded-up replay of the evolution of the species (phylogeny). See Ernst Heinrich Phillip Haeckel, The 
Evolution of Man, Vol. 1 and II, Kessinger Publishing, 2004. 
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air, water and soil; an animal can assimilate these elements only after being primarily absorbed by 
plants. Vegetables do not need the ability to move whereas animals, unable to assimilate directly the 
carbon and nitrogen, must be able to move as they seek vegetables and/or other animals for their 
nourishment. Therefore "animal life is characterized, in its general direction, by mobility in space." 
(CE, p. 114) Fixity and mobility are characteristics of vegetables and animals respectively but, 
Bergson points out, they can only be regarded as prevalent tendencies, as there are cases of moving and 
insectivorous plants and immobile, parasitic animals. 
Thus a connection between duration, conscious activity and movement, introduced in Time and 
Free Will, is explained in Creative Evolution by their mutual dependence: organisms able to perform 
complex movements demonstrate a higher degree of consciousness. ""The humblest organism is 
conscious in proportion to its power to movefreely". (CE, p.  117) 
Movement, namely, free movement of a living organism, appears as a prolongation of the conscious 
activity of the individual, and this correlates with another line of Bergson's thought where he maintains 
that individual conscious activity is a prolongation of the work of evolution. Thus everywhere we find 
movement, which is modified as it passes through different media,but nevertheless preserves its 
continuity throughout these processes. 
The final distinction that Bergson makes between plants and animals is that the former are 
unconscious and the latter are conscious. "To sum up, the vegetable manufactures organic substances 
directly with mineral substances; as a rule, this aptitude enables it to dispense with movement and so 
with feeling. Animals, which are obliged to go in search of their food, have evolved in the direction of 
locomotor activity, and consequently of a consciousness more and more distinct, more and more 
ample." (CE, p.  118) 
Bergson suggests, "The first living organisms oscillated between the vegetable and animal form, 
participating in both at once." (CE, p.  118) Then the two lines emerged by following different 
tendencies: one of mobility and consciousness, another, of fixity and insensibility. The very cause of 
life at its origin is "an effort to engraft on to the necessity of physical forces the largest possible amount 
of indetermination." (CE, p.  121) 
"Bergson sees consciousness even in the organisms that do not have a developed nervous system. He 
believes that the nervous system arises from a division of labour and takes the conscious function to a 
higher level, but does not create it itself. "It would be as absurd to refuse consciousness to an animal 
because it has no brain as to declare it incapable of nourishing itself because it has no stomach." (CE, 
p. 116) 
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The direction in which higher organisms developed is marked by the increased performance of the 
structures supporting the nervous system, Bergson continues. The latter is inserting indetermination, 
unforeseeabilit-y, into matter which is a manifestation of the primary role of life at the level of a 
concrete individual. A nervous system then is in itself a "reservoir of indetermination", the ultimate 
result of the work of the vital impulse. (CE, p. 133) 
The three directions of the vital impulse, vegetative torpor, instinct and intelligence, are all mutually 
complementary and mutually antagonistic. Plants have some mobility dormant within them and 
animals are sometimes prone to torpor. The same works for instinct and intelligence, which "having 
originally been interpenetrating, retain something of their common origin." (CE, p.  142) Human 
intelligence, Bergson maintains, is, above all, manifested by man's manufacturing ability, a 
materialized invention. But there are some animals which can construct a crude instrument (apes) or 
recognise a constructed object, such as a trap (foxes), and this demonstrates elements of intelligence in 
animals. Diagram 3 illustrates Bergson's interpretation of the evolutionary development, where the 
original impetus of life, containing three different tendencies (vegetative torpor, instinct and 
intelligence), divided itself into plants and animals. 
	 - 
Diagram 3. The evolutionary development of consciousness. 
Original impetus (vegetative torpor, instinct, intelligence) 
'I, 
Plants 	 Animals 
Derive their nutrients from 
air, water, soil. 
Plants are immobile, 
unconscious, 
insensible. 
Derive their nutrients from 
plants or other animals. 
Animals move in search for food. 
Mobility is accompanied by 
consciousness. 
In plants, vegetative torpor is 	 Arthropods 	 Vertebrates 
at its highest. 
In humans, intelligence 	 In Hymenoptera, instinct 
is at its highest. 	 is at its highest. 
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As the evolutionary development results from life's explosive force plus resistance of matter, 
Bergson asserts a firm link between the evolution of life and the work of consciousness: evolution 
unrolls as if consciousness had penetrated matter, loading it with possibilities which are slowed down 
by the resistance of matter. "Consciousness launched into matter" is thus a new angle that Bergson 
gives to the definition of life. (CE, p. 191) 
As for the relation between mind and things, Bergson regards "the intellect as a special function of 
the mind, essentially turned towards inert matter." (CE, p.  217) Intellect and matter adapted to each 
other in order to fulfil the objective of the sentient beings to gain control over matter. "This adaptation, 
has, moreover, been brought about quite naturally, because it is the same inversion of the same 
movement which creates at once the intellectuality of mind and the materiality of things." (CE, p. 217) 
During the course of the evolution, the original impetus was divided by matter to accompany the 
plurality of individual beings, unity and plurality being categories of inert matter. Bergson asserts that 
at the origin of life there is supra-consciousness, an explosive creative tendency which lies dormant 
until the creation becomes possible. In this context, individual consciousness appears to be a mere 
fragment of supra-consciousness that, in its perpetual motion, is passing through concrete individuals. 
What differentiates us from animals qualitatively is that an animal brain can only set a limited 
number of motor mechanisms whereas our brain is unlimited in this respect. Consciousness 
corresponds to the living being's power of choice, being aware of possible actions that surround the 
real action, and is synonymous with invention and with freedom. Bergson admits that man is the end of 
evolution because in every other life form consciousness has found its limit, but man continues the vital 
movement indefinitely. Having said that, man is not the ideal result of the evolutionary process. 
Bergson would have preferred to see in humans not just perfected intellect but equally developed 
intuition: "A complete and perfect humanity would be that in which these two forms of conscious 
activity should attain their full development." (CE, p.281) As he maintains, the development of 
instinct, which gives rise to intuition, was lost when animals gave way to humans. Bergson also admits 
that there may have been times and places where evolution produced sentient beings which we would 
call men but "who are not necessarily our ancestors" (7SMR, p.  273n). 
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4. Instinct and intelligence 
Both being innate faculties for shaping mat/er, instinct acts on organic matter directly, and intelligence 
makes the organism construct an instrument out of inorganic matter. Consciousness appears when 
there is a choice of action. intellect solid?fles movement and presents continuity as discontinuity, losing 
becoming and novelty, instinct can understand ljfe, but cannot grasp it rationally. intuition is able to 
compensate for the deficiencies of both instinct and intelligence. 
Bergson distinguishes two culminating points of evolution resulting from two separate lines: the 
human species at the top of the vertebrates and hymenoptera at the top of the arthropods. In 
hymenoptera the instinct, and in man the intelligence, have reached their highest level. Instinct and 
intelligence are, according to Bergson, two tendencies, "two modes of acting on the material world" 
that the force of life has to choose from. (CE, p.  149) It can affect the material world directly, creating 
an organized instrument to work with, or indirectly by making an organism construct an instrument out 
of inorganic matter. The reason for intelligence being prevalent in humans is the lack of readyrmade 
organized instruments to sustain their existence. 
Instinct is a natural ability to use an inborn mechanism, a continuation of the work of organization 
itself, for it is not clear when the activity of nature gives way to the activity of instinct. "We may say, 
as we will, either that instinct organizes the instruments it is about to use, or that the process of 
organization is continued in the instinct that has to use the organ." (CE, p.  147) So, in their perfected 
forms, instinct is a faculty of using and constructing organized instruments (organs) and intelligence is 
the faculty of making and using unorganised instruments (manufacturing tools). An instrument that 
instinct uses is self-repairing, complex in its structure, simple in its fUnction and perfect in its action. 
The drawback there is that its structure is invariable, because a change in it would signify a 
modification of the species. Therefore instinct is highly specialized, "being nothing but the utilization 
of a specific instrument for a specific object." (CE, p.  148) 
As for the instrument constructed and used by intelligence, it is imperfect but flexible in its form: it 
can be modified and used for any purpose. Also, unlike the instrument of instinct, it is open to change 
and improvement and offers more and more freedom to its user to achieve a higher level of 
constructive machinery. Bergson thinks that if the creative force of life were unlimited, it might have 
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developed intelligence and instinct in the same species, but as it is limited and must choose a direction, 
instinct and intelligence became separated. 
In many cases instinct is unconscious, Bergson finds. But there is a difference between 
unconsciousness in which consciousness is absent and unconsciousness in which consciousness is 
nullified, i.e. impossible in principle. In certain cases when the consciousness is absent, as in habitual 
actions, the act fits its representation so perfectly that there is no room for consciousness there. On the 
other hand, when the act does not follow the representation adequately, we have consciousness of the 
gap. Thus consciousness appears in cases of possible actions and indicates hesitation or choice. And, 
"where the action performed is the only action possible", consciousness is superfluous and is reduced 
to nothing. (CE, p.  152) 
Consciousness is now being defined as "an arithmetical difference between potential and real 
activity. It measures the interval between representation and action." (CE, p.  152) Seen in this light, 
consciousness should be expected to accompany intelligence and be absent in the instinctive activity. 
However, Bergson asserts that both intelligence and instinct involve knowledge, reflected upon and 
conscious in the former, and acted and unconscious in the latter. 
At this stage the story twists as we learn that Bergson believes both instinct and intelligence to be 
innate: a baby would instinctively look for its mother's breast, and also, as a toddler, immediately 
understand relations between things such as cause and effect, like with like, content to container etc., 
which, to Bergson, demonstrates intelligence. This is interesting, because in Matter and Memory he 
had explicitly argued against any possibility of images being produced by the brain, the argument that 
he used as a necessary foundation for the claim that spirit (or mind, or the inextensive) is not derived 
from the material component of the brain but is correlative with it. (MM, p.  9) We could have 
interpreted this part of Bergson's theory as a campaign against innate knowledge. 'What Creative 
Evolution seems to tell us now is that, even though Bergson denied that any factual knowledge could 
be innate and coming from the brain, the predisposition to receive data as knowledge about the 
environment is innate. In fact, this seems to be merely a rephrased Kantianism. 
By allowing innate knowledge as a predisposition for factual knowledge, Bergson is 
demonstrating that the stream of conscious or quasi-conscious activity, which passes from an 
individual to its siblings, is not interrupted and then restarted in another individual, but that its 
continuity is preserved even though it is modified in such a way that each individual has an impression 
that his or her conscious autonomy is complete and that his or her knowledge and memories are 
entirely his or her own. This is an illusion, as the individual's ability to know has been inherited from 
the infinite chain of other individuals, a fact that lowers the degree of one's own autonomy. 
Firstly, we have knowledge of things, and secondly, of relations, Bergson asserts. Innate knowledge 
of things, matter in its immediacy, is instinct, whereas innate intelligence is knowledge of a form, i.e. 
of the totality of all relations. In instinct, we have knowledge applicable to one specific object; in 
intelligence, we have knowledge containing form with no matter and applicable to an infinite range of 
objects. 
The above is an analysis of instinct and intelligence from the standpoint of knowledge rather than 
that of action. But Bergson is leading us to the unification of ontology and epistemology, of being on 
the one hand and creating and knowing, on the other. At this stage Bergson says explicitly that 
knowledge and action are two aspects of the same faculty. 
Instinct is innate knowledge of a thing because it is a faculty that uses a natural instrument, the 
philosopher continues, and it must have knowledge of this instrument and of the object of its 
application. Intelligence is a faculty that constructs an artificial instrument and, therefore, an ability to 
find the way out of a difficult situation, and it is for that purpose that intelligence is primarily the 
tendency to establish relations. This innate formal knowledge can be filled with any content and is not 
restricted to any content in particular. Thus "an intelligent being bears within himself the means to 
transcend his own nature." (CE, p.159) However, the purely formal character of intelligence lacks the 
ballast enabling it to concentrate on the object. Instinct has the desired materiality, but it cannot 
speculate. Hence Bergson's conclusion: "There are things that intelligence alone is able to seek, but 
which, by itself, it will never find. These things instinct alone can find; but it will never seek them." 
(CE,p. 159) 
Refusing to grant intellect the too high a role of an absolute that knowledge depends upon, Bergson 
regards it "as relative to the needs of action." (CE, 161) And this is another argument he uses to merge 
ontology and epistemology, as knowledge then is no longer a product of the intellect but is part of the 
ever-moving reality. 
Intellect constructs instruments out of inert solid matter, and even if any organized or fluid material 
is involved in the process, it is treated as inert and solid, the fluidity and the living escaping the 
attention of intellect. "Our intelligence, as it leaves the hands of nature, has for its chief object the 
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unorganized solid." (CE, 162) It presents everything real as consisting of parts, units, thus creating 
arbitrarily a discontinuity out of the real, for "of the discontinuity alone does the intellect form a clear 
idea." (CE, 163) Also, when it comes to mobile objects, we are not interested in the process of their 
movement, but predominantly in the initial and consecutive positions of the bodies involved. 
Movement is the reality itself, and immobility is secondary to movement, according to Bergson, but 
our intellect, practically orientated, ignores movement, concentrates on immobilities and then 
reconstructs movement out of immobilities. The result of this operation is not movement as it really is 
but its practical equivalent - the spatial image that we have of movement, its trajectory. 
When manufacturing tools our mind looks at matter with a view to modifying it and thus regards it 
as a substance indifferent to any form and capable of adopting any form. There is a limit to what extent 
real matter can be decomposed and reassembled, but the mind disregards the matter's real limitations 
and, in principle, treats it as decomposable in the homogeneous space that underlies it and this forms 
the plan of our potential actions on things. So, "the intellect is characterized by the unlimited power of 
decomposing according to any law and of recomposing into any system." (CE, 165) 
The aforementioned deficiency of the intellect is reflected in language. By the analogy with spatial 
	 - 
objects, we treat concepts as if they exist outside each other and as if they are, like objects, stable and 
solid. "The intellect represents becoming as a series of states, each of which is homogeneous with itself 
and consequently does not change." (CE, 171) If we attempt to reveal the internal change occurring 
within one of those states, we break it up into another series of states, and so on, Bergson explains, and 
thus becoming escapes our understanding. What is new escapes it also because we are always trying to 
reconstitute what is already given and reject the unforeseeable and so we reject creation. Causality, that 
we find everywhere, accommodates repeatable causes, old and known, and repeatable effects, and does 
not allow us to see unique causes and unique effects of creation. Just like becoming, novelty, which is 
an essential aspect of life, escapes us. Ultimately, Bergson says that the intellect is not an instrument 
designed to understand the mobile and living: "The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to 
comprehend life." (CE, p.  174) We can read into this that intellect is equally unable to comprehend 
duration, since, like life, duration is movement and becoming. 
The faculty that can comprehend life is instinct. It is moulded from the very form of life and, while 
intellect employs a mechanical approach to everything, instinct proceeds organically. Instinct is a 
prolongation of the work of life and, if it were conscious, "would give up to us the most intimate 
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secrets of life." (CE, p. 174) Unfortunately, what is instinctive cannot be expressed in terms of 
intelligence. 
Bergson attempts to explain instinct not in terms of intelligence but declaring it to be sympathy. 
(CE, p.  186) The term "intuition" appears in Creative Evolution meaning "instinct that has become 
disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely." (CE, 
p. 186) Man's aesthetic faculty shows that such an effect is not impossible as, according to Bergson, an 
artist creates a work of art by a simple move which is not unlike the creation of organs by nature. 
Bergson envisages a possibility of intuition compensating for the deficiency of intelligence and 
transcending it. The two faculties of knowledge, intellect and intuition, would complement each other, 
he believes, because without the push from the intelligence, instinct could never become intuition, and 
without intuition, intelligence can only restrict itself to a mechanistic view of life. In Bergson the 
double form of consciousness corresponds to the double form of metaphysics,: intelligence corresponds 
to inert matter, and intuition, to life. 
To summarise: intelligence is manifested as manufacturing ability, materialised invention, whereas 
instinct is manifested as a natural ability to use an inborn mechanism, continuing the work of nature. 
Intelligence is described as a faculty of making and using unorganised instruments, and instinct is a 
faculty of using and constructing organised instruments. 45 If intelligence allows infinite variations, 
instinct is highly specialised. Intelligence involves thought and consciousness, and instinct is 
unconscious in the sense that consciousness is absent from instinct. 
H. Wildon Car, albeit sceptical about treating instinct as a form of psychological cognition at all, 46 
points out that consciousness and unconsciousness are not main characteristics differentiating between 
instinct and intelligence as Bergson allows degrees of consciousness in both faculties. 47 Kolakowski, 
thinking along the same lines, makes an attempt to reconcile intuition and analysis in Bergson by 
softening the opposition between them. He points out that, although Bergson portrays them 
as radically different ways of being acquainted with an object, they primarily differ in the object of 
their application rather than in the method: intuition, the critic finds, is limited to approaching life, 
u The evolutionary conception of humans as essentially tool-making animals is criticised and debated 
by philosophers of technology. An illuminating collection of essays on this subject can be found in 
Robert C Scharif, Val Dusek (ed.), Philosophy of Technology, Blackwell Publishing, 2002. 
46 Carr(1910),pp. 110— 112 
47 Carr(l9lO),p. 101 
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mind and movement, and everything else must be dealt with by analysis. 48 Therefore, "the 
intuition/analysis dichotomy ... is ... less sharp than it might appear from his [Bergson's] general 
definition." 49 Analysis and intuition thus complement each other, and neither can replace the other, 
since they differ in the area of their application, Kolakowski concludes. This, of course, can be 
challenged by recalling that for Bergson, everything ultimately is duration and movement; so to say 
that intuition is limited to grasping movement would be the same as saying that intuition is limited to 
grasping being. Kolakowski himself inevitably admits the universality of possible application of 
intuition. For Bergson, he remarks, intuition is "an act of identification with the time in which the 
'object' is immersed." 5° Admitting that intuition grasps the temporality of the real here is the same as 
saying that intuition grasps the object, since, for Bergson, the temporality of the object is identical with 
everything that the object entails. 
Perhaps Bergson's own words can determine the intensity of the opposition between intellect and 
instinct. In his letter to H. Wildon Can, Bergson emphasises that in his understanding of the problem of 
cognition, intelligence is surrounded by a fringe of intuition, which allows us to sympathise with the 
essential features of life. He says that one can call this fringe "intelligence", albeit stretching the 
meaning of the word, and that in his view, this fringe is more like instinct than intelligence. 5 ' So 
Kolakowski is probably correct in softening the Bergsonian opposition between the supposedly 
incompatible and conflicting intelligence and instinct. Also Cunningham observes that, starting with 
the sharp opposition, Bergson resolves it by indicating that ultimately, analytical and intuitive 
knowledge do not contradict but complement each other. 52 
Moore reads Bergson differently here: "What is new is Bergson's willingness to make the contrast 
between intuition and analysis entirely general (independent ofsubject-mauer)." (Italics mine) (F. C. 
T. Moore, p.8) Both Moore's and Kolakowski's reading of Bergson are legitimate due to the obvious 
inconsistencies in Bergson's own texts. However, when we realise that the ultimate genuine object of 
knowledge is temporal reality, then the ultimate genuine cognition is only possible in intuition, and 
analysis only gives us an illusionary idea of illusionary reality. 
Kolakowski, p.  32 
° Kolakowski, p.  35 
"[NJotre intelligence est entourée d'une frange d'intuition, qui nous permet de sympathiser avec ce 
qu'il y a de proprement vital dans Ia vie. Si l'on veut donner a cette frange d'intuition le nom 
d'intelligence, on est libre de le faire; mais on dtendra beaucoup le sens du mot; et, a vrai dire, cette 
frange d'intuition me parait ressembler moms a l'intelligence qu'a l'instinct, qui est presque l'opposé 
de l'intelligence." (Can (1908— 1909), p.60) 
52 
 Cunningham, p.39. The detailed analysis of the dual position that Bergson holds in respect of this 
opposition see Chapter III in this book, pp.  32 - 64. 
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5. Matter and consciousness in evolution 
Matter and consciousness shape each other in action. Brain is the point where consciousness and 
matter are in immediate contact. Alan ufact uring presents a descent from conscious awareness of the 
mind to the passivity of matter as a receptacle of the conscious imprint. 
In Bergson's theory of evolution, the assumption that matter and consciousness originated from the 
same source grows into another assumption that along the way of their development, matter and 
consciousness have been shaping each other. Next, this idea of the mutual adaptation of matter and 
consciousness is taken into the domain of action. Bergson believes that intellectuality and materiality 
must have been developed alongside each other and by reciprocal adaptation, both being "derived from 
a wider and higher form of existence." (CE, p. 197) If Bergson is right in claiming that matter and 
intellect have been involved in a process of mutual adaptation, there is no reason to suspect that this 
process has stopped. If the primary purpose of intellect, as Bergson asserts, is to act on matter, then we 
should turn our attention to action. 
Looking at the relation between consciousness and matter from the standpoint of Rergson's theory 
of action, they appear as pans of one and the same continuity, and as a cause and effect reciprocally. 
Material circumstances question consciousness and make it produce a response; consciousness initiates 
action, a process in which consciousness and matter are interwoven with each other, followed by 
modified matter existing independently from consciousness. This modified matter in its tum will act as 
a cause for a consciousness to act in response to it. It appears as if in this type of fluctuating cyclical 
relation, consciousness and matter move from being distant from each other to merging, with the 
culminating point being at the time of action, and then distancing from each other again. 
It is true that if we take consciousness and matter as beings of a different nature and originating 
from different sources, then the relation between them will remain iiiexplicable; for how do we find a 
mediating agent that ensures co-operation of mind and body, or how can we explain any contact 
between consciousness and the material world at all? This is exactly what was lacking in Matter and 
Memory. The transition from intelligence to physicality, or from physicality to intelligence, appears as 
an inexplicable qualitative leap. 
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However, if we agree with Bergson that "the intellectuality of mind and the materiality of things" 
are created by the same movement, and that the relation between intelligence and matter is that of 
mutual adaptation which is the inversion of that movement (CE, p.217), then at least there is a starting 
point on the way to try to understand the connection between consciousness and matter. 
In living bodies, matter and consciousness are part and parcel of the same thing - a living process, 
with different degrees of consciousness being present in all life forms. The point of origin of a concrete 
action is found in the brain, and that is how Bergson describes their relation. 
Everything seems ... to happen as ifconsciousness sprang from the brain, and as ifthe detail 
of conscious activity were modelled on that of the cerebral activity. In reality, consciousness 
does not spring from the brain; but brain and consciousness correspond because equally they 
measure, the one by the complexity of its structure and the other by the intensity of its 
awareness, the quantity of choice that the living being has at its disposal. (CE, pp.  276- 277) 
Further on he says: 
The consciousness of a living being ... is inseparable from its brain in the sense in which a 
sharp knife is inseparable from its edge: the brain is the sharp edge by which consciousness 
cuts into the compact tissue of events, but the brain is no more coextensive with consciousness 
than the edge is with the knife. (CE, p.  277) 
Intelligent activity involves both brain and consciousness as inseparable elements of the same 
process. In action, involving body as a mediating agent between consciousness and the world, the 
relation between the latter two becomes complicated by the fact that intelligence is not the only form of 
consciousness that is involved in the process. Pure consciousness alone acting via brain is capable of 
reflecting and making decisions, but it is not capable of physical contact with the outer world. The 
body that does the conscious acting comprises a multitude of organs, which are composed of a 
multitude of cells, each of which, according to Bergson, is like a living organism in itself, and as such 
contains consciousness in the form of instinct which ensures the organic existence of the living. 
Between consciousness that correlates with the brain, and matter that is acted upon, we have a 
multitude of conscious processes that correlate with the body. The further we move away from the 
consciousness of the brain, the more we find that the processes lying in between are loaded more with 
matter than with consciousness. Thus in action or, more specifically, in manufacturing, we observe a 
gradual descent from the ultimate intensity of awareness in the brain to the ultimate passivity of the 
manufactured object whose relation to consciousness is one of a receptacle of an imprint. 
The hierarchy of the universal "consciousness - matter" movement, emerging in Creative 
Evolution, seems to be as follows: 
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I. At the highest point there are brain and consciousness where the intensity of conscious 
awareness is at its strongest. 
2. One step down there is a body which is largely material, and yet its materiality is loaded with 
consciousness of the living process, which presents itself as instinct. Also, the body is an 
active conductor of the conscious will. 
3. Further down we find tools that the body uses to create artefacts. These tools are material 
things but they serve to prolong the work of consciousness - they are passive conductors of 
consciousness. 
4. At the bottom there are artefacts which are mailer that has received an imprint of 
consciousness. 
5. Beyond this point there is matter untouched by consciousness, indifferent to it and 
independent from it. 
6. Human consciousness prolonging the evolution 
Evolutionary movement is refracted in human consciousness which prolongs the progress in 
manufacturing In evolution, consciousness ascends to the human mind, and in manufacturing, 
descends to inanimate art efacts. Artefacts bear the conscious imprint, readable by other minds but 
alien to the artefacts themselves. 
Bergson talks of the movement of consciousness running through the evolutionary movement, from 
the starting point to the highest known point, the human intelligence, where it is intensified and where 
it culminates. Also, whereas from the beginning of life to human species consciousness followed the 
direction of ascent through the living, in the human mind it is refracted and its further movement as 
conscious activity and, more specifically, manufacturing, is descent into matter. 
The issue would be immediately complicated if we questioned Bergson's theory of action against the 
distinction of more and less basic actions. According to this distinction, one does one thing by doing 
another, such as voting by raising one's arm, whereby the raising of the arm is more basic than voting. 
We would probably have to admit a regress in the conscious component within one and the same 
physical act, and introduce layers of reality with different intensity and extensity ratio, where raising 
the arm or, in the case of manufacturing, shaping clay would be more material than conscious, and 
voting, or making a mug, more conscious than material. (For the theory of basic actions, see Jennifer 
Homsby, Actions, London, 1980, chapters 5and 6.) 
In line with Bergson's thought we can observe that we live in a world saturated with consciousness 
via two major movements: the movement of ascent that involves the whole of organic life with human 
consciousness at its highest point, and the movement of descent, with its multitude of specific 
activities, and without that uni'ing force of evolution wherein each individual consciousness acts as if 
it is independent and detached. If in the ascending movement, consciousness is more instinct than 
intelligence, and is ontologically bound with material living bodies, in intelligence, consciousness is 
much freer and its ontological bond with the material base is weaker as it is able to choose an object of 
its attention with a greater degree of freedom than instinct. Brought to its highest point by evolution, 
human consciousness begins to act as if it were the primary cause of the changes occurring through 
man's activity, as if the evolutionary development leading to man has little to do with what each 
individual consciousness chooses to change. And if in the ascending movement we can talk of the unity 
of all processes, the descending movement is broken up into a multitude of dissipated movements of 
independent streams of consciousness. It is in this sense that we understand Bergson's assertion that 
"man 
... continues the vital movements indefinitely, although he does not draw along with him all that 
life carries in itself" (CE, p.  280) 
As we try to show in Diagram 4, in manufacturing consciousness is realised through action and 
leaves its imprint on an artefact. It remains totally external to the artefact; the specific shape, look, 
smell and colour of the artefact are like footprints left by consciousness. And, although consciousness 
remains external to the manmade object, it is there, and it is recognisable. 
We can add that it matters greatly to archaeologists whether the discovered stone acquired its 
specific shape naturally, or whether its natural shape has been altered deliberately by the first man who 
made it into the first tool. Equally, travellers passing through uninhabited land would be excited to find 
any man-made objects - the remains of a tent, or empty cans - and an immediate feeling of having 
some communication with human beings. 
	 - 
However, consciousness carved into man-made objects remains superfluous to the matter on which 
it is inscribed. Consciousness springs off the artefact only towards another human being and remains 
dormant when no one is there. Objects themselves remain fragments of matter and do not partake of 
consciousness. This, we can assume, stands as an obstacle in the way of manufacturing artificial 
intelligence: a most sophisticated machine designed to speak, calculate and move about would not 
acknowledge these processes internally, and would remain a collection of material particles indifferent 
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to the external attempts to inject consciousness into it. When a material body gives in to the conscious 
effort coming from outside, it gives in to the physical force, unaware of the consciousness that stands 
behind it. 
Diagram 4. Consciousness in the world 
Man: 
the highest form of conscious activity. 
Evolutionary movement 	 t 	 Manufacturing: 
consciousness is ontologically, consciousness, descending through 
internally bound with the materiality of 
	 boufy to matter, is an external addition 
living creatures, 	 to material objects. 
Primitive life forms: 	
.4rtefacts: 
rudimentary conscious 
	 they bear a conscious imprint 
activity, 	 alien to them. 
In organic bodies consciousness is an integral part of their being and a driving force of their form of 
existence which is internally connected with their creation wherein an act of will (or quasi-will) creates 
directly. In material artefacts consciousness too, is the driving force of their creation out of raw matter, 
but here consciousness cannot act directly - it must use mediating elements such as body and tools. 
Also, ëonsciousness always remains outside the object and can never become an integral part of its 
being. Consciousness in the artefact can be recognised only by another consciousness, but not by the 
object itself. 
The hierarchy of movement in the living process, as it appears in Bergson's theory, can be 
summarised in the following terms. The work of an organ is restricted to a particular spatio-temporal 
Any further pursuits to follow up conscious input into material artefacts would need to refer to 
llyenkov's objective idealism. According to Ilyenkov, manufacturing involves giving a new physical 
form to the material object (pieces of wood) as well as attributing to the object certain significance 
(table), which has nothing to do with the physical substance of the object. This significance is the 
objectively existing "ideal form" of the object. See E V llyenkov, "The Concept of the Ideal", 
Philosophy in the USSR: Problems of Dialectical Materialism, Moscow, Progress, 1977. For an 
interpretation by a Western commentator, see Bakhurst, pp.  155 - 178. 
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point. Instinct isa prolongation of the work of an organ. Introducing extra mobility, it breaks the spatial 
immediacy of the body but, unable to be aware of anything but the immediacy, it is confined to the 
temporal immediacy which it prolongs into the next moment. It is true that the end of the work of 
instinct may lie far in the distance (reproductive behaviour, for example), but this end at a distance is 
not known through instinct, and instinct appears concerned only with the prolongation of the here-and-
now into the next moment. Intelligence goes beyond maintaining the continuity of life and satis'ing 
natural requirements and concerns itself with the fUture, ensuring that the continuity of life is 
maintained in the remote future and not just in the present and in the immediate future. 
As for the place that an individual self occupies in the hierarchy of being, we have learnt that firstly, 
the duration of selthood is modelled as a living process, and is.itself a fragment of that living process, 
enriched by intelligence. In the structure of duration, there are various currents: the current that is but a 
prolongation of the stream of life, manifesting itself as innate cognitive abilities common to all 
humans; the current that is a prolongation of concrete hereditary features such as traits of character; the 
concrete developed intelligence and concrete traces of instinct that are addressed to concrete content 
and are responsible for the self-awareness of the individual, that part of the individual that defies the 
evolutionary movement and regards its own being as the end of all prior evolutionary development. 
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Chapter 5. Heterogeneous duration 
I. Heterogeneous duration: non-numerical multiplicity 
The content of heterogeneous qualities is not confined to their physical immediacy but includes 
relations with other qualities. Thus heterogeneous qualities cannot be singled out as units within a 
multiplicity. Their individuality is exposed by the spec (fic effects they have on the world 
The brief exposition of the three major Bergsonian texts (see Chapters 2-4) demonstrates that his 
philosophy points towards a theory of the universal principle of being - heterogeneous duration. 
However, this theory is incomplete because the discussion of duration is fragmented and its 
exemplification as concrete modes of being is not systematic. We will attempt to develop a plausible 
version of heterogeneous duration, complying with Bergson's key principles where possible, and then 
apply it to concrete reality. This chapter will be centred on the general metaphysical aspects of 
duration. 
The idea of heterogeneity is necessary to Bergson's project of making a radical distinction between 
simultaneous and successive phenomena, which form the continuity of identity of a temporally 
stretched unity. The key difference between a spatially stretched unity with all its elements being 
simultaneous and a temporal unity is that, according to Bergson, the spatial unity can be divided into 
parts with clear spatial borders, whereas the temporal unity cannot be broken down into segments 
which can be regarded as separate from one another. Thus, he claims in Time and Free Will, the 
temporal continuity is indivisible. In Matter and Memory we learn that ultimately, spatial reality is also 
indivisible (MM. p.  196), because after all, all reality is temporal, even that which seems purely spatial. 
Thus Bergson opposes the idea of temporal duration not to space but to our illusory idea of purely 
spatial reality. 
For Bergson, if elements of continuity cannot be separated, this means that they cannot be treated as 
its countable subunits. On the other hand, the content of temporal continuity is not the same throughout 
" tapek offers a thorough analysis of the Bergsonian heterogeneity with links to other key notions of 
the Bergsonian philosophy. See Capek, pp.83— 186, esp. pp.  118— 125; 142— 151. A brief 
explanation of the Bergsonian heterogeneity can be found in Lacey, pp.  49 - 50. Moore's account of 
heterogeneous properties of duration is also useful: see F. C. T. Moore, pp.  54-65. 
its development; it differs from its previous stages, firstly because every event evolves, and secondly 
because it simply becomes older and accumulates the time of its own swelling existence. This makes 
Bergson assert that in its essence, duration is a non-numerical qualitative multiplicity. But this is not 
all; he also talks of the elements of duration permeating one another. He uses metaphors of a ripening 
fruit and a snowball in order to show that the past stages of duration do not disappear but become 
integrated into the state in which the duration finds itself at present. 
The example of a musical piece is supposed to provide a decisive demonstration of a phenomenon 
which is incomprehensible in any other way than as an unbroken temporal unity with elements diverse 
but inseparable from each other, and whose meaning depends on the other elements. To spell this out, 
let us imagine a musical phrase abcda. All these notes can be taken as separate units. They can be 
played in isolation, or in a different order. Each of them can also be combined with other notes in 
another musical phrase. For instance, the musician can single out the note d, play it alone, or in a 
sequence cgad. But as a member of the phrase abcda, the identity of the note dcannot be defined solely 
by its physical immediacy. The musical meaning of d is defined by its relations with abc and a. 
Isolated from abc and a, alone, or as part of a phrase cgad, the meaning and identity of d will be 
different. Thus the content ofdspills over out of its own physical and temporal immediacy and spreads 
beyond itself involving the surrounding elements. 
An attempt to enumerate qualities in such heterogeneity would mean treating a, b, c, dand a as units 
which represent their content by themselves. But such isolation kills the music. As we can see, since 
each note contributes to the content and identity of each other note, then enumeration of them as units 
becomes very complicated. If we wanted to treat das a countable unit, we would have to assume by 
this that dexhausts its own content and is complete without reference to abc and a, and also to abcda. 
But to complete d, we must involve other notes in the phrase as well as the complete phrase itself. That 
defies the idea of presenting abcda as a collection of countable units, and das one of those units. So, 
abcda must be accepted as a unity which entails multiplicity, as a heterogeneity in the Bergsonian 
sense. Or, as Moore usefully observed, it may be said that heterogeneity entails complexity rather than 
multiplicity. 56 
The above exemplifies a heterogeneity of an obviously temporal piece of reality: a musical piece 
needs time to be brought to life. But the idea of heterogeneity is supposed to be applicable to the reality 
16 
 F. C. Moore, p. 64 
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of everything existent, which is necessarily, albeit not always obviously, temporal. Let us test another 
multiplicity of qualities: we drink tea, which is liquid, hot and sweet. Could we treat all three qualities 
as separate Lmits? Sweetness could be such a unity, if we could isolate it and point at it ostensively. We 
taste the sweetness, but it is inseparable from the liquid and the heat. Sweetness cannot appear by itself; 
wherever sweetness occurs, it needs to be accompanied by other properties. It does not have to be tied 
with liquid and heat specifically: if it is the sweetness of an apple, it will be tied to the hardness and 
coldness of the apple's texture. But whatever its accompanying properties are, it cannot be felt in 
separation from them, nor can it be separately located. In either tea or apple, we have a heterogeneity 
where the identity and content of every element depend on everything else. 
In heterogeneity the whole obviously consists of diverse components, but they are not extractable as 
individual items with definite outlines. But how do we know that they remain distinct qualities, have 
not become homogenised and maintain the heterogeneity of the whole? Unexpectedly, help comes 
from the remote philosophical past, from Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica. In Treatise on the 
Angels, he faces a problem, similar to ours. He needs to account for the multiplicity of angels, linking it 
with his earlier conclusion that the latter are not corporeal. " 
Aquinas' position is that the form explains the species membership, and matter explains the 
individuality of things, but this does not work for angels because they are not material. Since angels do 
not contain matter and form, they cannot be distinguished as separate individuated units and cannot be 
enumerated. Yet, Aquinas needs to demonstrate the diversity of angels, as he would not want to assert 
that there is just one angel, because it is only God that is one. Aquinas' solution is that angels differ as 
do species or kinds, similar to qualities within the Bergsonian qualitative multiplicity. There is also the 
possibility of explaining matters further, outlined by Aquinas but not pursued by him. Aquinas wants to 
prove that angels cannot belong to one species, and one of his passages reads as follows. "And if the 
angels had matter, not even then could there be several angels of one species. For it would be necessary 
for matter to be the principle of distinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according to the division 
of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according to the diversity of their powers." 
" Aquinas, p. 297 
Ibid, italics mine. 
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Matter cannot explain the diversity of powers, according to Aquinas, but we will say that the 
diversity of the powers of the events in itself explains differentiation. What Aquinas provides here, in 
effect, is identification of an entity, which would be an alternative to the ostensive visual singling out 
of it. An entity, we read in this, maybe identified as such according to the effect it has on the rest of the 
world, the effect which would differ from effects produced by other entities. For the purpose of this 
enquiry, we can apply Aquinas' remark on angels to reality in general and distinguish qualities within a 
heterogeneous multiplicity by relations that they emanate, if the direct spatial or quasi-spatial 
identification is not possible. 
The key feature of a qualitative non-numerical multiplicity must be the interrelatedness of all 
qualities involved in its construction. For if there are distinct qualities, they must produce distinct 
relations with each other, or else the difference between the qualities would fade away, and the 
heterogeneity, the multiplicity of qualities, would collapse into homogeneity, and become just 
one quality. In other words, each quality will have to demonstrate the way in which it remains opposed 
to other qualities, albeit escaping identification as a phenomenon occupying a spatio-temporal position, 
reserved for that phenomenon only. 
Returning to our example of the heterogeneity of music, we could say that d is a necessarily 
qualitative component of abcda. When we listen to a, b, c, dand a, we bear in mind the entire 
sequence, but the effect that each element produces in us differs. The first a may evoke a sense of 
anticipation and a desire to hear the whole phrase; b and c could represent a build up of emotional 
tension; d would be its culmination and the second a would give us a sense of anticlimax and bring the 
phrase to a conclusion, as if it had been a mini journey, where we started out at a and returned to a, 
enriched by the experience of b, c and d. All the notes, albeit entwined with each other, produce a 
different effect on the listener and in this they remain distinct from each other. As for the liquid, heat 
and sweetness of tea, they too produce different effects on us even though they cannot exist or appear 
in separation. In fact, it is their effects in the first place that make us distinguish them as individual 
qualities. 
T. 
2. Constructive negation: same and other 
Bachelard 's suggestion to include negation into heterogeneity is accepted, but only as a relation of 
phenomena's own absence which phenomena emanate. This negation accounts for the diversity of 
qualities within heterogeneity but does not explain the emergence of new types of being. 
Bergson explicitly argued in Creative Evolution that duration which equals being does not involve 
negation, because negation is not an ontological but an epistemological feature. " We will argue that 
although Bergson is opposed to negation understood as a void, the idea of duration does not exclude 
negation if it is understood in terms of sameness and otherness. For if we follow Bergson and cancel 
negation altogether, then the theory of duration can be taken as a one-sided affirmation of fullness - as 
Bachelard understands it. 
The very idea of temporal heterogeneity, Bachelard observes, with the diversity of its qualities 
taking place over a period of time, means the presence of some qualities and the absence of others, and 
when absence gives way to presence, we have a change from negation to affirmation, and that in itself 
is a leap. Bachelard claims that in order to accept continuity strictly in the Bergsonian sense, we would 
have to give up heterogeneity and instead assert the homogenised content of duration, which is the 
same at all times. Following this, the idea of novelty and becoming would have to be given up too, as 
absolute sameness of content would not allow for novelty and change. Of the living duration Bachelard 
says: "So great is heterogeneity of its terms that succession is in effect discontinuity." 60 
 Bachelard's 
ambition is to improve the Bergsonian continuity by bringing discontinuity into it: "Time is 
continuous as possibility ... It is discontinuous as being." 6 ' He introduces lacunae into duration, trying 
to reflect the "duality of events and intervals" 62 
See Chapter 4, Section 1 for an exposition of Bergson's theory of the nought. 
° Bachelard, p.  42 
Bachelard, p. 44 
62 Bachelard, p. 19 
Describing Bergson's philosophy as "a philosophy of flullness" 63 , Bachelard says that there is no room 
in it for contradiction or emptiness of any kind. 
To counteract continuity which can possibly be understood as the sameness of the temporal content 
of duration, Bachelard introduces into it nothingness. Bergson explicitly excluded the nought from 
ontology claiming that negation of x is secondary to affirmation of xM,  and Bachelard is sceptical about 
this. Convinced that the dialectic of being and non-being is the foundation of ontology, he links it to the 
idea of becoming preceded by a void, for as he observes, "the miracle of being is as extraordinary as 
that of resurrection." 65 
Arguing against the one-sidedness of Bergson's argument that the idea of nought is parasitic on the 
idea of being, Bachelard remarks, "[W]hile it is very true that you can only empty what you first found 
full, it is just as accurate to say that you can only fill what you first found empty. ... [T]here seems to 
us to be a perfect correlation between emptiness and fullness. One is not clear without the other and in 
particular, one idea is not clarified without the other." 66 
 In other words, Bachelard finds negation to be 
a necessary background for affirmation. 
It can be said that Bachelard's efforts in this respect are unnecessary because Bergson's 
heterogeneity already accounts for discontinuity via the notion of a continuingly growing multiplicity 
of diverse qualities. Bergson himself admits of leaps in duration, when he recognizes that the 
evolutionary movement is not a smooth process. "But it proceeds rather like a shell, which suddenly 
bursts into fragments, which fragments, being themselves shells, burst in their turn into fragments 
destined to burst again, and so on for a time incommensurably long." (CE, p.  103) As Marie Cariou 
observes, "Bachelard raisonne comme si In durée était one substance homogene. Mais c'est bien pour 
éviter au confraire cette interpretation que Bergson parle d'élan, de directions, de tendances." (Cariou 
(1995), p.70) 67 She points out that Bachelard's erroneous perception of duration as a smooth continuity 
is due to an overestimation of Bergson's comparison of duration with a melody. She reminds the reader 
63 Rachelard, p.23 
"See Chapter 4, Section 1, p. 51. 
65 Rachelard, p.  32 
Rachel ard, p.  30 
67 
"Bachelard treats duration as if it were homogeneous substance. But this is so as to avoid that 
interpretation of duration where Bergson talks of drive, of directions, of tendencies." (Translation mine 
—E.F.) 
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that Bergson also talks of turbulent currents and of swelling rivers. This diversity of images, she 
suggests, is supposed to illustrate the diversity of qualities of duration, which should not be restricted to 
one definition based on only one image. The Hergsonian duration, according to her, involves efforts 
and overcomes obstacles, which contradicts the image of a quietly flowing river. (Cariou (1995), pp.  70 
—71) We would add that Bachelard's misinterpretation of duration could have been avoided if Bergson 
had not argued against negation in the way he did. Accepting his claim that one must not posit the void 
prior to positing duration, we will reintegrate the nought into duration in a different role. 
It seems that the difficulty in the way of understanding the nought is that philosophers, including 
Bergson and Bachelard, expect it to be a quality, polar to being but equal to the latter as an ontological 
category. Any suggestion to consider reality in terms of the dialectic of being and nothingness equates 
the roles of being and the nought, where being actively creates and the nought actively destroys. As a 
quality, the nought must be able to sustain itself and be comprehensible as a self-contained 
phenomenon. However attempts to grasp the nought without any reference to being collapse into 
absurdity because the nought then should be responsible for maintaining its own existence, its own 
being. As soon as one realises that, one will inevitably say that the idea of the being of the nought 
contradicts the idea of the nought itself, because it is supposed to be absolute non-being. That is why 
Bergson is forced to conclude that the nought and negation in general are artificial constructs, 
secondary to the reality of absolute affirmation, and then he excludes negation from ontology. 68 
We are prepared to talk of being and nothingness as parts of a heterogeneous whole, but with a 
necessary asymmetry between these terms. We will not seek in nothingness qualitative features and the 
ability to sustain itself as an absolute void and, contrary to Bergson, we will include it in the objective 
world. We will say that concrete manifestations of being within themselves contain non-being of some 
properties and themselves radiate their own non-being in other places and at other times. In this, we are 
taking on board Plato's position developed in Sophist, where not-being of some properties is taken as 
the being of other properties rather than an absolute void. 69 The difference between the Platonic 
position and ours, Bergsonian, will be that we will add a dynamic dimension to being and not-being. If 
Plato merely states the being of some property and points out its not-being replaced by the being of 
For a recent discussion on nothingness, which brings together Western and Japanese philosophers, 
see James W. Heisig, Philosophers of Nothingness, University of Hawaii Press, 2002. 
69 Plato, Sophist, Kessinger Publishing, 2004, pp.  23 - 25 
another property, we are saying that the being of a property produces, generates its own not-being 
beyond its own boundaries. 
Whereas being in its self-evident self-affirmation is a quality, negation of its presence at other times 
and other places is a relation. As a quality, each embodied manifestation of being emanates a halo of 
numerous relations, and amongst them there is not having certain properties, or not being in any other 
places rather than in a particular one. 
Negation taken in this sense is ontologically secondary to being understood in qualitative terms, 
albeit it does not mean, of course, that it is temporally later than being. It is a relation which is not 
made up by a rational observer but is ontologically presupposed. The facts that a given table is not 
white and is not in this room are not mere "pedagogical" constructs, as Bergson would put it, because 
for the table to be described as not white and not in this room, it must not be white and not be in this 
room in its actual reality. 
As part of reality, negation appears in the following guises. It can be the non-existence of some 
quality at time it, possibly followed by the existence of that quality at time it'. Or it can be that an entity 
displays some qualities and not others. One may argue that these relations require a perceiver in order 
to be ascribed to a quality, and that therefore they do not, strictly speaking, belong to the quality. From 
the Bergsonian standpoint we will say that even if the perceiver may be required to acknowledge a 
relation, the acknowledgment is itself a relation, and it takes two terms to give rise to a relation. So the 
relation of acknowledgment cannot be created unilaterally by the perceiver. If it could, then it would be 
up to the perceiver to ascribe any relation to any quality, but this is not so. Relations, even those 
articulated by the perceiver, are regulated by qualities themselves. 
The negation as a relation is not a mighty rival of being, equal to being and posing as a monster that 
gnaws on being: this negation has a constructive role to play in the formation of heterogeneity. For 
instance, we can distinguish between duration at time it', (d9, and the same duration at time t (d-'). d2 is 
richer in content than d', because d' includes d' as its history. Thus negation involved in the 
heterogeneous duration is not a pure indifferent "is not" indicating a simple fact "xis noty". "Is not", 
which underlies the identity of its elements, is immediately complicated as "more than", "later than", 
"part of", etc., and these relations in themselves are involved in the formation of the heterogeneous 
duration. 
w 
Negation entails directedness of one element to another, comparison, thus playing a positive role - 
coordinating terms which it differentiates. In particular, past and future entities, albeit absent in the 
present, are not negated absolutely. They are not those which "are not" but those which "are not yet" or 
"are not any more", as well as "not here". This in its turn indicates that real qualities have some 
directedness built into them, a vector value, so to speak, and that their being, even in relation to itself, 
includes being in a particular place and in a particular period of time, because outside that place and 
that time the entity in question does not exist in its embodied form. 
Qualities are not locked in within themselves but reach out for other qualities, transcend themselves, 
emanating relations or, in other words, are in themselves vectorial: they harbour relations with other 
qualities within their own nature: if x is later than y, then x must bear within itself an in-built vector 
which directs x towards y and makes them comparable. In particular, when qualities are present, the 
"presentness" is both a relation of simultaneity with other active phenomena and an intrinsic state of 
the event. It is down to the inherent structure of the process ontologically to assert that it is active and 
present, but being present is also a relation directed outwards of oneself, revealing the temporal vector 
of the given phenomena. 	 - 
It may also be said that negation is the most basic relation that individuates qualities within duration 
when we fail to do so via ostensive affirmation. Whist we cannot establish the exact positive 
parameters of, say, note d within abcda, we can still say that d is not abcda, or that d is not a or c. We 
could summarise the above discussion by saying that the way in which elements can be distinguished 
in a non-numerical heterogeneous multiplicity is by using what we call here constructive negation that 
helps to expose the identity of qualities. It shapes qualities, by opposing their sameness to the 
surrounding otherness, but it also binds the same and the other in various relations. 
Without introducing this kind of negation into ontology, we end up with every feature of reality 
being omnipresent, which would, in its turn, endanger the concept of heterogeneity, homogenising all 
content, making no distinction between presence and absence, between the past, present and future. 
Eventually, we would have to accept everything as some kind of undifferentiated One, into which all 
differences would inevitably collapse. Allowing constructive negation as a relation that being 
generates, we are able to maintain the balance between presence and absence, and comprehend 
temporal succession: for example, despite the difficulty of finding positive characteristics for the 
present, it can be characterised negatively as not past and not future. 
In heterogeneity, the same and the other are distinct qualities connected together, but the connection 
between them is not a loose relation but an in-built feature which assures the integrity of the entire 
heterogeneous whole. As Bergson warns, if we separate terms of this whole and allocate to them fixed 
temporal and spatial coordinates, we will erase the connection between them, which in its turn, would 
fragment the heterogeneous whole, reliant on the integrity and balance of all its terms. It could be said 
that in a heterogeneity, there are no gaps between qualities, and no mediating elements apart from 
qualities themselves. Their relations are made up of vectors found in qualities, and the joining is 
complete. However, the differentiation between qualities is maintained by constructive negation which 
opposes the same and the other within heterogeneity. 
Thus we could argue against Bachelard that the idea of fullness does not contradict the qualitative 
diversity of being: there can be fullness without emptiness, but the sameness of one quality implies its 
absence in the otherness of another quality. Bachelard seems to imply that absence of a quality, even if 
replaced by the presence of another quality, means a gap, a lacuna. Does this have to be the case? The 
question is: what is the ontological status of non-existence and absence? - 
The Bergsonian duration, as we can see, progresses and expands with time. Its content is constantly 
on the increase, and new qualities are being added to the previous ones. In this process we do not see 
any gaps between the old and the new: the old simply grows bigger, and the new does not appear at the 
expense of the loss or absence of the old, because the old does not disappear in order to give way to the 
new. As time expands, it makes room for both. Where we do, nevertheless, see a gap is looking at the 
old prior to the new. In our next task of applying heterogeneity to selfhood, we will observe these gaps 
in trying to find a foundation for psychology in living matter, and a foundation for biology in inanimate 
mailer. Granted that time is a constructive component of duration, it is not however the only 
constructive component. In order to give rise to a new level of evolution, time alone is not enough. 
However, new layers of being appear in the new time, and create a relation of their own absence in the 
past. It is these lacunae that we shall find difficult to fill or explain, in order to preserve the idea of 
continuity. Constructive negation explains the diversity within a unity, but it does not explain how new 
types of being appear seemingly from nowhere. 
Fral 
3. Changing the past: backward causality 
Inevitably, Bergsonism leadc to a theory of the changeable past, where new events affect past ones by 
adding to them new relations such as causal properties. 
In our opinion, the philosophy of duration unavoidably leads to an observation that the future affects 
the past. Bergson comes very close to saying this in his later philosophy: in chapter 3 of The Creative 
Mind, entitled "The Possible and the Real", he argues that we can say that such and such a real event 
was possible only in retrospection, for it is the realisation of it at some present time that made its being 
possible or potential in some past time. For, as the future is essentially uncertain, the state of affairs in 
the present does not entail the possibility of being a kind of pre-existence of some future events which 
will eventually happen. The following quotation is almost an introduction into the philosophy of 
changeable past: "Backwards over the course of time a constant remodelling of the past by the present, 
of the cause by the effect, is being carried out", because "it is the real which makes itself possible, and 
not the possible which becomes real." (CM, p.  104) Bergson stops at this but we will argue that the past 
(not as part of the metaphysical framework but as part of embodied temporal reality) constantly 
changes 70, 
 affected by the events that follow. 
We remember from Matter and Memory that for Bergson, the past temporal reality is primarily 
disembodied reality. It is the reality that "acts no longer" (MM, p.  68), unknowable when taken as the 
pure past (MM, p.  135). Yet the past survives (MM, p.  149). All of the past pushes onto the present and 
some of it is recalled to life - in a new guise, as a foundation and backing for new, present occurrences. 
Our key claim regarding the past as part of heterogeneity will be that the past changes, and the proof 
will be based on the role that retrospective issues play in the construction of the real. Naturally, we 
must expect that any talk of changing the past may provoke an extremely sceptical reaction." Indeed, 
changing the past is a taboo imposed on us by the laws of physics, logic and ontology, and we find that 
all philosophies agree that the past is written in stone once and for all. When imagination dares to 
challenge this taboo, the attempts are severely punishable - Faust, meddling with the natural course of 
70 For an altemative treatment of possibility and retrospective issues see Mullarkey (1999), pp.68-SI 
' For a meticulous and thorough validation of the irreversibility of temporal processes see Adolf 
Grtlnbaum, "Time, Irreversible Processes, and the Physical Status of Becoming" in J. J. C. Smart, (ed.) 
Problems of Space and Time, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1968, pp.  397-416 
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biological processes, must hand over his soul to the devil in return for his second youth. 72 Yet we 
intend to prove that the idea of duration requires our accepting that in some sense the past of temporal 
reality can and does change, and even that the foundation for this view exists in Bergson's original 
texts, albeit without his being aware of the fact. 
What we mean by the idea of changing the past needs to be clarified. Ordinarily, this would be 
understood in the terms of science fiction as going back to the chosen moment in the past and altering 
the physical content of events that happened then. We mean nothing of the sort. On the contrary, time 
travel is an ontological absurdity, from the Bergsonian point of view, because leaving one's original 
temporal coordinates would be as destructive for one's identity as leaving behind one's size and one's 
colour. "Time, for Bergson, is the essential stuff everything is made of and, of course, it appears as 
particular temporal stretches, integrated into the network of global time, not as some loose chunks of 
time which hang by themselves, unattached to the total temporal continuity, and which can float from 
one set of temporal coordinates to another. Besides, if the travelling entity, whilst entering the past, 
retains all its experiences and memories acquired in consequent times, then we must assume a 
multiplication of timelines, where one present coexists with another present, which is really past: we 
take it for granted that these facts are unchangeable. Neither do we intend to claim that events can 
exchange their temporal positions, or be erased from the past. What we are proposing is that in 
temporal heterogeneity, where all elements are bound together, later elements contribute something to 
the content of earlier elements. 
Let us consider the following two events: 
I. The assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife on 28 June 1914 in 
Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip 
2. The First Word War 
Historians universally agree that event I, the assassination, is a cause of event 2, the war, and 
therefore we will treat them as links in the objective chain of events. When the 28 " of June 1914 was 
the present time, and the Archduke had just been killed, it was a formidable but localised event. No 
one, including the assassin himself, would have seen this as the start of a war which by August would 
72 Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe, Faust, Oxford University Press, 1998 
" For an earnest consideration of the possibility of time travel see David Lewis, "The Paradoxes of 
Time Travel" in Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath (ed.), The Philosophy of Time, Oxford 
University Press, 1993, pp.  134-146. 
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already involve Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, Russia, Serbia, Britain and Belgium. In June, the 
recent assassination was a mere act of personal terrorism, a political murder. But in August it became 
the cause of the First World War, which later involved other nations as well and cost the world an 
estimated 10 million lives. 
Thus event 1, the assassination, became something else - the cause of the First World War - after it 
was no longer present. We cannot say that the assassination was the cause of the war at the time of it 
taking place but we just did not know about it, because on the 28 " of June 1914 the future state of 
affairs was uncertain and the assassination may not have led to the war if, for example, Russia had not 
mobilised in response to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia. But the events that followed the 
assassination did lead t6the war, and so events which followed event I changed the nature of the event 
I, by contributing new content to it. 
To take a biographical, example, Wellington's biographer, Richard Holmes, in his account of the 
Iron Duke's earlier years, mentions: "... [H]e was soundly thrashed by a young blacksmith named 
Hughes, who was proud to relate how he had beaten the man who beat Napoleon?' 75 
Holmes brings this up as nothing more than an amusing anecdote, but we see in this the work of 
time that makes changes in the past. The youngster whom Hughes had thrashed was not, of course, the 
Duke of Wellington who celebrated the victory at Waterloo. He was not even the future Duke of 
Wellington, because when the scuffle with the blacksmith took place somewhere in the I 780s, the 
future did not shape itself favourably for Arthur Wellesley. Far from expecting him to become a 
significant figure in the history of Europe, his family hoped that he would merely get by in life, so to 
speak, and a free commission in the army was not the preferred but the only option available to the 
sixteen year old of no special talents or fortune. Such were the present situation and the future 
projection of it for Arthur in the mid eighties. 
Thirty years on, when the present time falls on the year 1815, Arthur Wellesley is Duke of 
Wellington and a national hero. We can see how the embodied eventuality of 1815 changes the nature 
ofan event which happened back in the 1780s. By 1815, the Arthur Wellesley of the 1780s in ISIS had 
become the future liuke of Wellington who would beat Napoleon. So it is only retrospectively that 
Susanne Everett, World War!, Hamlyn, London, 1980 
Holmes, p.  8 
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Hughes the blacksmith became the one who had beaten the man who was to beat Napoleon, and not 
when the scuffle between the young men actually took place. 76 
In Creative Evolution, Bergson refers to the human species as "the culminating point of the 
evolution of the vertebrates" (CE, p. 141), on the basis that it claims "the entire earth for its domain" 
(CE, p. 140). If we agree that the dominant species ought to be considered an end of evolutionary 
development then humans are indeed its culminating point. On the other hand, this is the state of affairs 
at present. We can imagine a remote future where humanswill have evolved as a new species, 
creatures, say, with a far advanced brain capacity who will claim not only the earth but other planets as 
well. In that remote future the humans of the present day will become past, and no longer will be the 
end point of evolution. They will have become a stepping-stone towards a more developed, more 
powerful species, and so their role in the universe will have changed after they have gone. 
Thus we shall insist that the past changes and it is the causal relations that are best suited to reveal 
its changeability. This can be presented schematically in the following terms. Let us assume that c is a 
cause and e is its effect, and that c is earlier than e. When c takes place at time 1, it is not yet the cause 
of e, because e has not yet happened, and we accept that the fUture is ontologically uncertain. c 
becomes the cause of e when e takes place at time C, but by that time c is already past. Thus the 
characteristic of c as the cause of e is attributed to c in retrospect - c becomes the cause of e when c is 
already gone. Our claim here is that e has changed the past by attributing to ca new ontological feature 
—that of being the cause of e. 
We shall try to anticipate possible arguments against this. For example, we may be questioned on the 
very concept of causality. For example, how do we distinguish between a true cause and a mere 
condition of something happening? We could quote Collingwood who states that both would be a part 
of the genuine cause, which is "made up of two elements", and "[n]either ... could be a cause if the 
other were absent." " But we shall go further than that. Remaining on the Bergsonian premises, we can 
cancel out the distinction between cause and condition because, for Bergson, the emergence of the 
present is caused by the entire past, and as both cause and condition are past, it makes no sense to 
distinguish between them. But going even further, from the platform of the revised Bergsonism, we 
76 
For an altemative explanation of this,let us say that the researcher who is writing these words started 
school in 1982. In 1982 that child was not the fUture researcher because the future is generally 
uncertain and she could have chosen another career. But now she is a researcher, and this fact makes 
the child of 1982 a future researcher retrospectively. 
" Collingwood, p.  292 
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shall allow the distinction between the decisive cause of an event and the mere condition which made it 
possible. We shall say that the difference between them is temporal. The state of affairs at time F is a 
condition for a range of future possibilities at the future time C, but when the future time t'becomes 
present and the reality has shaped itself as a definite present event, then this condition has become the 
cause and as such, gained a new causal property. 
Also, a sceptic would say, it is not the past that changes, but the present contains a new evaluation 
of the past which makes no difference to the past itself. He or she may add that causality is a relation 
which matters to the effect and not to the cause. In response to that we can say that it is quite right to 
characterise causality as a relation: we have already introduced it as a relation ourselves. However, our 
analysis of qualities and relations within heterogeneity 78 convinces us that they do not come in a pure 
form, autonomous and independent of each other. Qualities inevitably prolong themselves as relations, 
and relations in their tum affect qualitative properties to varying degrees. This is true because qualities 
and relations do not hang suspended in mid-air waiting to be connected but rather produce each other, 
keeping up the idea of continuity and duration. So when we talk of causal relations, we find that fore it 
is qualitatively important that it is an effect of c because this fact reflects its history, but then it is 
equally qualitatively important for c that it is a cause of e, fore cannot remain indifferent to a relation 
that connects it with another quality: relations connect both terms, and are not one-sided. But that new 
qualitative addition is only possible after the emergence of e, i.e. when c is past. 
Another criticism could be that it is a logical condition of c that it is the kind of quality that can give 
rise to e, and that this characterisation eliminates the point which we are arguing. To this we would 
reply that firstly, Bergson already says that the potentiality is determined retrospectively, after it has 
been realised. Secondly, and more importantly, there is an ontological difference between can and did, 
and the quality that can give rise to e is not the same as the quality that did give rise to e. It may be 
argued that if the assassination of the Archduke had not happened, the war would still have broken out, 
triggered by something else and therefore the assassination is not the actual and ultimate cause of it. 
But due to the ontological difference between could and did, the fact is that Gavrilo Princip's actions 
led to a chain of events which escalated into a global conflict, however bizarre this may seem when we 
compare both events. Altematively the sportsman who did win the trophy is rightly treated differently 
from all those who could have won the trophy but never look the trouble to fight for it. Thus time, we 
71 See Section 1 of this chapter. 
insist, affects not just the embodied reality which it constructs but also the embodied reality which it 
leaves behind. 
It may also be argued that if we say that eisa cause when c happens as its result, this only changes 
our subjective interpretation of past events which does not necessarily reflect the objective state of 
affairs. An answer to that could be the Bergsonian reply that interpretation is also pan of the being of 
the event. But to make it stronger, we will say that if the division of reality into causes and effects is 
subjective and ontologically unreliable, then any continuity falls apart into atomised elements and 
dissipates altogether because, if causes and effects are dispensed with, there is nothing to hold the 
continuity together objectively. Every minute event can be divided into causes and effects, and if we 
regard causality as superimposition of interpretation, then even minute events will be eliminated from 
ontology. With every phenomenon broken down to unconnected elements, we would end up with a 
picture of an atomised, pulverised universe, but even that view could be said to be a result of a 
subjective interpretation. 
As for Bergson's own inadvertent contribution to the theory of a changeable past, we get glimpses 
of the constructive role of retrospectivity as early as Chapter 2 of Time and Free Will, where Bergson 
claims that duration "forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole." (TrW, p.  100) 
Bergson unpacks this later as a unidirectional process, with the movement being effected solely from 
the past towards the future. However, we are compelled to say, if past and present states melt "into one 
another", then the influence should be mutual, in the way that not just the past elements would affect 
the present ones, but the present ones should somehow affect the past ones. 
Next we leam that it is retrospection that underpins and constructs spatial representations. When we 
perceive a succession of elements we, according to Bergson, set them out in line "after having 
distinguished them." (TFW, p.  102, italic mine) For Bergson, setting out in line is spatialising, which is 
a wrong and misleading procedure, but we see in this the positive work of arranging past elements into 
something new that can only appear retrospectively. 
In Chapter 3 of Time and Free Will Bergson portrays retrospective self-consciousness which reveals 
to our present self the motives of our past actions of which we were not aware at the time: "[W]e shall 
believe that we are acting freely, and it is only by looking back to the past, later on, that we shall see 
For an alternative defence of the objectivity of causal relations see Michael Dummett, "Bringing 
about the Past" in Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath (ed.), The Philosophy of Time, Oxford 
University Press, 1993, pp.  117— 133. 
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how much we were mistaken." (TFW, p. 169, italics mine) The same would apply to the understanding 
of one's own free acts: we realise that we acted freely, only when turning back to our past ideas and 
feelings, "not unperceived but rather unnoticed at the time of acting." (TFW, p. 169) 
Further on Bergson scrutinises the schema of choice between paths OX and OY (TFW, p. 176): "[l]f 
I dig deeper underneath these two opposite solutions, I discover a common postulate: both take up their 
position after the action X has been performed." (TFW, p.  179, italic mine) 80 In what Bergson 
negatively calls spatialization, we see the constructive work of retrospection. 
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In Chapter 2 of Matier and Memory, there are more unintended references to constructive 
retrospectivity. When Bergson asserts that "complete perception is only defined and distinguished by 
its coalescence with a memory-image" (MM, p. 127), he also mentions that "the memory-image itself, 
if it remained pure memory, would be ineffectual."(MM, p.  127) This is because "[v]irtual, this 
memory can only become actual by means of the perception which attracts it." (MM, p. 127) What 
matters to us here is Bergson's acknowledgment that a later event (perception) affects the previous 
event (memory) by bringing it to life. This said, we understand that even after being brought to life, the 
memory remains what it has been - a memory, a past event. 81 
° For a frill analysis of this diagram see Chapter 2, Section 5. 
SI Memory is understood here in the Bergsonian sense as the accumulated past. 
4. Predetermined but changeable future 
The constructive role of time contradicts Bergson 's arguments against predetermination as a plan. 
Partial and changeable determination of/he future as a projection of the changing past and present 
Despite Cunningham insisting that considerations of the future are abhorrent to Bergson, 82 the idea 
of the fbture can be retrieved from his arguments against finalism. Bergson argues that, in the existing 
tradition of thought, objective things, from Plato's Ideas to Kant's noumena, are considered outside 
time. This implies that everything already exists, but the limitations of our cognitive ability prevent us 
from seeing everything as already existing, making us perceive everything as becoming, unrolling in 
time. Thus temporality is superimposed on the real by our subjectivity and is seen as superfluous to the 
real being. 
Bergson asks: if everything is already given at once and the future is thus predetermined, why does 
it take a certain amount of time for events to unroll? His own answer is that time is not a mathematical 
construct that can be reduced, stretched or eliminated completely from the real events. Time is real, 
absolute and irreducible as it is, and it plays a constructive role in the process of becoming. Time is 
"causally efficacious" (CE, p.41) for the following reasons. 
I) The time it takes for a process to unroll is irreducible and is an integral part of the makeup of 
that process —just like its physical components. It takes a certain length of time for a process 
to happen; this time cannot be eliminated from the process, or reduced: therefore it is not 
relative but absolute. 
2) Each moment of time succeeding the previous one has never occurred before and will never 
occur again, and is in this sense absolutely new and unique. It always takes a new, different 
period of time for a new process to happen: thus time ensures novelty. 
3) Time is not an empty container being gradually filled with the eventual content. Events 
"make" time as they unroll, and constitute time itself. Thus the newness of each portion of 
time automatically becomes a property of its content. So the content can be apparently the 
same as in the past, but it is nevertheless different because it happens at a different time. 
82 Cunningham, p.  130 
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4) In duration, loaded with the past in the form of memories and experiences, any repeated 
experience affects each time a new, older duration, resulting each time in a totally new state of 
the being in question because it is a different being. 
Thus the Bergsonian future can be described as predetermined in form (in that everything will grow 
old and that all future events will be new) but indeterminate in content. However, we fail to see how 
the efficacy of time eliminates the possibility of the future being predetermined in the Platonic sense, if 
we take determination and novelty in the Bergsonian sense. There is a sense in which determinism 
denies novelty if novelty is to be understood as reality with original content, never thought of or 
encountered before. But for Bergson, the very fact of something existing in a new present entails 
originality and novelty and, from this perspective, his own claim that a plan would forfeit novelty 
carries no weight, because the realisation of a plan would unroll in a different time than the creation of 
the plan. The plan is an idea; its realisation is a series of events with their physicality and temporality, 
predetermined by the plan but not equal to the plan. The fact that the plan predetermined the events 
makes the former a cause and the latter an effect, but does not equate them. 
There is also the hard-line mechanistic view of predetermination as mechanistic causation 83 
 which 
Bergson plainly reduces to predetermination as a plan and hence does not address it separately. "The 
essence of mechanical explanation ... is to regard the future and the past as calculable functions of the 
present, and thus to claim that all is given." (CE, p.p. 39 —40) 
The revised Bergsonism from our standpoint allows us to account for both predetermination and 
novelty, and also challenges the mechanistic view of rigid determination. We suggest a partially 
predetermined future, which changes with every new present. The future possibilities cannot be totally 
indeterminate - they must be compatible with the previous development - and, however numerous and 
varied, are limited, and as such they are ontologically predetermined to a certain degree. It is the past - 
not the plan - that limits future possibilities. One does not need a plan to predetermine the fUture - the 
development of things themselves does it - but, although this renders the universal plan unnecessary, it 
does not dismiss it either. 
For instance, according to Skinner's position, if we abandon myths about freedom and choose the 
scientific view of reality, then we would inevitably admit that we have no capacity to interfere with 
casual properties of matter. (B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behaviour, New York, The Macmillan 
Company, 1963) 
If there isa plan, it may be produced internally as a logical projection of the actual state plus a 
certain tendency, coming from the past, which predetermines what will happen next, and after that, etc. 
Then there would be a future, predetermined by firstly, the past (inasmuch as it contains the decisive 
tendencies) and the present, and secondly, by the fact that it is inevitable that something will be in the 
future. So, if in a current state of things we can see what will become of it next, there is a plan as an 
anticipation of the future. But the realisation of the future in the present will affect the state of affairs, 
and then the plan for the more remote future will change, as it will be a projection of different 
circumstances: so, the predetermination itself will change. It is only in the present that events and 
things take their final and definite physical form and become what they are. It is the present that is 
determined in such a way that it cannot change, but the future, a projection of the present, is vulnerable 
to change and infinitely flexible - until it becomes present. Our key claim here is that different presents 
have d?/ferent  futures. 
In Bergson, the reality of the present comprises all of its history, so we can say that the next stage 
following every present state is predetermined by all of its past, all of the content of its being up to the 
present moment. So, a thing as a process completed up to a particular moment has its future determined 
and limited by all of its content. The thing at time t, comprising a content of abc has its future lying 
ahead of itself, determined as abcdef destined to have occurred by time t', and abcdefghi, destined to 
have occurred by time C', as in Diagram 5. 
Diagram 5. The stale of affairs at time!. 
abc 	 abedef 	 abcdefghi 
I 	 t' 	 I" 
present 	 future 	 future 
Diagram 5 illustrates the state of affairs at time t, with the state abc being the history of an object up 
to this moment. The state abcdef is a devetopment of abc, where the abc etement will be retained and 
def added on by time a''. As a further development of abc, the state abcdefghi will have occurred by 
time a'". So, at time t, the future states abcdef at t'and abcdefghi at (''are determined by abc at time a''. 
However the state abcdef at t' is a new reality, and at ('it is abcdef that will determine the fixture 
state at a'' and not abc. A new, different reality with new content, abcdef will determine a different 
future from the old reality, abc. So, at time t'the fUture state at a'" is altered compared to what it is at t. 
At present time t' the future 1" may be, for example, abcdeJhik, as illustrated by Diagram 6 
Diagram 6. The state of affairs at time t' 
	
abc 	 abcdef 	 abcdefhik 
	
t 	 I' 	 a'" 
	
past 	 present 	 future 
The hard-line mechanistic view would still hold, however, that this state of affairs is already 
predetermined at time t. But according to our theory of backward causality, abc, which at time 
implicates abcdef and abcdeJhik at time t'will have a different identity, enriched by relations with 
abcdef. Therefore its prolongations into the future existing at time twill become altered at time t'',and 
this, we believe, effectively disproves the mechanistic view of reality where all fixture possibilities are 
already entailed in the past. 
So, the future exists as predetermined by the whole of the accumulated temporal content, and is 
altered every time some new reality is added on to the whole of the existence of things. The future is 
predetermined by the past, but the content of this predetermination keeps changing because the past 
keeps changing. 
5. The present: temporal shift within the self 
The present warrants reality but is ostensively inaccessible by the mind The mind in the present 
recognizes the past or the future ofphysical reality, including one 's own body but misses the present. 
Hence the inner temporal displacement within the embodied self 
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The embodied present as part of the heterogeneous whole involves the following controversy. It is 
the criterion of embodied reality: real events must at some stage be present. But when we attempt to 
focus on the present moment, the present time slips through our fingers, and avoids the grasp of our 
thoughi. 
The embodied present is a quality within a heterogeneity which we cannot demonstrate ostensively 
but which manifests itself via relations with other members of the heterogeneous whole. The reality, 
including our own existence, hinges on the present: both the future and the past are refracted through 
the present and are changed by it. We cannot define the boundaries of the present from the standpoint 
of the present itself, but we say, using constructive negation, that the present is not past and not future. 
This eliminates what the present is not. Also, the present is not just "not past", and "not future" - it is 
not pastyei, and not future any more. The present entails vectorial properties which locate it within 
temporal continuity: its position between the past and the future is not a superimposed relation but is 
entailed in its own qualitative makeup. 
We caimot rationalise our experience of the present in that very present, because the present passes 
too quickly. Instead, we seek evidence of it in the time which is either past or future in relation to it. 
We know that the future will come as present, and anticipate its content more or less accurately, 
because the existing reality projects itself into the future as a limited range of possible outcomes. On 
seeing a falling object, we anticipate its hitting the floor in the coming future moment. But no sooner 
have we focused our attention on this situation, than we have already lived through the present time of 
the fall, and now it is the past time of the fall. However, the outcomes of that formerly present event - 
the object lying on the floor plus our memory of the recent fall - indicate that the embodied event of 
the object falling has just been present. 
We observe a certain temporal imbalance, a shift of temporal planes, between our conscious act and 
the objective process towards which this act is directed. Our physical and sensory existence, together 
with other material objects and organisms, joins in the formation of the present. Our thought, however, 
cannot access that present while it is present. Our conscious attention is either behind it, or in front of 
it, depending on whether we anticipate it or reflect on it: our awareness misses the present time of the 
physical reality of the world. 
The crucial moment here is that our awareness also misses the present of the physical reality of our 
own bodies inasmuch as they are part of the physical reality of the world. What Bergson labelled a 
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spatialization of the fleeting reality by intellect may be due to the temporal displacement between the 
consciousness and the body within a person. The rationalising mind needs a distance from its objects to 
perform its act, and is forced to maintain a temporal distance between itself and the embodied reality, 
including its own body. When the body lives in its present, the consciousness accompanies this process 
from the premises of its own present which is either past or future in relation to the present of the body. 
In an attempt to double on itself and reflect on its own present, the mind has to abandon this present as 
well and access it from outside, temporally removed from it. Thus even the present of the mind itself is 
not accessible by the mind whilst this present is present, because the temporal act of rationalisation 
requires its own time to unroll, and this time does not coincide with the time of its object. 
The complete coincidence of thought and its object, which should take place in the Bergsonian 
intuition, is also impossible if we revive Bergson's implicit observation that perception and, we shall 
add, acknowledgment of any type, is a process and as such, is stretched temporally. If it is triggered by 
the object at time z, it takes a stretch of time for it to develop into an image shared by the object and the 
perceiving subject, and for the subject to have thoughts about it. Thus the image will always be 
temporally dislodged and stretched in relation to the original object, as it has to belong to the time of 
both the object and the subject. What we attempt to think of as present is, in fact, past, or the present 
image of past reality. As this past reality includes our own bodies, the images that they emanate are 
delayed in relation to their actual existence. 
When we direct our mind to an unrolling event, we see a continuous, unbroken development and 
expect that if we focus hard enough, we should be able to connect with the very present time of the 
observed process. Instead, our conscious attention fluctuates between the reality that has just been 
present and has just shaped itself, and the projection of this reality into the nearest future. Our 
consciousness misses the phase of the actual shaping of reality and catches up with it only when it has 
already been shaped, which means that the present of embodied reality is always either anticipated by 
our mind or delivered to our mind with a slight delay, and both the anticipation and the delivery happen 
in the present time of the mind which does not coincide with the present time of the world and the 
body. Thus mind and body do not exist simultaneously but are in a fuzzy temporal field where 
consciousness in the present corresponds to the body in the past and in the future. 
Suppose our self is at time C. Both the mind and the body and the rest of the world are present at the 
same time C. Our mind is able to grasp in experience or in thought the body and the world at the 
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previous time t and at the following time 1'', but is unable to connect with the actual time 1'. The 
illusion is that the mind is grasping the present in its experience, but what we see is a flyover of 
consciousness from the future to the past and from the past to the future, and the state of 
unconsciousness corresponding to the present. 
To support this view of the present, we shall recall the Augustinian confession of the impossibility 
to rationalise time: "I know well enough what it is, provided nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it 
is and try to explain, I am baffled." Geoffrey Bennington interprets this as the inability to focus on 
time and links this problem to Lyotard's discussion of lateral vision whereby the attempt to bring 
lateral vision of an object of investigation into focus loses the object by transforming it into the focal 
vision which it is not meant to be. 85 Bennington suggests that time may be simply lost in a thematic 
presentation and proposes philosophical acceptance of "the unknowledgeable knowledge suggested by 
Augustine"86. We take a similar attitude in respect to the present time, the time that passes right now, 
and suggest that it is never in focus but always in a lateral field of our mental vision. When we manage 
to bring it into focus, it is no longer present but is shifted towards the immediate past or the immediate 
future. Also, George Rostrevor ,in his analysis of the Bergsonian intuition as the cognitive grasp of 
one's being coinciding temporally with one's being, finds the same inner temporal split: "{W]hen I 
examine this intuition, I am led irresistibly to the conclusion that the reflective element is not only 
present in it, but is in truth the only active element present. When I am completely absorbed in some 
activity, I have not at the same moment any consciousness of the nature of that activity." 87 
St. Augustine, p. 264 
85 Bennington (1988), pp.73-4 
86 Bennington (2001), p. 301 
' Rdstrevor, p.  55 
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Chapter 6. Time 
1. Time as a quality and as a relation 
Bergson asserts time as a quality and reduces external temporal relations to spatial relations. But 
temporal relations are not reducible to space: events do happen earlier and later in time than other 
events. Temporal relations are not reducible to qualities because some temporal relations do not affect 
the nature of events. 
In this chapter we shall consider specifically time and its role in duration. Bergson's major 
achievement in the understanding of the nature of time, as we see it, consists of maintaining and 
proving that time belongs to temporal reality as its integral part rather than something that exists 
separately from phenomena. 88 He successfully internalised time into the reality of things but in order to 
forti& his position, Bergson opposed time as part of things to time as a framework for everything that 
exists, dismissing the latter as a false, spatialised view on time. 89 
Whilst declaring time to be a qualitative, essential element of things, Bergson makes it impossible to 
consider temporal relations between things, because it can be said that they are nothing but spatial 
features where elements, for the sake of comparison, have been taken out of the genuine temporal 
sequence and presented simultaneously. As it is clear from Bergson's equating the reality of time with 
its efficacy90, from his refutation of the possibility of measuring time since measuring would involve 
comparison of temporal stretches and their simultaneous alignment 91 , and from his claim that duration 
can only be comprehended from within, 92 we understand that any relation between temporal stretches 
would be dismissed by Bergson inasmuch as they imply an externally initiated simultaneous alignment 
88 Kolakowski sums up Bergson's philosophy in one sentence: "Time is real". (Kolakowski, p.  2) An 
opposite claim that time is unreal is represented by McTaggart: see John Mclaggart Ellis McTaggart, 
The Nature of Exist ence, Vol. II, Cambridge at the University Press, 1968, Chapter XXXIII "Time", 
pp. 9 - 31. For refutations of McTaggart see D. F. Pears, "Time, Truth and Inference", in Anthony Flew 
(ed.), Essays in Conceptual Analysis, Chapter XI, pp. 228  —254, and Loizou (1986). 
89 For an exposition of this, see Chapter 4, Section I. 
9° See Chapter 5, Section 9. 
91 See Chapter 2, Section 2. 
92 See Chapter 2, Section 4. 
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of timeless entities. Thus, according to Bergson, relations between events such as "earlier" and "later" 
would merely be a spatialised view of time, where events are wrongly taken out of the genuine 
temporal sequence, mentally juxtaposed as if they were simultaneous, and their positions compared, 
very much like the spatial positions "nearer" and "further". 
We understand that, for Bergson, to be real is to be a quality, not a relation; that a quality must be a 
property that intrinsically belongs to an entity, whereas a relation is a property superimposed onto an 
entity in an epistemological act of a conscious mind, which mentally aligns one entity with another. A 
quality is a constructive component of a phenomenon, and exists in its own right, whereas the existence 
of relations is secondary to the exisiènce of self-sufficient qualities. A relation emerges as a resultant of 
a combination of at least two terms; it is a derivative of this combination and therefore its ontological 
status is less firm than that of a quality. Dependent on other things, a relation seems to be less stable, 
less dispensable and therefore less real. To defend the reality of time, Bergson insists that time is a 
quality and not a relation, thereby confining real time to the inner reality of things. 
Bergson's position on this is not unlike Bradley's. 93 Alongside external relations, which are 
superimposed on terms and do not affect their inner nature, Bradley introduces into philosophy internal 
relations, which connect the properties of an entity and reflect its very make-up. Eventually, he 
considers all relations to be internal, because he finds that the nature of things and of the whole 
universe is defined by this global network of relations. For Bradley things are not just characterised by 
relations - relations capture the inner nature of things. Every relation "exists within, and by virtue of an 
embracing unity, and apart from that totality both itself and its terms would be nothing. And the 
relation also must penetrate the inner being of its terms." 94 The assertion that all relations are ultimately 
internal is close to the Bergsonian view because Bradley is only one step away from saying that all 
relations are ultimately qualities. We, on the other hand, agree with G.E. Moore who counteracts 
Bradley's eagerness to intemalise all relations, arguing that it is not true that all relations affect their 
terms. 
Taking Bergsonism further, we need to align Bergson's idea of temporal continuity, where 
interrelated temporal elements are in a state of mutual proximity, immediacy and interpenetration, and 
Bradley, pp. 24 - 25 
Bradley, p.201 
G.E. Moore, p.  277. 
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those elements which together do not form temporal continuity but which are nevertheless temporally 
related to each other as events that happened earlier or later than each other. Retaining the Bergsonian 
idea of time as a quality, we must also offer an explanation of temporal relations. 
In this discourse, we accept internal relations as relations between qualities within heterogeneity, 
and external relations as those which exist between entities or events that do not affect each other's 
nature. We have already dealt with internal relations in Chapter 5, but it is more difficult to incorporate 
external relations into Bergsonism. If we do not, however, then Bergsonism remains a theory that 
absurdly refutes the ontological reality of "earlier" and "later" when it comes to components taken 
from distinct continuities, and maintains the impossibility of saying, for example, that the discovery of 
America took place later than the extinction of the mammoth. 
The reason for this refutation lies in Bergson's implicit claim that a relation necessarily means a 
spatial relation, where.genuinely temporal successive elements are falsely presented as simultaneous, 
because their bringing together in a relation involves their alignment in one plane, and thus they are 
made to coincide temporally, albeit in one's mind. The strict Bergsonian view thus implies that events 
_which are separated in space and time are not related at all, and constitute a mini-universe each - 
unless, of course, we accept the universe as a giant organism. 
Contrary to Bergson, relations do not necessarily presuppose a simultaneous alignment of qualities, 
whereby qualities are given, and relations are imposed on them, which, for Bergson, amounts to 
spatialization. There are genuinely temporal relations as well and the temporal relations of "earlier" and 
"later" are not reducible to spatial relations. The juxtaposing and spatialising of "earlier" and "later" 
would be merely a result of a particular usage of language, such as in tenseless theories of time. 96 
Tenseless theorists argue that it is possible to disregard tensed statements and account for temporal 
relations by saying "is earlier than" and "is later than". Instead of saying "xis past" and '3' is present", 
they suggest "x is earlier than y" thus avoiding the supposedly subjective view of reality and asserting 
ontologically eternal "timeless" truths. The element "is" indicates that temporal relations are fixed in 
eternity as, if x is earlier than;', it is always earlier than;'. Bergson would argue against such a way of 
seeing relations because the "is" used in the present tense aligns temporally diverse x andy in one time 
- the present. This way of talking also implies that reality and all relations in it are fixed from the start, 
as the tenseless "is" expresses necessity. However, instead of dismissing temporal relations, we can say 
See McTaggart, pp.9- 31. 
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that since reality is not fixed, x does not become earlier than y until both x andy become real, so at 
different times x will be, is, and was earlier than y, because, for example, when both x andy are in the 
past, they "were", and their relations with each other also "were". A similar argument is used by C. D. 
Broad against the timeless usage of"is" in McTaggart , but we argue here against its present use. 
Even though in our mind we may juxtapose events in a quasi-spatial simultaneity in order to ascribe 
to them characteristics of "earlier" and "later", in reality events undoubtedly happen earlier and later 
than other events. "Earlier" and "later" are not relations which are either fixed a-temporally or belong 
to the present in which events are compared; they emerge as events unroll and are irreducibly temporal 
relations. This shows that, firstly, the related items are not a-temporal spatial nodes but are events in 
themselves, and, secondly, that the relation is not spatial, or timeless, but grows out of the development 
of things. 
Accepting the Bergsonian argument that there are no timeless qualities in reality, 98 we rule out the 
possibility that temporal qualities may be reducible to temporal relations? 9 But we also need to show 
that the temporal relations of earlier and later are not reducible to temporal qualities. The key 
Bergsonian argument in favour of the claim that time is a quality is his proof that processes, taking time 
to unroll, need exactly that much time, not more or less, for their authenticity. This time - the particular 
length of it - cannot be dispensed with under any circumstances, if the identity of those processes is to 
be preserved. If this is true in respect to time, internal to an event, does the same apply to temporal 
relations between events? 
Supposedly, using the Bergsonian example, it is essential to the solution of sugar that the lump of 
sugar takes, say, two minutes to dissolve in water.' °° These two minutes are irreducible and Bergson is 
' Gale (ed.), p.  136 
98 As explained in Chapter 3, Section I 
For various discussions of temporal relations see, for example, Graeme Forbes, "Time, Event, and 
Modality", in Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath (ed.), The Philosophy of Time, Oxford 
University Press, 1993, pp.  84— 95; D. H. Mellor, Real Time II, Routledge, 1998; Richard Taylor, 
"Spatial and Temporal Analogies and the Concept of Identity" in J. J. C. Smart, (ed.) Problems of 
Space and Time, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1968, pp.  381 -396. 
For discussions of time as a quality see, for example, Anthony Quinton's view on times and spaces as 
individuals (Anthony Quinton, "Spaces and Times", in Robin Le Poidevin and Murray MacBeath (ed), 
The Philosophy of Time, Oxford University Press, 1993, pp.203 —220). On taking the Bergsonian idea 
of time as process further, see Whitehead, pp.  49— 73. 
oo For the exposition of the sugar example see Chapter 4, Section 1, p. 51. 
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convincing here. But does it matter for this process that it took place, say, twenty minutes after the 
news programme and ten minutes earlier than the film? Or would it be different if the news was 
broadcast after the sugar experiment, and the film was shown before it? 
If we take the universe as a whole, then every minute detail matters because it defines its precise 
identity - and this correlates with the Bergsonian view. But this also means that the identity of every 
single event in the universe must be defined by all other events, and we will argue against such an 
extreme understanding of heterogeneity. Many events and their timing are irrelevant to the identity of 
many other events. So temporal relations with events that are irrelevant to a given temporal process 
cannot be equated with the qualities of that process. Therefore, temporal relations cannot be reduced to 
qualities. 101 
2. Time and space 
Bergson promotes time and downgrades space. We argue that decreased spatial precision reduces 
temporal precision and the ontological concreteness of depicted events. 
In Chapter 2 of Time and Free Will we find an opposition between "real duration, the heterogeneous 
moments of which permeate one another", time, and "the external world which is contemporaneous 
with it", space, the two sides of the real which are aligned and give rise "to a symbolical representation 
of duration, derived from space." (TFW, p.110) Time and space are not reconciled even in motion: 
Bergson affirms that although a moving body occupies space, motion itself, the progress by which the 
body passes from one position to the other, "occupies duration" and "eludes space." (TFW, p.111) 
Bergson separates time and space to such an extent that they become incompatible and the 
ontological relation between them dangerously weakens. "There is neither duration nor succession in 
space," Bergson asserts, as "each of the so-called successive states of the extemal world exists alone." 
(TFW, p.120) The danger is that if the reality is thus broken up into the temporal and the spatial which 
Interestingly, Bradley discusses temporal (and spatial) issues in similar terms and concludes that 
since time (as well as space) is both a relation and not merely a relation, it is not, strictly speaking, real 
and is merely an appearance. Our observation that qualities and relations do not exclude each other 
permits a more positive conclusion: that time is real and that there are temporal qualities and temporal 
relations. (Bradley, pp. 30 - 36) 
do not participate in each other, formhig a unity, then the apparent uniformity and coherence of the 
whole of the Universe becomes fiction. 
In Time and Free Will Bergson divides reality into incompatible domains, space and time, and in 
Matter and Memory, he wants to reconcile them, but he does that by declaring everything, including 
space and substance, to be ultimately time and movement. The reason why we can apply the same 
terms to consciousness and to the material world is that, he claims, space can be removed from our 
analysis of the material world with no damage done to the adequacy of our understanding of physical 
objects. 
In regard to concrete extension, continuous, diversified and at the same time organized, we do 
not see why it should be bound up with the amorphous and inert space which subtends it - a 
space which we divide indefinitely, out of which we carve figures arbitrarily, and in which 
movement itself, as we have said elsewhere, can only appear as a multiplicity of instantaneous 
positions, since nothing there can ensure the coherence of the past with the present. It might, 
then, be possible, in a certain measure, to transcend space without stepping out from extensity; 
and here we should really have a return to the immediate, since we do indeed perceive 
extensity, whereas space is merely conceived - being a kind of mental diagram. (MM, p. 187) 
The dispensability of space from spatial objects seems to be Bergson's decisive step towards 
bringing together spirit and matter. He describes physical reality in the same terms as he described 
duration in Time and Free Will, considering, he claims, things as they are, and not as they are 
interpreted by our action orientated mind. 
Just as with the refutation of relations, Bergson's dismissal of space is a downside of his otherwise 
largely positive work of defending the reality of time as an independent essence. Bergson believes he 
has overcome successfully the prejudices that cloud our understanding of time. The main prejudice, 
according to him, is that time is mistakenly confused with space. He sees his own achievement in 
managing to expose this confUsion and, separating the spatial from the temporal, captures the essence 
of time in the notion of psychological duration.' °2 
Bergson considers space and time in openly axiological terms. Everything that has to do with space 
is false and lifeless, and everything that has to do with time is genuine and ontologically valid. But time 
can be comprehended only with the catalytic involvement of space, as without spatial markers there is 
no way of distinguishing between earlier, later and simultaneous; between past, present and fUture; and 
even the direction of the temporal flow cannot be established without spatial orienteering. Contrary to 
some of the Bergsonian claims, the elimination of space from ontology and epistemology does not 
102 For the exposition of Bergson's refutation of space see Chapter 2, Section 3. 
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enhance the picture of reality, making it vibrant and constraint-free. We shall demonstrate that the 
downgrading of space that occurs in Bergsonism dangerously affects temporality and reality itself, as 
the reduction of spatial precision makes reality less temporal and therefore less real, inasmuch as 
temporality is a feature of real things. 
Artists, whose task was to prove the temporal reality of the Biblical events, did so via symbolic 
depiction of time by spatial means, but the way they treated space affected the way they presented the 
time of those events and ultimately, their reality. Depicting the Baptism of Christ, Piero della Francesca 
(c. 1415 —92) wanted to convince the congregation that it did take place for real and in real time. (The 
Baptism of Christ, National Gallery, London). Working on this task, the artist obviously exploits spatial 
precision in order to achieve the sense of temporal reality. He pays meticulous attention to detail, as if 
indicating that when Christ was baptised, trees had the same leaves as those that one can see today, and 
so the Baptism must have happened in a real place and in concrete, real time. Also, Piero della 
Francesca deliberately transfers the scene of the Baptism from Palestine to Sansepolcro, his home 
town. '°3 The point here is that the event took place in a town which looks like one's own, in a unique 
and precise place - a real place - therefore it must have happened in a precise period of real time. The 
artist provides an almost physical, photographical evidence of the holy event, and validates its 
historicity by using spatial precision, a necessary attribute of the present time and of reality which at 
some point must be present. 
If the Italian painter's mission was to create an ocular demonstration of Christ's historical reality, 
icon-painters, by contrast, emphasised his divinity at the expense of sj,atio-temporal concreteness. For 
example, Icon of the Descent from the Cross (Late fifteenth century, Northern School, Tretiakov 
Gallery, Moscow) shows anatomically inaccurate human figures, simplified background, and a limited 
choice of colours. It may seem that the artist has failed to demonstrate that the depicted event ever 
happened, because if it had ever been embodied and present at some point, the scene would have 
looked more realistic. 
But this does not matter, since the aim here is not to prove the historical veritability , of the holy 
event, but to capture its holiness. The question whether the Descent did or did not take place in the 
chain of historical events is irrelevant: what the icon shows is that the Descent is not an ordinary, 
earthly event which took place in some concrete present and which is now past, but that this is a divine, 
103 Cumming, P. 19 
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spiritual happening, detached from any mundane empirical concreteness and possibly even from any 
particular here-and-now. It is assumed to have happened in actual fact, but once it had happened, it 
gained a property of a universal significance and omnipresence, being forever relevant, forever 
remembered, mourned and celebrated by the faithful. In a way, it continues to unroll at all times, 
reinforced by the presence of the icon which, itself holy, is not a mere representation of the divine 
event but is its transmitter, making it happen again and again whenever the icon is perceived visually 
and spiritually. 
The reduced and simplified spatial features of an icon take away its earthly realism, and together 
with it, the concrete temporality of depicted events. The more laconic and simple are the visual details 
in the painting, the more difficult it is to tie its content to a particular real point in time. It becomes a-
temporal in the sense that it may have never been present in the embodied sense, or it may be 
omnipresent as the idea which the depicted event is meant to only symbolise. 
The above examples illustrate the dependence of reality in general and of time in particular on 
spatial precision, and are contrary to Bergson's attempts to downgrade the ontological significance of 
space either by eliminating it from being or including it into time. We reply that space is not a mere 
artificial construction of our mind, facilitating our comprehension of the essentially fluid and shapeless 
reality, but an ontologically firm and irreducible fact, and replace the Bergsonian disjunction "time or 
space" with a conjunction "time and space", in the same way as we did with qualities and relations.' °4 
3. Space and extensity 
Bergson 's concept of extensity, which is opposed to homogeneous space, could be afoundation for an 
a/tern alive theory of space but it would not be consistent with the 7heory ofpure duration. 
Despite refuting space in general, Bergson accepts concrete extensity, which consequently may be 
taken as a foundation of the Bergsonian theory of space. However, as far as we can see, such a theory 
'04 
For more on problems associated with the understanding of space and time see Franz Brentano, 
Philosophical Investigations on Space, Time and the Continuum, transl. Barry Smith, Croom Helm, 
1988; J. J. C. Smart, (ed.) Problems of Space and Time, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1968, 
and especially Richard Taylor, "Spatial and Temporal Analogies and the Concept of Identity", pp.  381 
- 396, for a demonstration that temporal and spatial relations are "radically alike". 
111 
would be inconsistent with the theory of pure duration, and cannot be accommodated by it. In order to 
account for Bergson's philosophy as a whole, we will give a brief overview of it here, though it will not 
be possible to pursue it further in our further discussion. 
In essence, space is understood by Bergson as "an empty homogeneous medium." (TrW, p.95) A 
more detailed definition is this: "Space is what enables us to distinguish a number of identical and 
simultaneous sensations from one another; it is thus a principle of differentiation other than that of 
qualitative differentiation, and consequently it is a reality with no quality." (TFW, p.95) Bergson 
distinguishes between extensity and space, the former being an inner property of a material thing, that 
very portion of space that it fills, and the latter being a homogeneous medium in which material things 
are juxtaposed. Bergson's view on extensity fits in with his view on time and space as expressed in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Bergson 's view on time and space. 
IS 
existence 
Space Time 
As a medium uniting all beings " 	 Exists as a X 	 Does not exist as a 
homogeneous medium homogeneous medium 
without quality, because a 
homogeneous medium 
void of any quality is 
space. 
As part of the makeup of beings V 	 Exists as extensity of V' 	 Exists as duration of 
things in a beings taken as 
heterogeneous reality, processes. 
A common view on time and space is that they are both homogeneous media: in the first one, 
objects succeed one another and in the second, objects exist simultaneously. Also, we commonly 
believe that objects that exist in time and space are not outside time and space, but contain time and 
space within themselves. Bergson distinguishes between time and space as supposed media, and time 
and space occupied, appropriated, by objects: the latter are modified space and time, extensity and 
duration, part of the makeup of things. They appear as much a quality as, say, colour or weight. 
Bergson's idea of extensity could be used to provide an altemative solution to the Eleatic paradoxes. 
By his solutions of the Eleatic paradoxes Bergson wants to prove that motion is real, that it has no 
spatial features. Also, he aligns sensory data and reality showing that it is possible to grasp the real 
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through the senses. But more importantly, Bergson's defence of the ontological status of motion, his 
despatialazation of it, clarifies his position regarding the relation between motion, consciousness and 
time. It is not simply that the perception of movement is duration as a psychic state; movement itself is 
duration. The reinforcement for this interpretation of Bergson's position can be found in the following 
passage, which contains his analysis of Zeno's paradoxes. 
It is to this confusion between motion and the space traversed that the paradoxes of the 
Eleatics are due; for the interval which separates two points is infinitely divisible, and if 
motion consisted of parts like those of the interval itself, the interval would never be crossed. 
But the truth is that each of Achilles' steps is a simple indivisible act, and that, after a given 
number of these acts, Achilles will have passed the tortoise. The mistake of the Eleatics arises 
from their identification of this series of acts, each of which is of a definite kind and 
indivisible, with the homogeneous space which underlies them. As this space can be divided 
and put together again according to any law whatever, they think they are justified in 
reconstructing Achilles' whole movement, not with Achilles' kind of step, but with the 
tortoise's kind: in place of Achilles pursuing the tortoise they really put two tortoises, 
regulated by each other, two tortoises which agree to make the same kind of steps or 
simultaneous acts, so as never to catch one another. Why does Achilles outstrip the tortoise? 
Because each of Achilles' steps and each of the tortoise's steps are indivisible acts in so far as 
they are movements, and are different magnitudes in so far as they are space: so that addition 
will soon give a greater length for the space traversed by Achilles than is obtained by adding 
together the space traversed by the tortoise and the handicap with which it started. This is 
what Zeno leaves out of account when he reconstructs the movements of Achilles according to 
the same law as the movement of the tortoise, forgetting that space alone can be divided and 
put together again in any way we like, and thus confusing space with motion." (TFW, pp. 1  12 - 
114) 
But there is something that Bergson himself leaves out. Giving an account ofan instance of 
movement, he admits two elements - space traversed and movement per se, duration. The moving 
body, the one that traverses space, the one that moves, is left out of this discussion. In relation to the 
arrow paradox' °5 , together with Russell we can say that in Bersgon there is "flight but no arrow" 1°6 . 
The moving body, considered closely, gives rise to a more complex dialectic of space and time, given 
Bergson's division of the spatial into a spatial medium and extensity. We can understand an object as a 
spatial object in as much as it is extensity. This extensity does not necessarily have to occupy a fixed 
position in space as a medium. Thus the connection between the "portion of space", which is the 
extension of the moving body, and the place it occupies, is loosened. The same "portion of space" 
appears in two guises, as space divided in itself. As extensity, it shifts in relation to its previous 
position in space as a medium, and in relation to other objects; and movement results out of this 
division of space into two parts. 
05 A flying arrow is, in fact, at rest. At any indivisible instant of its flight, the arrow occupies as much 
space as when it is at rest. Therefore, it is always at rest. 
l06 Russell (1914), p.18 
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Bergson's division of space into a medium and extensity may provide an alternative solution to the 
"arrow" paradox. Zeno says that the arrow, when it is moving, occupies the portion of space equal to 
itself, just as when it is at rest. When this is asserted, what is assumed is that the arrow occupies a 
position in the spatial medium. But, when the arrow occupies the space equal to itself, it is primarily its 
own internalised space that it occupies. The arrow's extensity is a property of the arrow, and as such it 
is intrinsic and undetachable from the arrow. Therefore it is not contradictory to the idea of movement 
that the arrow should occupy the portion of space equal to itself: all it means is that it remains itself 
whilst it is moving. However, at different times it would occupy different portions of space as a 
medium - and that is evidence in favour of movement, which the Eleatics wanted to disprove. 
4. Three hypostases of time 
Time as an individual duration (quality) is spatially defined and spatially located It emanates temporal 
relations with other entities. A single temporal event constitutes the universal time by emanating 
relations of earlier and later which imply other events in the past and the future. 
The irreducibility of temporal qualities and relations confirms that we must talk of temporality in 
two guises at least: the temporality of earlier and later, and the internal temporality of events; 
temporality as a relation and temporality as a quality. But, if we assert temporal essences and relations 
between them, then we will need to assert time that unites them all, universal time. Thus, instead of the 
idea that there must be one and the same time, whatever its nature, we get an idea of three hypostases 
of time: 
I. Time as duration of individual phenomena (time as a quality) 
2. Time as temporal relations 
3. Universal time 
Bergson addressed time as individual duration and dismissed temporal relations and universal time 
as space in disguise. Asserting all three, we need to establish which hypostasis of time should be given 
ontological priority. Clearly, this cannot be temporal relations, for if we imagine that "earlier" and 
"later" float somewhere in suspended existence, waiting to be embodied in reality, then we inevitably 
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substantiate these relations and turn them into qualities. But if time is first of all to be treated as a 
quality, should it be the temporal stretch of an individual phenomenon or the universal, empty time 
waiting to include temporal reality? 
Problems with first admitting some kind of empty time are not easily resolved. Does empty time 
have a beginning? What defines its boundaries, if it has any, while the content that fills this time is still 
absent? What defines the direction or arrow of such time? These difficulties are insurmountable if we 
begin to talk of time in global terms, and it is inevitable that the discussion on time should begin with 
the temporality of an individual phenomenon, as in Bergson. Then an anempt can be made to derive 
other modes of temporal existence from an individual duration. 
We can take as a starting point an observable temporal phenomenon - any phenomenon, an object 
or an event - inasmuch as all phenomena are temporal. But, unlike Bergson, we need to go further than 
just acknowledging the inner duration of things: we must derive from it temporal relations and the 
concept of universal time. 
As discussed above, the reason why Bergson would object to including temporal relations such as 
"earlier" and "later" into the temporal system is that their acknowledgement requires a mental 
alignment of terms which takes place in simultaneity, thus presenting time as a static, non-progressive 
system, where everything is set once and for all. A Bergsonist would rightly insist that the theoretical 
temporal framework must be able to account for the dynamic, ever-progressing nature of temporal 
reality. However, by adapting the vocabulary, it is easy enough to introduce the dynamic element here. 
Instead of saying that terms are earlier and later than other terms, we could say that terms happen or 
lake place earlier than some and later than others. For, regardless of the possible Bergsonian criticism 
that any comparison of terms presupposes their simultaneous alignment which defies the successive 
nature of temporality, events do happen earlier than some and later than others. 
Now, Bergson would say, this gives us a dynamic picture of the temporal flow in between terms, but 
the terms themselves, those that happen earlier or later than each other, are still portrayed as fixed 
entities, as nodes of a stable, definite physicality, as reality that, albeit existing in time, nevertheless 
lives through it with its nature being unaffected by it. So our next step will be to introduce temporality 
into the.terms of temporal relations as well, and to present them as events or processes. Bringing in the 
Bergsonian language, we will recall that temporality of an event constitutes part of its makeup and 
contributes to its unique identity. Thus the relations of earlier and later will be applied not to 
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unchangeable nodes of reality but to entities that change in time themselves. "Earlier" and "later" occur 
between terms which themselves are never brought to a standstill; they are relations that emerge in the 
unceasing dynamics of change. We could say that temporal qualities, whilst unceasingly growing, 
transcend themselves in relations with other qualities, as well as producing the network of relations 
within themselves. Thus relations of earlier and later themselves partake of the dynamic nature of time. 
From this perspective, we shall suggest that the qualitative temporal component of a phenomenon 
emanates temporal relations which the phenomenon has or may have with other phenomena. This in its 
turn reveals the significance of spatial definitions for temporal identity of phenomena. It would not be 
accurate to say that duration as a pure temporal extract from the phenomenon evokes relations of, say, 
earlier and later with other phenomena. An individualised duration is by no means such a pure temporal 
extract because, first of all, it being individualised means existence within rigid boundaries. It is 
impossible to say that these boundaries are exclusively temporal, say, because they are set from time I 
to time I', since only spatial markers can set such boundaries. Duration as one's conscious life, for 
example, is defined by the physical existence and coherence of one's living body. Duration as 
movement of a body is equally marked at the beginning, by the body starting to move an&at the end, 
by the body stopping. - 
Also, if events of this type happen in a definite period of time, they also necessarily happen in a 
definite stretch in space. Spatial features not only mark the temporal boundaries of an individual 
duration, they take part in the evolution of duration throughout its continuous existence, for each 
duration is defined by a specific process which always has a physical backing. If the physical 
components of this process cease to move or, more accurately, alter their pattern of movement, then the 
given duration will cease to exist, or it will change. 
Due to the necessary involvement of the physical component, spatially precisely located in relation 
to other objects, duration as a temporal component of the process in question, will be also spatially 
located - contrary to Bergson trying to eliminate the "where" issue from the so-called true time. We 
locate psychological duration when we speak of the whereabouts of a person because all his or her 
thoughts and feelings take place wherever he or she is. We locate the duration of an action and of any 
other process because we locate the trajectory of the moving body, which has definite spatial 
parameters. Thus time is spatially located, in this sense. 
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We insist that duration is by no means a purely temporal reality, independent from spatial markers 
and void of spatial content, but is an entire individualised phenomenon, with all its spatial and temporal 
parameters. For if we talk of motion and the temporal extension of an object, we cannot abstract them 
from physical and spatial features without losing duration itself This, in its turn, means that when we 
say that duration as a quality prolongs itself in temporal relations, the agency that emanates those 
relations is not the stretch of pure time, as such unembodied time cannot produce any relations, but the 
entire complex compound of a spatially located physical or physically backed process, event or an 
object. 
In fact, the feature that represents objects in their temporal relations is not their own temporality, 
even defined by spatial features, but their visual spatiality itself. We remember that Bergson would 
dismiss temporal relations as spatialization of time, because the terms of such a relation would be 
juxtaposed in quasi-simultaneity. What really happens then is that the terms of a temporal relation 
appear in their guise as spatial entities, showing their visual spatial side for a comparison or contrast, 
necessary for forming a temporal relation. When we compare temporal relations of objects which 
reflect their ontological happening earlier than some and later than others, we are not interested in their 
inner temporality as such but in their temporal individuating boundaries which are spatially defined. 
That is why that which enters into a temporal relation of earlier or later is what Bergson called a 
crystallised object, i.e. an object or event whose spatial qualities have come to the surface as those that 
are most relevant for the required relation. Thus the quality that emanates temporal relations is not pure 
time, nor even the temporal extraction of the phenomenon, but its spatial, physical part. 
	 - 
Bearing in mind that a quality can form a multitude of relations and if we talk of a spatial body as a 
quality, then we will have to admit that amongst the multiplicity of relations that a spatial body forms 
with other bodies there are temporal relations. The ontology of a physical body entails that it exists and 
endures later, earlier and simultaneously with other bodies. From this we can see that it is the spatial 
marking that brings to life and to light the relational aspect of temporality. As we can see from this, 
time can only be revealed via space, whether in the individualisation of and exposure of duration, or in 
the formation of temporal relations. 
Regarding the interplay between temporal qualities and temporal relations, it is easy to see that 
whereas sometimes relational facts do not seem to matter to the qualities involved, such as linking the 
fact of dissolving sugar with the timing of the news programme, in many other situations, temporal 
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relations may play a crucial role for the qualitative definition and identity of phenomena. For instance, 
x may overhear y confessing a crime, but testi& my's favour during the criminal investigation. What 
would determine whether x is a socially dangerous liar or a mistaken law-abiding citizen, is the 
temporal relation between x's hearing y's confession and x giving the testimony. If the confession took 
place earlier than x's testimony, then x is a liar; if it took place later than x's testimony, then x may well 
be a law-abiding citizen. 
But what about universal time? As a fragment of temporal reality, each entity and each event is 
endorsed with relations of earlier and later, and this endorsement ontologically ëoincides with the very 
fact of their existence. Apart from being successively future, present and past, each entity fixes the 
temporal ordering by emanating relations of earlier and later and thus securing the structure of 
temporality in general. For, by saying that an entity is necessarily later than some other entities, we 
acknowledge that there were things happening in time prior to this entity, and by saying that an entity is 
earlier than some other entities, we establish a guarantee of the future world. Each new event, in virtue 
of it being "earlier" implies following events, and the relation of it being "later", safeguards the infinite 
historicity of the past, reminding us that before the most ancient event there must have been an event 
prior to that one. 
It is easy to demonstrate that universal boundless time follows from individual phenomena as a 
logical necessity. A phenomenon - every phenomenon - entails temporal relations of earlier and later 
with other phenomena. This means that its existence implies the existence of others, those that 
preceded it and those that will follow it. The implied phenomena in their turn also harbour relations of 
earlier and later, so that every previous phenomenon must have had a preceding one, and every fUture 
phenomenon must have a following one, with the time line projecting itself indefinitely in both 
directions. Thus the existence of one single phenomenon implies other phenomena which in their turn 
constitute a timeline saturated with content. This gives us a timeline as a logical necessity which can be 
constructed out of the existence of a single phenomenon. Crudely speaking, we could say that time may 
have began with the hypothetical first ever event - say, a big bang - but as soon as that event took 
place, it created universal time, which included the indefinite past as having elapsed prior to the first 
event. 107 
107 If we do not accept temporal relations that emanate from the individual temporal quality and 
constitute the past retrospectively, then we face insurmountable problems trying to account for the 
beginning of time and temporal reality. As Kant shows, neither can we prove sufficiently the thesis that 
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5. The past 
Bergson treats the past as a quality. We accept it as being a quality inasmuch as its eventual content is 
a quality, its pastness, on the other hand, is a relation with the present An event cannot be 
qualitatively past because it cannot be past in relation to itself 
Having accepted both qualities and relations into the discussion of time, we are prepared to treat 
parts of time, the past, present and future, in either qualitative or relational terms, or in both, as 
required. There is no doubt that duration must be understood as "real time, regarded as a flux" (CE, p. 
355) which involves indivisible movement between past, present and future. In 'The Perception of 
Change' in particular Bergson demonstrates that the impossibility of separating the past from the 
present is due to the indivisibility of change and time. (CM, pp.  152-156) The present and the 
immediate future equally cannot be separated from each other, for the same reason. The criticism of 
prediction in Time and Free Will especially demonstrates that the dynamic progress depends on the 
immediately preceding state of reality and that is why one cannot predict future states as if they were 
planned in some way. (TFW, pp.  183— 197)108  Thus the essence of duration rests on all the temporal 
dimensions taken in their indivisibility. However Matter and Memory's analysis of duration in terms of 
the past shows that out of all three temporal parts, the most important one for Bergson seems to be the 
past. 109 It is the past that is accumulated in duration, survives as memory and constitutes reality. When 
we say that for Bergson, time equals being, this may well be rephrased as the past equals being, 
inasmuch as the past is portrayed as substantial and rich in content, whereas the future is non-existent, 
and the main function of the present is to activate the past that already exists, and to add new content to 
the new past. 
the world has a beginning in time, nor the antithesis that the world is infinite. See I. Kant, Crtique of 
Pure Reason, transl. Norman Kemp Smith, London, Macmillan and Co Ltd, 1961, First Conflict of the 
Transcendental Ideas, pp.  396-402. 
As noted by Mullarkey, "The language of Time and Free Will fosters images of continual 
transformation, of multiple succession. (Mullarkey (2005), p. 476) 
109 This did not pass unnoticed for other readers of Bergson: see Stephen Crocker, "The Past is to Time 
What the Idea is to Thought or, What is General in the Past in General?" in Journal of the British 
Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 35, No I, January, 2004, pp.42— 53. Sartre goes as far as to say that 
Bergson considers the past in isolation from the present and fails to reconnect it to the present. (Sartre 
(1969), p.1  10) 
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Before we consider the content of the embodied past, something needs to be said about the past as a 
specifically temporal feature of reality, if only to point out that it is not the same as the content of the 
past, regardless of Bergson's attempts to equate time and its content. If we compare the present, past 
and future as purely temporal extractions from reality, we would struggle to find criteria to distinguish 
them from one another. Disembodied and abstracted from physical action, from traces of events, and 
from any other clues for presentness and pastness, time becomes basically a foundation for continuity; 
not even duration, since duration includes factual content, but a basis for duration. Such time would 
have neither past, present, nor future parts and neither would it have a direction of flow, because all 
these features are distinguishable only with the catalysing effect of physical or psychological content. It 
is important to emphasise that this unimaginable (because we can only imagine embodied things) time 
cannot exist by itself, and is only a theoretical abstraction. We must remember that if we insist on a 
purely temporal component in reality, distinct from everything spatial, we lose reality and time with it. 
So, when we talk of the parts of time here, we mean embodied stretches of time, with physical or 
psychological content, and with spatial or conceptual markers. 
Undoubtedly, the past, as a temporal stretch saturated with all the physical and psychological 
processes that happened when the phases of this temporal stretch were present, is a quality. But 
describing a temporal period as past, we correlate it with the present, i.e. with our own present position. 
From this perspective, "past" is a relational characteristic of the given temporal stretch. Also, because 
this relational characteristic is given to the period from the perspective of another period, and after the 
first period is gone, then this relation may be considered purely external and unable to affect the nature 
of the temporal period in question. In other words, the fact that the temporal period spoken of is past in 
relation to now, should play no role in determining the qualitative structure in the period that we call 
the past. 
However, it is evident that for Bergson, the nature of the past temporal stretch is determined 
primarily by it being past. This means that the relation that the temporal period has or acquires with the 
consequent period determines its own inner nature. What the ontological status of the past is, and what 
the ways in which it is a quality and a relation are need to be clarified. 
According to Bergson, all of the past survives in a modified, condensed form. However, a stricter 
approach to the correspondence of the past to the present would reveal that, although all of the 
embodied past may indeed contribute to the formation of the embodied present, the very fact that the 
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past survives in a modified form means that the content of the past, taken when it was present itself, is 
not identical with that part of the present content which is supposed to have been inherited from the 
past. There is some part of the embodied past that falls off and disappears with time. For instance, a 
tiger passes on to its descendents the tendency to have striped coats, but its own stripes vanish when the 
tiger dies and its coat disintegrates. So there is the past that vanishes, and it is the ontology of this past 
that we want to examine. 
The ambivalent nature of the past that is gone consists of two conflicting facts about it. Firstly, past 
entities and processes are those that once were present, occupied space and acted on one another. The 
fact that x has once existed in the present seems to secure x's ontological status as a real thing for 
eternity to come. By contrast, ify had never existed, y's ontological status is obviously far less secured 
than that of x. But if x is past, it is nowhere to be found, just likey, as present events fill the world with 
their own being, leaving no room for events gone. At first glance, both x andy are equalized in the way 
that both are nonexistent. Judged from the viewpoint of the present time, since there is no evidence of x 
existing, a present time observer cannot say anything about it, as if it is indeed something that had 
never been. But the truth is that it has been, even though it is now disconnected from the present. 
Just like the past that survives with the present evidence of it, the past that disappears has existed, 
unlike events which have never happened. Bearing in mind that past entities are really ex-present 
entities, we must ask, what happens when a present entity becomes past? Firstly, the relation of 
pastness is being established between the entity that has gone and all entities and processes that are 
present. From the point of view of the current situation, the status of the past entity is measured against 
its relevance to the present. The past entity does not exist, but not in the same way as something that 
had never existed. It existed, despite the fact that there may not be any evidence left of it in the present. 
This should demonstrate that it is wrong to test the ontological status of things and events by 
measuring them against the background of present things and events. This is what Bergson tries to 
avoid by introducing the past that survives as memory, which is not necessarily accessible by our mind, 
but this attempt is not entirely successful because his argument that the past exists is too tightly linked 
with the argument that the past survives as a foundation of the present, and also because the very idea 
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of the surviving past takes it into the present and correlates it with all things present. The Bergsonian 
surviving past then is simply some kind of a disembodied present!" ° 
From the point of view of the present, the time period that is past is, in fact, non-existent, being 
pushed out of the way by the present period itself, or even by other time periods that preceded the 
present and which now are past as well. If we relied on the present to evaluate the ontology of this 
vanished past, we would observe that the time period being past is non-existent in relation to the 
present, and conclude that it is past and non-existent universally (because we believe the presentness to 
be universal for all possible parallel worlds) and in relation to itself as well. 
If we admit that there are things that have been and gone, then the present, that knows nothing about 
them, cannot have the authority to judge their ontological status. For instance, there may be events in 
the past which happened on distant worlds and cannot have any relevance to our present earthly 
existence, but this does not mean that we, who do not know about them, have the authority to say 
whether they existed or not. 
The being, we insist, does not necessarily equal "the present" nor is it "relevant to the present". If 
we liberate being from the necessity to be demonstrable in the present time, then we are able to talk of 
being outside the present and outside our scope of memory and perception. Despite the fact that some 
past thing may be undetectable in the present, we would still have to assert its being, not the being that 
is but the being that was. 
Getting away from the present-centred ontology and giving up our attempts to prove the being of the 
past in terms of the present, we must refer to the past itself as a source of such proof. If the being of 
present things is asserted via their relation of presentess to themselves, what about the being of past 
things? Whereas they are past in relation to the present, they cannot be past in relation to themselves. 
But neither are they present in relation to themselves, because being present in relation to itself requires 
being present universally. As we cannot say that they are present in relation to themselves, we can 
nevertheless say that they were present in relation to themselves and in general. If we want to talk of 
the past as being, we must always say "was" or "were" about it, because as soon as we say "is", we 
correlate it with the present and render it deficient or non-existent. So, in the present-independent 
universe, the past being can be defmed quite simply as the being that was, and this should be sufficient 
"° At this point we may even agree with Russell's criticism regarding Bergson confusing the past and 
the present. See Chapter 3, footnote on p.  46. 
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to equate it with the being that is, not in the least because the being that is, is also going to be the beiiig 
that was. 
Questioning the ontological status of the past, we talk of the events that must have been present at 
some time and, therefore, actually happened. When an event is present and is happening, we can say 
that it is also present in relation to itself. This may seem like an unnecessary tautology, but being 
present to itself is a necessary feature of actuality, and being present to oneself is a necessary feature of 
a living consciousness. So when the present event gives way to a new event and becomes past, it being 
past means that it is past in relation to the new event, but in relation to itself it can only be present, 
inasmuch as everything existing or imaginable is contemporary with itself. An attempt to incorporate 
pastness into the nature of an event turns out to be futile. We inevitably have to admit that whereas 
presentess involves a relation between oneself and other contemporary processes and between oneself 
and oneself, pastness cannot be a relation of oneself to oneself, but only between previous and 
consequent events. Thus an event cannot really be past all by itself and comprise some specific past 
inner nature. Although, following Bergson, we treat an embodied past stretch of time as a quality, we 
renounce the idea of pastness as a quality, and accept it only as a relation. Saying that the past is a 
quality, we mean that its eventual content is a quality, but by no means that its pastness is a quality. 
6. The future 
It is impossible to identffr qualities offuture reality because whilst future they are uncertain. Futurity 
is a relation of the present reality with its expected projection. In the present free ontology, the future is 
a reality which will be definite in its own time and as such is equal to the present and the past. 
If we used the present tense standpoint as the ultimate platform of ontology, the reality of future 
things would be even more questionable than the reality of past things.''' If, from the point of view of 
the present, past events do not exist but had existed in some other present, future things are as 
ontologically inadequate as things that had never existed, because future things, indeed, have never 
III 
Considerations of the future are virtually ignored in Bergson, as Cunningham points out. 
(Cunningham, p. 118) Our analysis of the future in Rergsonism is based on what Bergson would have 
said rather than on what he actually said. 
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existed. However, it is possible to consider future events as a self-projection forward in time of the 
present, and then the future is not non-existent in the same way as something that cannot exist, because 
its existence is expected and is, to some extent, predictable. 
However we would find it difficult to establish qualitative features of future events. Qualities, 
whether accessible by mind and senses or not, must have some definite form: for example, if a thing is 
round, it is definitely round, and not square or triangular at the same time. But this is not so with the 
qualities of future events and future entities. States and events, consequent in relation to the present, are 
inevitable (because it is inevitable that there will be a future) but, prior to their actual embodiment, 
their exact nature and exact parameters are uncertain. Agreeing with Bergson that the future states of 
the Universe are not predetermined and that each new state is original in principle, we deny that the 
future states have any inner structure and any inner qualities. Due to the fuzziness of its indefinite 
parameters, we cannot establish the tautology of the future content and hence ascribe identity to the 
future which, vague as it is, cannot have a relation of presentness with itself. 
As the future is uncertain, its projection consists of a numerous variety of alternative possibilities 
that are all imagined to occupy the same place and time in the future. The insurmountable difficulty in 
determining future qualities will lie in this haziness and mutual overlapping of alternative properties. 
For when thinking of the future as a range of possibilities, we ascribe to the same future period of time 
different incompatible characteristics, and therefore cannot fix and identi& future qualities. To give an 
example, the future of a sprouting seed entails a range of possible states. Only one of these possibilities 
will actualise itself, but while it has not actualised itself, we may think of the whole range of 
possibilities as the plant's future. We can imagine, for example, that at the same time I and in the same 
place n there will be a) a rose bush with seven flowers; b) a rose bush with five buds and three flowers; 
c) a rose bush with no flowers, etc. 
We accept fUturity as a relation between the embodied present and consequent states and events 
which are not yet defined and embodied. The only definite characteristic of the future that is possible is 
the relation of futurity between the future and the present, established in the present, and the only 
definite fact we can establish about the future, whose content lacks identity, is that it is future. 
Thus the only indication of the being and of the reality of the future comes from outside the future, 
prior to its own existence, as an external relation. Thus we have a situation where one term, the present, 
has a relation of futurity with another term, which is indefinable, having neither identity nor inner 
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structure. Should we admit here that the relation of futurity is that element that constitutes any idea of 
the future at all? If we do that, we can end up asserting a relation prior to one of the terms and fall into 
substantiating this relation and presenting it as a quality instead of letting it appear as a side effect of 
the mutual co-existence of two terms. - 
Actually, this substantiation occurs in our practical attitude to the future, primarily realised in 
relational terms, which have a qualitative value for us. We know that, whatever the content of future 
events will be, the relational framework for them is fixed: whatever happens, Christmas day will fall on 
the predicted day, and if today is Monday, tomorrow will be Tuesday. We treat our own lives lying 
ahead, and those of others, like an empty diary, which guarantees relational facts such as dates and 
ages, which will definitely become present regardless of their qualitative content. 
In the ontology where the present is not the measure of being, the view of the future from the future 
position can be as follows. In order to establish the relation of tautology of the future event to itself, it 
needs to shape itself. This shaping has not happened yet in the present, but it will happen, so all we 
have to do and all we can do is wait. In time, future possibilities define themselves whilst becoming 
present, and then we can say retrospectively that this present was the future of that other present which 
is now past. So, in the present-free ontology, future events enjoy the same status as past and present 
ones, because they will define themselves in their own time, and for the present-free ontology it does 
not matter when being is present - it is real as long as it was, is, or will be present at some point. As for 
the reality of future things as future, just as we could not identitS' the past as a quality, in the same way 
there is no quality called fliturity, as there is nothing whose inner nature would be characterised by 
pastness or futurity. 
7. The present - 
The present is both a quality and a relation, but we do not confine the present to any one particular 
time: everything existing either is, was or will be present Consciousness is unable to grasp the present 
as it unrolls; the present is reconstructed retrospectively as a time when the world changing action 
took place. 
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There is an unspoken assumption that real things are present, and we tend to think of past and future 
things as somehow less real than present ones. From the point of view of this present centred ontology, 
the present appears to be in a privileged situation compared to the other two parts of time: a present 
process, apart from being present to itself, is also present to other processes, and so its reality is secured 
both from within and from outside." One may say that the same could be true of past and future 
processes as well, namely that they are present to other past and future processes respectively. But 
whereas past and future events are not capable of interaction and mutual acknowledgement, present 
events, in virtue of their being co-existent with each other in the present, realise this co-existence via an 
actual, physical or psychological impact on one another as they unroll. 
For instance, if a living consciousness were to forget that it exists in the present whilst daydreaming, 
some external intrusion, such as a ringing telephone, will inevitably bring it back to reality, i.e. to the 
realisation that it finds itself right at the heart of the present situation. The situation, with its stimuli that 
require responses from us, will also convince us that the present in which we are and which we 
constitute, is not merely a subjective mode of existing and perceiving but an objective present, whose 
demands we cannot escape. 
As complex processes, capable of self-acknowledgement and of acknowledgement of other events, 
we are sure of our present existence, and of the existence of the present time. The present is self-
evident and concurrent with us; we neither leave it behind, nor stay behind it ourselves. What is "now" 
and what is "present" is obvious to us on a pre-conceptual, practical level. Our understanding of the 
present is effected via the acknowledgement of tautology of all present entities and processes, where 
everything is unambiguously definite, and is undoubtedly itself in its fully embodied form. Since 
entities and processes that we observe in the present demonstrate unambiguously finalised and definite 
parameters, we can say that the embodied present may be comprehended in qualitative terms; that the 
present in itself may be a quality. 
The nature of the present, self-evident as a quality and via the relation of tautology, becomes 
problematic when we try to extract it from the immediacy of a conscious understanding of it and try to 
align it with other parts of time, the past and the future, in order to establish the purely objective 
parameters of the present. Bergson avoids this problem by refusing to objectify time altogether and 
labelling the objectification of time to be a substitution of space for time. Thus the Bergsonian thought, 
112 It is from this position that Augustine gives the present a privileged status, even though he is unable 
to explain the present. (St. Augustine, p.  267) 
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albeit giving preferential treatment to the past, does not escape from the immediate conscious 
apprehension of the present. For Bergson, if time as the accumulated reality or duration could be 
reduced to the past time, intuition, which is the recognition of such duration, could be equated with the 
present time in which the accumulation of reality and recognition of this accumulation takes place. The 
very same thing can be said of the intuited duration: if, as we remember, duration can really exist as 
apprehended from within, it must be.a currently living, existing duration, with consciousness that can 
account for events which are looked forward to. However this acknowledgment from within is possible 
only in the present, which firstly, identifies duration with the continuous living present and secondly, 
limits the Bergsonian account of time to such a present. 
But what are the purely objective parameters of the present? What we call present entities or 
processes are processes that run concurrent with each other and are able to interact with one another. 
From this perspective, presentness is a relation of mutual simultaneity shared by concurrent, active 
processes. One of these processes is our consciousness, which labels all processes concurrent with 
itself, present. The inevitable participation of consciousness in the ostensive naming of the present 
raises suspicions regarding the authenticity of the present and its objective existence, independent from 
consciousness. If we eliminated consciousness, would there still be present processes in the same 
sense? If the present is a subjective definition, would not the consciousness of a different type see 
presentness where we see pastness or futurity?" 3 
But our immediate apprehension of the present presupposes a process that has partly been already 
completed and partly not yet completed, thus our present is continuous, and partakes of the past and the 
future. The involvement of the past and the future is so strong, that, when trying to align the objective 
present with the objective past and the objective future, the continuous present breaks down into the 
past and the future, and it is impossible to pinpoint the actual present, that very moment of transition 
between the past and the future, where the past is not yet past, and the future, not future any more.'" 
113 There is an opinion that tensed view of reality is subjective and does not reflect the objective state of 
affairs. Tenseless theorists propose to eliminate tenses from the discourse of time and accept only 
relations of earlier and later. For a consideration of both sides of the argument see E. J. Lowe, "Tense 
and Persisitence", in Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), An Offbrinz of Questions of Time and Tense, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1998, pp.  43 - 59. 
114 Whereas Augustine regards this as a problem for the identification of the present, Loizou asserts the 
continuity of the present: [hf we followed Augustine in eliminating the continuous present tense, thus 
excluding extended events from ever being legitimately spoken of as present, we would thereby destroy 
the present tense in any form." (Loizou (1986), pp.  41 —42) 
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However, although we fail to point at the present ostensibly, whilst it is present, we know where and 
when we should have detected it. In this we are guided by the decisive feature of presentness: the 
flowing present necessarily culminates in the physical embodiment of action and the physical contact 
with other present entities. The key feature of the presentness, as supplied by Bergson, is not that 
present entities are consciously acknowledged, but that present processes are active. When they 
interact, they affect each other, and we can witness the emerging changes as they unroll. Neither past 
nor future entities are capable of inflicting change on one another or on themselves in the same way as 
present ones do. It is conceivable that these interactions with consequences, which characterise present 
reality, take place irrespectively of the monitoring involvement of our consciousness. As our 
consciousness, solely by virtue of its observing powers, does not change the fact that the worldly 
activity takes place, it must be equally irrelevant to the fact that this activity is present. We assume that 
the present unrolls by itself and that the waking consciousness is ableto witness it because it is itself 
present and active. 
The question then arises: for how long do the unsupervised processes remain present? For with the 
involvement of consciousness, we can talk of extended present processes, those that have begun but not 
yet ended. In the search for the objectivity and length of presentness, it may be useful to refer again to 
influential activeness as its criterion. Accepting that influential embodied activity can only take place in 
the present, we would also have to admit that wherever we see evidence of change, creation, and 
interaction of processes, we must assume that thisworld-shaping activity must have taken place during 
some present, with or without conscious involvement. As for pinning down the present, again 
appealing to the fact that all interactions take place in the present, we can imagine two interacting 
objects, such as a pen and paper, and say that the present time of the writing process corresponds to the 
phase of physical interaction of the pen and the paper, where the pen touches the paper whilst sliding 
on its surface, and the paper resists the pressure, nevertheless showing the ink traces on its surface. 
However impossible it may be to capture the actual phase of interaction, it does take place and it must 
constitute the objective present time. Unfortunately, consciousness impedes the perception of the 
present time, always involving the immediate past and immediate fUture in its perceptions, because an 
act of consciousness, perception or thinking, is in itself of some length, so that the act of consciousness, 
in an attempt to grasp the present will never temporally correspond to the time of action that constitutes 
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the present: no matter how quick our mind fries to be in grasping the present, action will always be 
quicker than the act of consciousness that tries to capture it. 
By denying that consciousness plays a role in constituting presentness, we assert that present 
processes are not present only in relation to some other processes, but are present universally and 
absolutely, and that all active processes in the universe must run concurrent with any other imaginable 
active processes, wherever they are. So, whereas the presentness is a relation of simultaneity between 
concurrent active processes, it must also be regarded as a quality for the following reasons. Firstly, 
presentess is involved in the effective activity of processes, and it is the key feature associated with its 
effectivity. Secondly, presentess as a mode of existence is absolute across all possible worlds. Thirdly, 
to be present to itself means to be present in relation to every other present thing, and when an entity is 
no longer present in relation to the present world, it cannot be present to itself either, and it is at this 
point that presentness partakes of both relation and quality. Of relation, because a present process is 
present in relation to other present processes, and of quality, because a present process is such in its 
own right, absolutely. A thing cannot be present to itself unless it is universally present, because if it is 
not present absolutely, its ontological status is not firm enough to establish a relation of positive 
tautology with itself 
The present time of one present entity coincides with the present time of all other present entities. 
The present pierces through the entire community of worldly working•phenomena, and it is this 
universality that raises the question of the possibility of its independent and authoritative existence, 
leading to a temptation to regard the present as a criterion of reality. We accept that the presentness is a 
criterion of reality, but we refuse to treat any particular present time as such. Whatever phenomena that 
have existed and contributed towards worldly development are not limited to the concrete present time. 
All world-changing phenomena have been, or will be, active in the present, but not necessarily in one 
and the same present. There have been and there will be innumerable present moments with 
	 - 
innumerable active processes. 
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8. Continuity of presents 
All three tenses assign a d(fferent ontological meaning to the temporal stretches that they refer to, but 
only the present can be an intrinsic property of events. Continuity ofpresent reality. 
When we align all three parts of time we see, first of all, where the main difficulties of the tenses lie. 
Whereas a philosopher would naturally treat them as objects of thought of the same order, our analysis 
above reveals that they are not. When we say, following Bergson, that embodied time is a quality, and 
attempt to treat its parts in qualitative terms, then we arrive at absurdities. 
If we say that the past is a quality, we imagine that pastness ought to belong to the past stretch of 
time as its intrinsic property, but it can only be past in relation to other following periods of time, and 
cannot be in a tautological relation with itself. It cannot be past by itself, because this would require an 
inner split, as the past would both be and not be: as past in itself, it would have expired in relation to 
itself. Taken as a real quality, the past must be present to itself, i.e. must have preserved its integrity. 
- Thus the past, when taken in itself, tums out to be neither past, because it cannot be gone in relation to 
itself, nor present because it is not present but past. 
The future cannot be a quality since its characteristics are not certain until the future becomes 
actualised as the present. In relational terms, the future is a relation established in the present between 
the present and no second definite term. Only the present, when taken as a quality, is feasible as 
continuity of actual experience. However, considered in relation with the past and the future, it 
disappears, divided between them. 
These absurdities reveal that since pastness and fiiturity are not intrinsic properties of temporal 
reality, it cannot be past or future in itself, as a quality. Pastness and futurity are relations between 
terms that appear in a temporal sequence. The present, on the other hand, is a quality inasmuch as 
everything existing, when present, is present in itself and not merely in relation to some other terms. 
Rejecting the view that reality should be centred on one particular time, such as the current present, we 
suggest that all reality is present both to itself and absolutely at some point, and that the idea of a reality 
that is only past or future is self-contradictory. To accommodate all temporal reality, we have to give 
up any attempt to standardise the tenses, as all three clearly have a different ontological meaning, and 
accept the idea of a continuity of present times, replacing one another. 
FM': 
Thus we arrive at the idea of the multiplicity of presents, which is not unlike Bergson's own. As 
Mullarkey observes, Bergson is able to talk of "present without supposing any particular presence as 
metaphysically unique or normative" 5 . Indeed, this follows naturally from Bergson's asserting the 
ontological validity of the past. 
" Mullarkey (2005), p.477 
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Chapter 7. Duration: from general idea to concrete self 
I. Coneretising duration as self 
Concrete man ?festations of duration. Only psychological duration can account for the entirety of being. 
Limitations of duration: psychological duration can account for the continuity of mind and matter in 
perception, but not for the ontological continuity of brain and consciousness. 
This chapter will offer a transition from duration as the all-embracing metaphysical term to duration 
in its concrete existence. Whilst exploring time and temporal reality, Bergson arrived at the idea of 
duration which he presents as the most fundamental principle of being in a general sense, without, 
however, offering a systematic exemplification of duration in the world." 6 He indicated its various 
hypostases as movement, matter, life, self, universe, but did not develop a complete and exhaustive 
picture of any of them. 
Bergson's accounts of various types of duration make us assume that within Bergsonism we can 
ascertain the continuity of everything that has ever existed. This continuity is based on the implicit 
assumption that the universe and everything in it involve movement of some kind and thus the term 
duration is applicable to any type of being: the same movement, albeit with different rhythms, flows 
through different media, and therefore everything - inanimate and animate matter, consciousness - is 
ultimately of the same nature and forms a universal continuity. 
But the sameness of everything can only be asserted at the metaphysical level, because concrete 
manifestations of being are diverse. The difference between various types of being is characterised by 
the rhythms of their durations, so in Bergsonism we see a hierarchy of being, where lower levels of 
being are characterised by slower rhythms, and higher levels by faster rhythms: from inert material 
objects at the bottom to human beings at the top, and biological life in the middle. Inert material objects 
demonstrate internal duration on the micro level and displacement on the macro level. Living 
organisms combine material and biological processes. Human beings exist in all three levels and 
comprise the thil hierarchy of being as material objects, as living bodies and as psychological duration. 
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'Whereas Keith Ansell Pearson, following Deleuze, tries to make sense of duration as abstract notion 
and a concrete phenomenon at the same time, we separate duration as a metaphysical principle from its 
concrete manifestations. See Pearson, pp.38-42. 
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Whilst scrutinising the idea of heterogeneity in Chapter 5, we found just how significant the whole 
is when it comes to characterising the nature of parts. Since heterogeneous duration is temporal, the 
whole of it is synonymous with "later", and part is synonymous with "earlier", because the whole of 
duration comprises its total history which, in temporal terms, comes later than any of its parts. Also, as 
duration gains new content over time, we can equate "earlier" with "simpler" and "later" with "more 
complex", and say that since "earlier" is part of "later", then "simpler" is part of "more complex". We 
can also say that duration in its up to date state, as an all-embracing concrete duration, as a 
heterogeneity with highest possible complexity, is duration taken at its latest— in the present. 
The entirety of being taken in the present includes the history of the universe crowned by the current 
human existence. In this chapter we will demonstrate that if we want to exemplify and concretise 
heterogeneous duration as embracing everything that exists, we must present duration as 
consciousness, because only consciousness can account for other types of being, such as biological and 
material existence, and other types of being cannot reach out beyond themselves and explicate 
conscious existence. (For Bergson, of course, consciousness is not necessarily tied to human form, and 
in Creative Evolution it is universal. (CE, p.  220) 
The concept of duration has its own limitations, however. Bergson believes that sharing the same 
characteristic of duration is a basis good enough for the explanation of the union of spirit and matter. 
Indeed, mind is duration of psychic states, and body is both material duration with its vibrations and 
displacement and a living process with growth, inherited tendencies and actions. They both comprise 
memory which in the mind binds psychic states into one continuity, and in the body preserves 
tendencies, extracted from past events. Both mind and body grow: mind via perception, recognition and 
volition, and body, via organic growth and cell renewal. 
It seems as though Bergson wants us to regard life as a prolongation of material movement, and 
filly developed alert consciousness as a prolongation of life. Biological processes, according to 
Bergson, are conscious or quasi-conscious inasmuch as they demonstrate inner logic, coherence and 
enclosure of the previous development into a present act. From this position, human consciousness is 
but a further stage of this complex combination of movements. Bergson claims that the relation 
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between mind and body "must be established in terms not of space but of time" (CE, p.  220), which 
means that they should be considered as processes prolonging themselves into one another. 
Indeed, we will see this continuity in perception (see our analysis of the feeling of warmth below). 
However, demonstrating the unity of mind and perceived matter does not explain the bond of mind and 
brain, and this is where the potential of duration is exhausted. Less complex forms of being are unable 
to demonstrate predisposition for more complex forms of being until they are already part of that being, 
and matter by itself is unable to show the potentiality of the union with consciousness. The best we can 
do is indicate components whose relation to each other may be regarded as a proto-relation of mind and 
matter. Those components are: in inanimate matter, movement and substance, and in organic matter, 
living force and matter. Movement in inanimate matter comes in two guises: as movement ofsubatomic 
particles, whose permanence of rate maintains the chemical identity of the material object, and as 
displacement, the movement whose parameters are not as rigidly defined but which, nevertheless, is a 
necessary component of the universe as a whole. As a prototype for the life of consciousness, internal 
vibrations could be compared to the internal living process that maintains the organic existence of the 
individual, and displacement witltaction. In organic matter, we find three types of movement: 
evolutionary movement, the living process of an individual organism and the behaviour of an individual 
organism. 
2. Imperfect duration in inanimate matter 
All-embracing duration cannot be found in matter. Deficient character of duration in matter. 
Movement in matter is ins eparable from substance and cannot transfer itself into other types of being. 
When in Chapter 5 we discussed the whole in temporal terms, as comprising later and earlier parts, 
we also established that the nature of the earlier parts becomes affected by the later parts: later stages of 
an event comprise longer history of that event, which includes earlier parts, retrospectively enriched by 
relations with consecutive events. So if we want to examine the up to date status of a past event, or a 
state of affairs, we should take into account everything that followed it as well, because what followed 
Karin Stephen holds the view that in Bergson, matter and mind appear as "incompatible 
abstractions" whereas they are "blended" in "the actual fact". (Stephen, p. 81) 
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would have altered the nature of that event or state. Applying this to worldly development, we will 
observe that earlier states of the world, for example when it comprises only inanimate existence, cannot 
offer any indication for being at later states of the world which comprise life and consciousness, nor 
can it offer clues for the role of matter in biological or conscious existence. On the other hand, the state 
of the world comprising life and conscious existence can account for inanimate matter as a foundation 
for life and consciousness and as images that consciousness accesses by way of perception. But this 
relation of life, consciousness and matter only appears when consciousness and life are already on the 
scene. Prior to the existence of life and consciousness, matter in itself does not contain any 
predispositions for its possible relation with biological and conscious structures - this relation is 
established retrospectively. Duration, taken at the level of matter, is limited to matter and is unable to 
explain anything beyond inanimate matter. 
As we remember, consciousness, for Bergson, is a movement tending towards a higher intensity, 
whereas "matter is a relaxation of the inextensive into the extensive." (CE, p.230) The movement of 
life and consciousness is "ascent"; the movement of mater is "descent". (CE, p.  12) The crucial point 
is that both matter and consciousness are seen as ultimately the same movement which has split into 
two opposing tendencies: Bergson talks of the real that passes "from tension to extension and from 
freedom to mechanical necessity by way of inversion." (CE, pp. 249-250) It is as if the same 
movement that defines the type of being is alterable, and can constitute either matter or spirit, the 
words "the same" here playing a decisive role because they indicate an ontological transitory link 
between matter and spirit, making them part of the same process reality in principle: "life is a 
movement, materiality is the inverse movement." (CE, p.  263) 
Bergson "affirms the reality of spirit and the reality of matter" (MM, p.  9) and stresses that they are 
the streams into which the being divided itself, and one is by no means a derivative of the other. He 
treats matter and spirit as polar qualities, as building blocks of the universe, equal to one another in 
their temporal existence and equally participating in concrete manifestations of heterogeneous being, 
which includes life and consciousness. 
We argue that matter and spirit cannot be taken as ontologically equal polar qualities because matter 
is a lower, less complex being than consciousness, and can be comprehended as an element of a higher 
being of life and consciousness only from the position of this higher being. And as we equate "more 
complex" with "later", we can say that matter, as an ontologically simpler, less developed and in this 
135 
sense "earlier" type of being, forms a relation with the more complex, more developed, "later" type of 
being which includes matter as its foundation, only when it is already part of that higher being and not 
before, as this relation emanates from the higher being to matter retrospectively. Therefore we cannot 
follow Bergson in equating matter and spirit and giving them equal roles in the union of matter and 
consciousness: if there is transitory movement between them, it originates from spirit and not matter. 
Although duration involved in matter cannot progress beyond itself and embrace the totality of 
being, this is still a valid case of duration for Bergson. Taking matter in its pre-animated state, we 
remember that at first it appears in the Bergsonian philosophy as a purely spatial and static mix, with 
no history, as an ever-renewed present with no duration and no provisions for genuine change. Later 
we realise that this a-temporal picture of matter is nothing but an ideal picture of materiality, as real 
materiality turns out to be far more complex. 
Bergson invites us to take the data of science into account and imagine the ultimate structure of 
material objects which, free from the view we have of them, lose their definite shape and their apparent 
stability. "We see force more and more materialized, the atom more and more idealized, the two terms 
converging toward a common limit and the tmiverstthus recovering its continuity. We may still speak 
of atoms; the atom may even retain its individuality for our mind which isolates it, but the solidity and 
the inertia of the atom dissolve either into movements or into lines of force whose reciprocal solidarity 
brings back to us universal continuity." (MM, p. 200) And more: "The nearer we draw to the ultimate 
elements of matter the better we note the vanishing of that discontinuity which our senses perceived on 
the surface." (MM, p.20l) 
As our habitual view of the material world turns out to be a practically useful illusion, we find that 
in matter, taken in itself, discontinuity of definite shapes dissolves into a continuity and cohesion on the 
atomic level. The solidity disappears too. On the microscopic level we are shown "pervading concrete 
extensity, modifications, perturbations, changes of tension or of energy and nothing else". (MM, p. 
201) Bergson believes he has proven successfully that consciousness is constituted by the inner 
movement of psychic states in Time and Free Will, and in Matter and Memory he attempts to present 
matter in the same fashion. He wants to show that particular qualities of matter are in themselves 
constituted exclusively by movements with particular rhythms: "Matter thus resolves itself into 
numberless vibrations, all linked together in uninterrupted continuity, all bound up with each other, and 
travelling in every direction like shivers through an immense body." (MM, p. 208) 
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When one talks of movement and vibrations, there is a need to clari& what moves and what 
vibrates. A sympathetic reader of Matter and Memory may suggest that, even though Bergson seems to 
disregard that which moves, he nevertheless does not deny its existence. However, The Creative Mind 
contains a passage which explicitly affirms the opposite. "Thete are changes, but there are underneath 
the change no things that change: change has no need of a support. There are movements, but there is 
no inert or invariable object which moves: movement does not imply a mobile." (CM, p.  147) 
Appealing to the auditory experience of perceiving music, Bergson claims that if we eliminate from 
it spatial references such as images of notes written on a piece of paper, the keyboard and the 
musicians, then "pure change remains, sufficient unto itself, in no way divided, in no way attached to a 
"thing" which changes." (CM, p.  148) Music is only one example of substance free motion, as Bergson 
asserts that when we think of a moving object, "[t]his alleged movement of a thing is in reality only a 
movement of movements." (CM, p.  148) 
if both consciousness and matter are nothing but pure movement, then they simply become equated 
and the gap between them, as in brain and consciousness, can be called an illusion of spatialization. It 
seems that Bergson implies just that, but his plan does not work. Lacey, clariing the meaning of the 
music example, says that usually, movement, when observed, implies a moving object which retains 
the same form but changes its position. From this perspective, movement does not seem to affect its 
essence. As for the melody, he admits that without the variation it would not be itself at all. Lacey says 
that, for Bergson, "the fact that change can be essential to something is not confined to things like 
melodies but can apply to things ordinarily accepted as enduring substances." 8 
However, Lacey continues, even though Bergson may have succeeded in demonstrating that change 
is essential to things, he did not manage to prove that we deal with pure change. For if, for example, 
melody equals 'pure change', what would it be? "How would one tell one change from another, or one 
type from another? How could a melody have structure if it had no 
Lacey refuses to talk of sounds as void of any substantiality: "A sound that is only accessible to the 
sense of hearing is in a way 'insubstantial', though it can still be objective, or at any rate 
intersubjective; it can be such that anyone suitably placed could hear it. it is also substantial enough to 
carry properties. it can be high or loud at one moment and low and soft at another, and would change 
IS Lacey, p.97 
119 Lacey, p.99 
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from one to the other in the sense that it existed as a whole at each moment." 2° As for the example of 
colour, which, as Bergson demonstrates, resolves itself into a series of vibrations, Lacey reminds the 
reader that Bergson talks of a coloured spot, and a spot, even more than a sound, has features of 
substantiality and objectivity. 
Lacey moves on to suggest that what Bergson really does is to challenge a tradition in philosophy 
that regards the substance of that which is real as permanent, that no matter what changes, there must 
always be something that does not. Lacey's own example of something that "changes its matter 
whenever it moves" and "moves by changing it" is a water wave, which "does have a material substrate 
even if this is always changing." 2 ' If we look beyond the individual wave, we will find the whole of 
the sea changing qualitatively all the time. The next step would be to extend this idea to all motion in 
the universe, whose parts are constantly changing in this way. Thus, Lacey believes, we do not get rid 
of the mobile in favour of pure movement; we rather get rid of the permanent substrate. Yet the 
substrate remains, because even though Lacey agrees that solidity does not have to be a criterion of 
objectivity, he argues that "properties, including movement, cannot exist on their own. Even a coloured 
spot is a coloured spot, with a shape, size and location." 22 
Lacey discovers passages in Bergson where he talks as if he does accept substantiality of matter: 
"There do not exist things made, but only things in the making." (CM, p.  188) Lacey says, "This 
suggests he is allowing that there are things but insisting that they are perpetually changing." 23 
Bergson even asserts substantiality, according to Lacey, but it is the substantiality of change: for 
Bergson, "it is action and movements rather than objects that are the substances" 124,  and thus we are 
invited to accept, in Rergson, "an ontology of actions and movements" 125  and we should talk of an 
ever-changing substance. 
Having considered Lacey's arguments, perhaps we could replace Rergson's apparent anti-
substantialism with a thesis that substance exists but is never at rest. Density and motion thus constitute 
20 Lacey, p. 100 
121 Lacey, p.  101 
122 Lacey, p.  105 
123 Lacey, p.  106 
124 Lacey, p.  107 
5 
- Lacey, p.  108 
138 
one and the same reality of matter, and the universal movement of movements is not a void (and it 
would have to be a void if we remove any substantiality from it), but a process where the element of 
volume and density and the element of motion are both necessary predicates of material reality, and 
neither one nor the other can be abstracted from it without destroying the integrity of matter. Neither 
can substance be imagined still, a-temporal and motionless, nor can motion be imagined empty of 
volume, but both components are inseparable from each other in the space-time continuum. 
Bergson says that in movement there is nothing solid and stable that moves, and we accept this as a 
claim that it is a mistake to imagine some substance that remains unchanged whilst movement, or 
change, are superimposed on it as a relation between itself and other objects, or between itself in the 
past and itself in the present, with the core of that thing preserved in order to carry its indestructible 
identity through time. This, within the Bergsonian understanding of things, portrays that a supposed 
indestructible core of the thing would have to be regarded as a-temporal whereas nothing is a-temporal 
and everything is involved in time and everything changes, even if only by becoming older. 
The question still remains: Bergson wanted to demonstrate that the movement of matter and the 
movement of consciousness are essentially the same - and they mut belong toiiie same order of 
reality in order to be part of the same universal movement - but does he succeed in proving this? Our 
answer is no. The supposed splitting of being into consciousness and matter is not something that had 
occurred at the outset of the development of the universe. "The universe is not made, but is being made 
continually" (CE, p.  255): therefore, we should expect to see the same ontological processes now as 
that of billions of years ago. Matter must be governed by the same key laws as it was in the remote past 
prior to the emergence of life on Earth; it must be ready to be a foundation of life again if the sudden 
disappearance of life required it. So, if Bergson were correct, we should be able to see some evidence, 
some traces of the "sameness" of the movement involved in mailer, life and consciousness as they are 
now, and not just trace this "sameness" to the hypothetical remote past where amorphous being divided 
itself into matter and consciousness once and for all. 
The type of movement that we observe in mailer is, above all, inseparably bound with substance. 
This bond is such that all of the movement is a property of all of the substance and vice versa, so that 
neither one nor the other can be considered separately. In matter, movement is in-built into the 
structure of things in such a way that the substantiality of the real is a process, which comprises 
substance and movement as part of one thing. The key feature is that movement cannot be extracted 
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from the material object: the movement is totally committed to the physical substance of matter. 
Movement and substance cannot be considered separately, because as soon as matter loses one of them, 
it loses its integrity as matter, so that both movement and substance, taken separately, are nothing but 
abstractions. 
Bergson's assumption that movement is the key to the connection between matter and mind is based 
on the observation that movement of one entity can initiate movement in another entity: the foot kicks 
the football, and the ball flies. For Bergson, we understand, this is a prolongation of the same 
movement which finds embodiment firstly, in the kick of the foot and secondly, in the flight of the 
football. The movement is the same because of the uninterrupted continuity of the first phase flowing 
into the second phase - there is no temporal or spatial gap between them. The movement is one, but it 
is modified in each case due to the different media involved. 
One moving entity (the foot) causes another entity (the ball) to move, by kicking it forceflully. The 
movement of the first and the movement of the second are stages of the same movement which began 
with the raising of the foot and continued with the rolling of the ball, as if movement were some 
tendency that sought embodiment in various portions of matter. But any portion of matter, prior to any 
displacement communicated to it (outside movement), already comprises movement within its own 
structure (internal movement)' 26 . Moreover, a particular movement of its subatomic particles 
determines the type of matter we deal with: stone, gold, plastic etc. The mechanical movement from -. 
outside that causes the ball to roll or fly does not interfere with the internal movement of its atoms and 
electrons but remains superficial to them. Both entities, the foot and the ball, retain their integrity, and 
the movement that they take part in, if it is a bond, is weak and can be easily cut out with no 
consequence for the entities involved. 
Outside movement that affects the internal movement of atoms and electrons is possible, and occurs 
in a chemical reaction. But in both physics and chemistry we witness material things making changes 
in other material things. We never see movement detaching itself from a particular substance and either 
transferring itself into another substance or acquiring some independent existence by itself. Besides, in 
mechanical and chemical changes it is not pure movement embodied in physical things that causes pure 
126 Terms "outside movement" and "internal movement" referring to the mechanical displacement of an 
entity and to atomic movements within the entity respectively are not used by Bergson, but they reflect 
the significant ontological distinction made in accordance with the Bergsonian principles. We claim 
that whereas intemal movement is crucial for the identity of the entity as a particular type of matter, 
outside movement is not. 
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movement in other physical things: it is the whole moving substance which constitutes a particular type 
of matter that causes changes. That which changes is not pure movement either but a specific 
compound of substance and movement which constitutes concrete matter with a specific chemical 
structure. 
Bergson argues that real movement is a qualitative change rather than simple spatial displacement. 
But when we talk of qualitative changes, these must be changes of qualities and, if we deal with 
material things, why should we exclude substantiality from a qualitative change? Instead, we should 
regard the whole of matter as the cause and recipient of change, and not attempt an extraction of pure 
movement from physical reality. 
To summarise, Bergson is opposed to the view in philosophy where solid stuff is regarded as 
primary reality and movement is reduced to a superimposed characteristic. He strives hard to raise the 
importance of motion in ontology and goes too far in this, sometimes denying any reality to substance, 
sometimes giving an impression that movement can disengage from substance and behave as if it were 
some kind of independent reality. The view indicated by Lacey, where we have substance in motion, 
seems more plausible. The moving and acting party here comprises substance and motion together, and 
the division of matter into real motion and the illusory substance does not work. 
To stress that the movement involved in matter and consciousness is different, we must also look 
again at the distinction between irreversible and repeatable change which Bergson made in the 
beginning of Creative Evolution 127 and our observation that not all temporal relations have qualitative 
significance.' 28 
 Repeatable changes, and events which do not affect each other, are not part of 
heterogeneous duration, where all elements are entwined. This mutual independence belongs to entities 
whose inner nature is not essentially tied to particular temporal coordinates and particular links with 
other entities, and this can be said to be a feature of the material world. We observe duration in the 
inanimate world as concrete instances of movement from one place to another, and as internal 
movements within entities, but material entities and processes can be isolated from each other in space 
and in time and may have no effect on each other's nature. Thus inanimate reality does not illustrate 
nor does it imply universal duration. Bergson presents movement in matter as a case of duration but it 
127 See Chapter 4, Section 1. 
'28 See Chapter 6, Section 1. 
141 
lacks the most essential feature of duration, namely growth as an inner accumulation of its own history, 
which is found in the higher being of life and consciousness. This makes it difficult to talk of material 
movement as duration at all, and reveals a significant discontinuity in the Bergsonian picture. 
The movement of displacement obviously serves as a prototype for consciousness in Bergson, and 
the relation of substance and motion as a prototype for the relation of brain matter and consciousness. 
However, it cannot be any more than a prototype: the movement caused by two objects pushing each 
other cannot explain the supposed movement from consciousness to matter and from matter to 
consciousness as if they were equal poles. Taken in itself, matter cannot account for links with life and 
consciousness. 
3. Living matter 
New role ofmatter within a biological structure. Matter serves as mat erial for the living force and as 
an individuating facility, but it also restricts the expansion of the living tendency. 
When matter is taken as a component of living structures, its role changes. This change does not 
come from within matter per se but from the more complex biological heterogeneity of which matter is 
only a component. In the biological structure matter gains new functions which can only be detected at 
this level, where the more complex structure includes and accounts for a simpler structure within itself. 
Describing the biological realm, Bergson talks of the creative force of life which launches itself into 
matter and "strives to introduce into it the largest possible amount of indetermination and liberty." (CE, 
p. 265) The relationship between the impetus and matter is not straightforward. On the one hand, the 
impetus needs matter for its own realization and on the other hand, matter restricts and channels its 
expansion. Matter becomes indispensable material for life and an agent restricting the expansion of life 
at the same time - a typically Flegelian contradiction, with a thesis (matter is material for life) and an 
antithesis (matter restricts life). In the living organism the two opposite movements of matter and life 
meet and are reconciled, interact and together result in an "organised" body. 
Every manifestation of life is a creation of something new. The novelty is brought in here by the 
impetus itself, as it effects creation as against the mere rearrangements of parts. We can observe that 
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matter ensures that the body exists as a physical object, and the impetus is responsible for it being 
created, for its development in time, for the novelty of forms. 
In Bergson's own theory of the two opposite processes, life is "an effort to remount the incline that 
matter descends", and if in life he finds a creative power, in materiality he finds features of"a thing 
unmaking itself." (CE, p.258) The creative process of organic life includes a struggle between the 
creative force and matter which serves as material for the constitution of living bodies. Creative force 
prevails when the body lives, but as time passes, the material base becomes damaged, gradually or 
suddenly, and life is unable to continue in a body that refuses to live. Just as creative force cannot apply 
itself to a fragment of inorganic matter, i.e. animate a stone, it is equally unable to thrive in a body that 
ceases to be organic, whose internal structure tends towards passive inert existence. 
Bergson points out that life in general is little concerned with the indefinite preservation of an 
individual organism. Perhaps this just demonstrates the limitations of the living tendency and its 
dependence on suitable material for its own realisation. The living tendency is strong enough to create 
a body, but not strong enough to make it grow indefinitely in size or let it persist indefinitely in time. 
Eventually, matter in its passivity prevails, but this is only a localized victory because life is carried 
forward by means of other bodies. This is what Bergson must mean when he says that life could resist 
"the most formidable obstacles, perhaps even death". (CE, p.  286) The lack of interest, or the lack of 
obsession at least, that life demonstrates towards individuals, makes an individual death insignificant in 
regard to the whole picture, because the individual organisms are merely fragments of one living world. 
We see that an organism dies because disintegrating matter can no longer serve as the physical base 
for life, and not because the living force at some point expires. Bergson's observation that an individual 
life is so easily terminated as against life in general which seems indestructible, can be explained by the 
fact that an individual life, cut off from the general tendency, is weaker and more vulnerable than the 
general tendency and, dependent on the concrete fragment of matter, lives in this hypostasis for as long 
as matter is able to support it. 
Bergson stresses that the living tendency is a tendency to individuation, but he does not unpack the 
role that both matter and the creative push play in this process. He implies, though, that it is the 
creative tendency that is responsible for all positive modifications of the resulting body or organ. But, 
as we can see, the living tendency in itself is indifferent to any individuation. It uses matter to promote 
itself further and further. But that fragment of it which is actually tied with matter is affected by its 
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concreteness, for matter is always concrete, so the living tendency becomes concrete too. Affected by 
matter, it no longer participates in the whole of the living world to the extent of disregarding the 
interests of any particular individual. Instead, having constructed an individual and being part of it, 
concretised and individualised, the living tendency is cut off from the rest of the living world so that 
when the matter that it has organised becomes destroyed, this individualised life is destroyed with it, 
and the persistence of life in the world is not going to help that particular life which depends on the 
integrity of its concrete materiality. It seems that, contrary to Bergson, it is matter that gives the living 
tendency foundation for individuation, as it brings in concreteness at a physical level. 
The closer we look at organic matter, the more we realise that the role of matter in this compound is 
more important than Bergson wants us to believe. We realise that the impetus of life is solely 
responsible for the push, for the advancement and growth in a very general sense. On its own, the 
living force is impersonal, indifferent to any concreteness, lacking any particular direction, and 
responsible for no concrete features in the living organism. Planted in matter, it pushes its organic 
growth, but the rest - the individuation of the living organism, its generic and unique features, its 
welfare and its death - all this is determined by matter which exists as a concrete carrier of the 
tendencies that it shapes, as a repository of life, as its protector and as the immediate producer of death. 
Without matter, the living tendency is a pure possibility, it is nowhere and everywhere. When realised 
in concrete bodies, it becomes embedded in them, localised, and acquires co-ordinates in the physical 
world. That part of it, which remains a tendency, also remains nowhere and everywhere, until it 
concretises itself in future forms. It seems that the creative impetus is a general principle responsible 
for all possible manifestations of life, from the creation of a cell to the pattem of behaviour of a 
concrete animal. Any specifications observed in tendencies where the impetus gains particularity must 
be due to the nature of matter that the impetus encounters and which shapes its performance. Without 
being involved in a concrete manifestation, the impetus is indescribable and unimaginable. But, we 
shall say again, this new significant role of matter cannot be identified as a potentiality when matter is 
considered prior to its involvement in biological existence. 
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4. Psychological duration 
An acknowledged sensation penetrates all levels of being. Immersing one's hand in warm water, one is 
consciously aware of one 's hand as a material object, and as a biological structure, directly presented 
to one's mind 
The heterogeneity with a highest complexity (consciousness) accounts for simpler, biological and 
material levels in perception. To illustrate this phenomenologically, we will look at the feeling of 
warmth - one of the very first components of psychological duration ever mentioned by Bergson. 
(TFW,p. I) 
When we place our hand in hot water, from the standpoint of the material world there is physical 
contact between two material elements - the flow of water and a soft, flat oblong object with five 
protruding extensions. As members of the material world, neither the oblong nor the water is 
competing for preferential treatment. The situation is decentralised with no focal element as to for 
whose sake the physical contact could be taking place. After a prolonged contact with the water, the 
temperature of the oblong rises. If the temperature of the water becomes 45°C, the oblong turns red, but 
this does not change the axiologically neutral status of the situation, for no axiological statement has 
any reason to appear in the material world. 
From the standpoint of the living world, the oblong is a palm, and the extensions are thumb and 
fingers. It is now part of an organism, an organ of holding, selective touching, exploring and 
manipulating matter. Water, too, changes its meaning. It stops being merely a colourless transparent 
liquid compound of oxygen and hydrogen and acquires a new role - as part of the environment. The 
situation is no longer decentralised: it acquires an axiological element which determines its centre, a 
step towards subjectivity, we may suggest. Neither an oblong nor a colourless liquid can experience 
pleasure or pain, but the hand can, and water as part of its environment can be a cause of pleasure or 
pain. Also, the hand is an organ designed to perform certain fUnctions. These fUnctions which 
constitute the hand-ness of the hand can be affected by feelings of pleasure and pain resulting from 
physical disturbance: if the temperature of the water increases to 45°C, the water becomes a hostile 
environment, as it would scald the hand, damaging its hand-ness. As a feeling entity, the hand becomes 
the centre to which the criteria of good and bad can be applied. Water, not being another living entity 
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rivalling the hand's right of centrality, becomes a means to promote the hand's existence or a potential 
threat to that existence. 	 - 
The mechanical contact of the water and the oblong which turns out to be a dialogue where the 
living hand draws either support or destructionfrom the mineral, becomes at the level of consciousness 
something else. The value that the hand assigns to itself is shifted and reassigned to its conscious bearer 
- the human being—, with the hand losing its value as the ultimate end but retaining its value as a 
functional part of the human body. In cases when the hand forfeits its hand-ness, for example when it is 
dangerously infected, it may be amputated if the survival of the whole organism demands this. 
As a functioning part of the human being, the hand's pleasure or pain becomes pleasure or pain for 
the person. The sensations that I am aware of are localised and restricted to one single area of my body 
and lam fully conscious of the restricted location of the sensation, but the pleasurable feeling spreads 
to my body as a whole, and delivers pleasure to me as the self. The pleasure is not identical with the 
feeling of warmth and yet it is not separated from it. I am certain that although I can localise the 
sensation and maybe even cannot help but localise and hence limit it, I cannot separate it from myself, 
from my "1" either: the sensation is experienced by me directly as the warmth of my hand. 
The hand as oblong or as organ is not part of my psychological duration. Yet my mind experiences 
directly the sensations of my hand; not learning about them theoretically, but gaining factual 
knowledge of warmth. My mind understands intimately what the hand is in mechanical terms (its 
shape, size, weight) and what it is in biological terms (a functional part of my body). My knowledge of 
these aspects may be inaccurate and incomplete, but my mind does not question or doubt the data it 
receives; it does not question whether the water is hot or cold, wet or dry - it definitely knows one way 
or another. 
It seems that my pre-reflective mind has direct access both to the material and biological nature of 
my body, and that my mind causes the awakening of both inert and living matter to another mode of 
existence - as being experienced, being known. My mind, which is not an extended entity, experiences 
extension, location, direction, size, weight, colour, and density. My mind, which is not an organ, 
experiences warmth, pain and pleasure. Psychological duration appears to be a higher process which 
includes all lower processes, not as empirically given, but as empirically known. Psychological 
duration in its pre-reflective state comprises dematerialised but otherwise real material and organic 
processes - as images, we should perhaps say. 
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Referring back to the Bergsonian theory of images, this is perhaps the best understanding of 
"images" we can have - as dematerialised events, and distinguishing them from material events 
themselves. Then perception, we must admit, dematerialises embodied reality, and where Bergson sees 
the node of continuity between the perceiving mind andthe perceived matter we nevertheless see a 
discontinuity - ajump from the empirically given to the empirically known.' 29 
5. Heterogeneous self 
Duration as self accounts for all existing components of the human being. Thickest possible self 
Our mind consists in duration ofpsychic states bound together by memory, growing via the joint effort 
ofperception and recognition, and man (Testing itself largely as intelligence, partially as instinct, and 
rarely as intuition. The body comprises duration of inanimate matter (internal duration and 
displacement), and duration of the living processes of the individual, which also include tendencies 
inheritedfrom all of its ancestors, as well as deliberate actions made through choice. Psychological 
duration accounts for all lower processes and includes extra elements. 
The involvement of matter and organic being in the feeling of warmth contributes to the content of 
our psychological duration. We have observed them in a certain order: material characteristics came 
first, biological ones followed and psychological ones concluded the process by including them all. But 
in the light of the conclusions made in Chapter 5, we will emphasise that, as a fragment of 
heterogeneous duration, our sensation of warmth cannot be separated into a sequence of sensations 
whereby we first feel the shape of our hand, then its rising temperature, then the pleasure. The 
awareness of all these characteristics appears jointly as one experience, and we separate various 
sensations by the different effects they produce on our body and mind. Here we see heterogeneous 
duration at work: characteristics as diverse as shape, temperature and pleasure are united in a single 
awareness of warmth; they can be singled out as qualities which emanate different relations but cannot 
be considered in a sequence as separate elements. Thus a single sensation illustrates a unity, a 
129 For an exposition of Bergson's theory of images see Chapter 3, Section 2. 
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continuity of mind and body, whereby bodily features are included in the mind in the disembodied 
form as tactile images. 	 - - 
The idea of heterogeneous duration comprising diverse qualities in a temporal flow is able to 
accommodate a potentially unlimited number of diverse phenomena. Within the theory of self as 
duration, we do not search for the core of selthood eliminating the rest of the human being from the 
picture, but talk of the entirety of human existence, as various aspects of the human being do not exist 
separately from each other. 
	 - 
We must stress that the "highest" psychological duration including other "lower" durations involves 
discontinuities when we consider this connection from the point of view of the lower durations: 
inanimate matter suddenly becomes a base for life, and life suddenly gives rise to consciousness. But 
lower durations taken prior to their involvement in the entire heterogeneity of the human being cannot 
account for this entirety and for other elements that are involved in this heterogeneity —just like the 
isolated note d cannot account for the musical sequence abet/a. 
We recognize that the direction in which we are following Bergson is different from the traditional 
Cartesian position taken up by flume and Kant, philosophers for whom the self, the "I", necessarily 
meant the thinking subject, the author of thoughts, as opposed to the object of those thoughts. Bergson 
disolved the opposition of subject and object, and so made the ptoblem of the self shift from the 
concern about the rationality displayed by the self, to the being of the self which includes rationality as 
its part: the idea of the self that is precedes the idea of the self that knows. We still acknowledge the 
privileged role of waking consciousness as a summit, so to speak, of the human being, but we cannot 
pretend that it has some independent existence and assert that the self simply equals a knowing mind. 
Adapting Loizou's distinction of "thin" and "thick" conceptions of the self to our discourse, 13° we can 
say that whereas the Kantian and Humean are amongst the "thinnest", where the self is equated 
exclusively with the rational knowing subject, the Bergsonian supersedes the thickest possible 
	 - 
conception of the self: according to the Bergsonian principles, the human being is irreducible to any of 
its components, and the self comprises psychological life and the body, taken in their past and present 
existence. 
Concerned with the ultimate principle of being, Bergson did not offer a systematic view of selthood 
as the self is only a fragment of being, but there is enough evidence in Bergsonism to construct a theory 
Loizou (2000), p. 70. 
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of heterogeneous self. As duration impregnated with memory, the self comprises all of its history, both 
as a psychological and as a physical duration. Human beings, developed from inanimate matter to 
bearers of intelligence, encompass everything they have accumulated along the way: physical laws that 
govern inanimate matter, instinctive growth of the living tissue - these layers underline the existence of 
our mind. Everything that affects inert matter will also affect living matter which is built on inert 
matter, and features of living matter will be included in the existence of a conscious being. 
The self as duration is saturated with its own past, and its every manifestation, from the existence of 
an individual to an act performed by the self, is the work of all of its history, going back far beyond the 
birth of the individual into the history of the living world and of the universe. It could even be said that 
the human self is a culmination of all worldly processes - from movement of the substance in inert 
matter to the advancement of life in organic bodies. 
Part of the Universe and a fragment of evolution, human consciousness or psychological duration is 
the continuity of interrelated psychological events. The mechanism that binds them together is memory. 
Perception supplies new material for the content of duration and is given meaning by means of the 
information about previous experiences preserved in memory, revived by recognition and grafted onto 
the newly supplied sensory data. This complex process of cognition, involving the joint work of 
perception and memory in recognition, is a base for the work of intelligence which, for Bergson, is 
ultimately a manufacturing ability, i.e. an ability to manipulate matter at will, decompose and 
recompose it in a multitude of ways. Apart from the explicitly rational and logically narrative side of 
our conscious life, represented by intelligence, there are also feelings, emotions, beliefs and acts of 
volition. 131 
Instinct too comes into the life of our self: It is a prolongation of the biological drive which is 
involved in the construction of organs and in their functioning. It is evident in our involuntary activity 
(e.g. breathing) but also included in our rationalised actions (e.g. procreative behaviour). In addition to 
intelligence and instinct, there is also intuition. If intelligence is the dominant faculty of our psyche and 
131 Independently of "thick" and "thin" conceptions of the self, there are theories that define self as a 
narrative structure, involving temporally extended eventuality, and those that prefer to see it as 
episodic, confined to the present moment. (For an example of the former see Crowther, "The Cohesior 
of the Self' in his Philosophy after Posimodernism: Civilized Values and the Scope of Knowledge, 
Routledge, 2003, pp.  78— 100, and for an example of the latter, Galen Strawson, "The Self' in Models 
of/he Self Shaun Gallagher, Jonathan Shear, Galen Strawson (ed.), Imprint Academic, 2000, pp.  1 - 
24.) The Bergsonian concept of the self is, of course, comparable to the self as narrative, but it 
supersedes it, because in Bergsonism, we also take into account the past history beyond the concrete 
existence of the self such as evolutionary development. 
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the role of instinct in humans is restricted (unlike in animals which survive mainly due to the work of 
instinct), intuition as a cognitive faculty exists in a nascent state and manifests itself really only through 
artistic work. Like instinct, it is involved in direct creation, where the complex structures are produced 
in one act of inspiration without the rationalised analysis and composition of their parts. But its goals 
go far beyond the goals of instinct, which is only concerned with the immediate tasks of the 
preservation or promotion of organic life. As a cognitive and creative faculty, intuition is disengaged 
from the practicality of intellectual knowledge or manufacturing and is able to grasp the very being of 
things. 
The mind, comprising various tendencies and processes, is embedded in the processes and 
tendencies of its physical base - the organic body. The body is duration of organic events which 
constitute the life of the organism. They are bound together by memory, just like psychic events, but in 
a different way: memory of living matter does nor preserve images of events but preserves extraction 
of concrete events as tendencies, which are manifested later in subsequent events. Duration of a living 
organism also involves behaviour of that organism, which comprises movements as a result of choice 
made by the organism. Also, the life of the organism in itself is part of the mega-process of evolution, 
and as such contains tendencies remaining from the biological events of all preceding ancestral life 
forms. It could be said that the relationship between organism and its past is direct rather than 
representational. 
Living matter is matter that supersedes inanimate matter, but includes the latter within its own 
structure and thus the duration of inanimate matter is also included in the structure of the animated 
matter. Just like inert matter, organic matter, on a sub-cellular level, involves internal vibrations and 
vortices. In addition, we must not forget that the motion of a living organism is not exhausted by its 
behaviour; bodies, just like inert objects, can be pushed, lifted or thrown, or in other words, involved in 
mechanical motion which differs from deliberate actions. 
	 - 
The human being, as an heir to all its preceding history, is a multidimensional being comprising 
features of inert matter as well as those of organic matter. For example, a human being possesses 
qualities such as size and weight which he or she shares with all objects extended in space. "I" as a 
physical object is a dimension of the self different from "I" as an organic body and from "I" as a 
sentient being. We accept the totality of the self as a material, biological and psychological unity, 
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bearing in mind that the self can function in all three dimensions: as a material, biological and 
psychological entity. 
Amongst material objects, the human being is but another material object, and those sides of us 
which do not find counterparts in material things, are left out of the scene. We are inert matter for 
material objects, and our interactions within their realm are restricted to mechanical displacements: 
pushing, lifting, dropping, breaking. 
In the living world, our biological side finds response. Living existence involves material existence, 
so we can still push, lift, drop and break, but we also engage in biological interactions: we eat, kill, 
grow, procreate. Our biological actions retain their material significance, however, so that the events of 
the organic world acquire a twofold meaning: the same event, in the material dimension would be 
pushing, whereas in the organic dimension it could be causing pain, and increasing in size, for a 
material object is growing if this object is an organism. 
In the psychological dimension of the self, the latter displays features, specific to consciousness, but 
also retains both biological and material ones. For a phenomenological example, we can recall that 
alongside the feeling of warmth, Bergson mentioned the feeling of sadness. (TFW, p. 1) Whereas 
analysing the feeling of warmth we found that it consists of consciously acknowledged material and 
biological components, the feeling of sadness contains an extra layer which is generated in 
consciousness and not included in the previous, biological, level. 
The feeling of sadness can be triggered by, say, a letter. Then, just as in the case of warmth, we have 
a purely physical element to begin with: the flat square piece of paper in the proximity of a sphere 
which turns out to be the head, because being a head involves being a sphere. On the biological level, 
the eyes perceive the paper from the distance of some 30cm and distinguish lines of black marks. The 
further development of sadness involves memory. Our mind recognises black marks as letters of a 
familiar language, groups of letters as words. Then we engraft further layers of meaning, such as 
emotional connotations, onto the words of the letter. We connect the concepts in the letter with our 
memories, and their combination evokes the sadness. 
Despite its physical and biological manifestations, such as a lump in our throat and tears in our eyes, 
we understand that sadness, unlike the feeling of warmth, is necessarily generated by consciousness. In 
the feeling of warmth, the role of the mind is limited to the acknowledgment of the biological event. 
We mentioned the feeling of pleasure associated with it which is more like a feature of consciousness, 
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but this still could be a simple acknowledgment of what is beneficial for our body. As for sadness, even 
though we find both physical and biological elements involved in the causing and manifesting of this 
feeling, the actual production of it is obviously the work of the mind, or soul, or psychological 
duration. When we say "I am warm", we recognize that it is the body that is warm, and that the 
psychological being warm is an acknowledgment of the bodily experience. When we say "I am sad", 
there is nothing apart from our psychological self that can be sad, because our body cannot be sad: 
Sadness, of course, can be depicted by an actor via a bodily performance, and real sadness projects 
itself in our appearance, but cannot be reduced to it and originates in the psychological realm. 
Of course, duration, although shown in Time and Free Will as purely inextensive and spiritual, 
could not exist as such in reality because its existence presupposes growth, the addition of new content, 
and the material for new content comes from the physical world. In Matter and Memory Bergson 
shows that data about the world is delivered to our consciousness by our senses in such a way that we 
experience the very materiality of the world - we partake of it as recipients of the direct influence that 
weight, size, colour or sound produce on our body. In this sense, psychological duration partakes of the 
materiality and extensity of the physical world since its content comprises sensations that originate 
from a physical cause. "It is in very truth within matter that pure perception places us, and it is really 
into spirit that we penetrate by means of memory. But, on the other hand, while introspection reveals to 
us the distinction between matter and spirit, it also bears witness to their union." (MM, p. ISO) 
In Matter and Memory Bergson nevertheless talks about "reconciliation between the unextended 
and the extended." (MM, p. 181) This reconciliation (which appears to be inconsistent with the theory 
of pure duration in Time and Free Will), takes place in pure perception: 
We place the perceived images of things outside the image of our body, and thus replace 
perception within the things themselves. But then, our perception being a part of things, things 
participate in the nature of our perception. Material extensity is not, cannot any longer be, that 
composite extensity which is considered in geometry; it indeed resembles rather the undivided 
extension of our own representation. That is to say, the analysis of pure perception allows us 
to foreshadow in the idea of extension the possible approach to each other of the extended and 
the unextended. (MM, p. 182) 
We observe that our mind is aware of the physical qualities of things in such a way that it does not 
just know ofthem - our mind has a direct experiential knowledge of physical things. Unextended, it 
experiences their extensity in sensations delivered to it by the nervous system of the body. Thus 
extensity and inextensity must partake of each other: inextensity as a recipient of the physical influence 
and extensity, as a bearer or producer of a visual, audio or tactile "image". This is how one can 
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understand Bergson's position regarding the unity of spirit and matter occurring in perception. Memory 
helps us in this, he believes: "Our conception of pure memory should lead us, by a parallel road, to 
attenuate the second opposition, that of quality and quantity." (MM, p. 182) 
Bergson demonstrates that what spirit and matter have in common, what makes them belong to the 
same order of reality and what makes their interactions possible, is that they both share in movement, 
to the extent that both are, primarily, movement themselves. In perception the extended and the 
inextended flow into one another. "That which is given, that which is real, is something intermediate 
between divided extension and pure inextension. It is what we have termed the extensive." (MM, p. 
245) The extensive participates both in things (when they are taken out of an abstract space) and in our 
consciousness as we perceive extensity. 
However, although in Matter and Memory Bergson accounts for the continuity of subject and object 
in his theory of perception, the perception of an object does not explain the emergence of an emotion. 
Here it may be useful to recall Bergson's "deep-seated phenomena, the cause of which is within us and 
not outside." (TFW, p. 5) This could imply a division of psychic phenomena within psychological 
duration, where the feelings of sadness and warmth could be labelled as more or less deep-seated. 
Sadness, even when triggered by outer circumstances, is not simply taking the physical and the 
biological phenomena to a higher state of their being known. Sadness appears as a result of the reader 
coming into physical contact with the letter, but it is not a mere prolongation of this physical contact: as 
sadness, it is a new creation within the psychological duration per se, which reveals another split in 
duration. 
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Chapter 8. The structure of rational selfhood 
1. The pre-refiective self 
In Bergsonism, the subjectivity of the self is not limited to self-conscious awareness. Character and 
constitutive attachments define the self on the pre-reflective leveL Traits of character and habits begin 
their l(fe as concrete repetitive episodes in the present; they then turn into tendencies. 
We do not expect rational subjects to be all the same, as every person demonstrates differences in 
temperament, values and preferences. Bergson recognises that one's rationality is not defined solely by 
self-conscious awareness but includes character as well - the character which is built over time: "V/hat 
are we, intact, what is our character, if not the condensation of the history that we have lived from our 
birth - nay, even before our birth, since we bring with us prenatal dispositions?" (CE, p. 5) 
For the analysis of the pre-reflective base of psychological duration we can use terminology 
introduced by Loizou who presents psychic dispositions, values, traits of character, preferences as 
constitutive attachments —the self s inner objects which may not be present to one's consciousness but 
are not detached from the self as, say, objects of sight: they constitute our character and our pre-
reflective self which is a base for rational performance. 132  At the pre-reflective level, "constitutive 
attachments define not merely what I will, what I do, or what I have, but what I am" 33 and give our 
subjectivity colour and body. 
Constitutive attachments do not enter our psychological duration at a definite time as concrete 
temporal episodes. They are present in our psyche, and there must have been time when they were not 
present, but we cannot account for a definite date when such and such preference or belief came to 
exist and to contribute to one's psychological duration. 
132 Loizou (2000), pp.  67 - 70. Loizou introduces "inner object" only as a provisional term, but it 
effectively highlights the distinctive and problematic nature of character traits. 
Loizou (2000), p. 70 
154 
Tendencies that form our character' 34 are not evident unless they are manifested through some 
concrete action. One's love for music is always there but is not manifested unless there is, say, a choice 
between going to a football match or to a concert - and the lover of music will choose the concert, thus 
revealing the preference for musical entertainment as a trait of character. 
Creating a tendency must be akin to acquiring a motor memory.' 35 A tendency exists prior to its 
realisation but, before it can exist as unrealised tendency, first it needs to be formed. To understand the 
mechanism of forming a tendency, we shall recall Bergson's assertion that "the formation of memory is 
never posterior to the form ation ofperception; it is contemporaneous with it." (ME, p. 157) It is an 
illusion, Bersgon says, to believe "that memory succeeds perception." (ME, p. 160) Memory, he 
asserts, is formed alongside perception (ME, pp. 159— 160), and after perception has ceased, memory 
remains. (ME, p. 164) "The memory seems to be to the perception what the image reflected in the 
mirror is to the object in front of it. The object can be touched as well as seen; acts on us as well as we 
on it; is pregnant with possible actions; it is actual. The image is virtual, and though it resembles the 
object, it is incapable of doing what the object does." (ME, p. 165) 
Image remembered is then an object dematerialised —as concluded in Chapter 7136  Memories that 
we keep and which constitute our psychological duration consist of dematerialised eventuality. While 
we are engaged in an event which contributes to our acquiring a tendency, our physical and biological 
interactions are accompanied by their dematerialised counterparts. When the physical and the 
biological cease, the dematerialised remains. And, according to Bergson, it remains even though we are 
not conscious of it: this memory is always there and always ready to push its way into the 
consciousness. 
A tendency thus consists in an inactive memory of numerous instances of repeated events of the 
same type. This memory is not always evident but, as an indestructible part of psychological duration, 
the tendency contributes to our character and to our self at all times as unconscious, unremembered 
memories. Habit memories are thus traces of past events, where events have become anonymous with 
their dates and places erased, being irrelevant to the formation and realisation of the habit. 
114 For Bergson, character is a network of tendencies ("that special tendency that we call our character" 
(CE, p. 104). 
" For an exposition of motor memory see Chapter 3, Section 3. 
136 Chapter 7, Section 4, p.  146. 
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We do not remember each instance of eating and enjoying spicy food, for instance, but these 
inactive memories condense themselves into a tendency to like spicy food, with this tendency 
becoming part of our character. Enjoyment of eating spicy food on particular occasions becomes the 
reason for choosing it in consequent situations. When the circumstances permit this preference to be 
revealed in the act of making a choice of food, this memory, de-concretised and transferred into a 
generalised tendency, becomes manifested. Its pastness is being restored: we can admit that our 
reaching out for spices is the evidence of our having acquired the taste for it in the past. 
But what about the ontological status of inactive memories when they are dormant? They are not 
extended, not materialised, not obvious, not in any place, but they exist, according to Bergson, and 
constitute the past. Bergson calls memory in a state of inactivity pure past, but it may even be 
appropriate to regard it as a-temporal, as it loses any connections, any relations with reality: it is there, 
but without a date in time, or location in space. The property of being past of such memories is only 
revealed when they are remembered or brought to light as actualised tendencies. When they are not 
remembered they can only be understood in negative terms. Since unremembered and unrealised 
memories are inactive, they cannot interact with each other, because interacting would be acting. The 
status of inactive memories is dubious: they are part of duration (according to Bergson) but, having lost 
all their concrete characteristics, they have lost everything that ties them to the reality of concrete 
duration. Bergson does not seem to offer an explanation of this difficulty.' 37 
Another difficulty consists in Bergson insisting that all our past is preserved and that the demands of 
the current perception retrieve those memories that are suitable and relevant.' 38 But there is no criterion 
of their suitability and relevance, so in principle memories can be retrieved at random. Secondly, if the 
entire past contributes to the formation of every present, then we have an undifferentiated totality. 
Contrary to Bergson, there must be a division of experiences into influential which contribute to my 
character and non-influential which do not, even though the principle of selection is not immediately 
obvious. 
137 As we demonstrated in Chapter 6, the vaguer the spatial parameters of an entity are, the vaguer are 
its temporal coordinates and its ontological concreteness too. (See Chapter 6, Section 2.) 
138 For our division of the past that survives and the past that "drops oft' see Chapter 6, Section 5. 
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2. Unity of the self in self-consciousness 
Unity of/he temporally stretched self is achieved rationally in self-consciousness. It requires synthesis 
of temporally diverse events, which is only possible in memory. 
Moving on to the questions of identity, of the self acknowledged and rationalised, we will note that 
if Descartes, flume and Kant were beginning their discourse of the self with the "I think" we, following 
Bergson, arrive at the "I think" only after considering its material, biological and unconscious 
foundations. 
How does the self become self-conscious? When dealing with the self's rationality we enter the 
domain of the obvious, of the phenomena. However, we are not interested in the acting self yet but in 
that fragment of the process of selfhood that lies between the pre-reflective self and the self's physical 
engagement with the external world. This is rational self-consciousness, alert and waking phenomenal 
mind comprising thoughts, desires and ideas, the "I" of the individual. It is there that we will look for 
identity - conscious, acknowledged self-sameness preserved over one's entire life. 
Flow would Bergson explain the unity of temporally stretched self? By the work of memory, of 
course: all our experiences are preserved, explicitly remembered or not, so that we comprise in our 
now-existence all that we have ever experienced in the past. We have noted above our suspicions 
regarding the significance of the entire past for the person, but granted, this accumulation of 
experience, de-materialised but not lost, explains the temporal unity of the self. But does it explain this 
unity to the self? Most of the preserved memories are suspended in a non-remembered state, and can be 
traced back to the point of their origin only retrospectively, when they are brought to light in an act of 
remembering. Thus the self is not aware of its largely unconscious entirety, and yet it is aware of and 
believes in its own self-sameness preserved over the time. 
The selfhood analysed in section I of this chapter is not yet self-consciousness, as self-
consciousness involves reflection of consciousness upon itself, and this is what the pre-reflective self is 
lacking: one can be kind, angry or love music without acknowledging one's self-sameness. Turning our 
attention to self-consciousness, we will now consider it in terms of rational awareness - an ability to 
navigate between various temporal planes and synthesise temporally diverse events into a unity of 
one's own "I". 
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Should we regard the "I" as merely a concept or as another, possibly central and privileged, process 
of selihood? As a concept, we would expect it to be an abstraction of all processes of selthood, to be 
superimposed on the diversity of personal events as an a-temporal entity which represents and points at 
one's identity, but which has no correspondence to anything real. 
It is this a-temporality of the conceptual"!" that Hegel uses in his discussion of absolute religion 
where he sees the possibility of entering heaven, not after death, but during one's life, provided one 
loves God and detaches oneself from empirical reality.' 39 This would mean taking the concept of "I" as 
primary reality and identiing oneself with this concept. Thus, dematerialising oneself to the extreme, 
one can hope to experience immortality as immateriality whilst alive, for the concept will remain 
indefinitely. Hergson would argue against this view of immortality, for concepts cannot be immortal 
simply because they have never been alive: he asserts the concrete reality of processes ofelthood. So, 
if we recognise the "I" as a concept, we need to find out what this concept means to us when we use it: 
does it stand for a specific process of selthood or could it be, in ontological terms, made redundant? 
Bergson's explicit reference to the self as "1" can be found in Mind-Energy: 
Besides the body which is confined to the present moment in time and limited to the place it 
occupies in space, which behaves automatically and reacts mechanically to external 
influences, we apprehend something which is much more extended than the body in space and 
which endures through time, something which requires from, or imposes on, the body 
movements no longer automatic and foreseen, but unforeseeable and free. This thing, which 
overflows the body on all sides and which creates acts by new-creating itself, is the "I", the 
"soul", the "mind", - mind being precisely a force which can draw from itself more than it 
contains, yields more than it receives, give more than it has. (ME, p. 39) 
Yet Bergson does not dwell on the issues of self-consciousness. It seems that, for him, there is no 
urgency in distinguishing between consciousness and self-consciousness: both are understood as 
consciousness, as Bergson concentrates on the function that conscious processes play in action and 
manufacturing. From this point of view, self-consciousness is consciousness that is just more highly 
developed and accommodates a wider scope of possible action. However, Bergsonism, does not deny 
self-consciousness - Bergson's position on it can be retrieved out of his deliberations about psychic 
states, memory, intelligence and intuition. 
' Hegel talks of consciousness of reconciliation, abstracted from present actuality. (Hegel (1988), p. 
460) 
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3. Bergson: intuition versus analysis 
Bergson favours intuition and opposes it to conceptual intellection. 
Self-consciousness is self-knowledge, an awareness of one's "I", where the most basic statement of 
seithood, the "I am", is acknowledged and taken for granted. Like everything else in the Bergsonian 
system, self-consciousness must be understood as a process with irreducible temporality. 
Self-consciousness, awareness of one's own unity as a temporal individual, is an achievement and a 
case of rational thinking. Therefore in order to answer the question as to whether we could trust our 
rationality to deliver a reliable portrayal of our self, we ought to evaluate rationality in general. In 
Bergson we find two ways in which rational awareness manifests itself: intelligent analysis (a practical 
means that helps manipulate matter) and intuition (a direct grasp of reality). 
The idea of intuition is developed and contrasted with analysis in Bergson's An Introduction to 
Metaphysics, but to understand fully what this contrast entails, we need refer to Bergson's subsequent 
work, Creative Evolution, which describes intuition as 'instinct that has become disinterested, self-
conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely'. (CE, p. 186) 10  
From the analysis of Creative Evolution we remember that instinct, intelligence and vegetative 
torpor are independent tendencies of the original impetus of life which is carried on throughout the 
evolutionary development from the most primitive forms of life to plants, to Hymenoptera and to man, 
where vegetative torpor, instinct and intelligence appear in their most developed forms. Whereas 
intelligence is the ability to dissect reality in order to, ultimately, construct man-made tools, 
maintaining man's work of adaptation to the environment, instinct is nature's ability to create natural 
tools, organs and organisms, in a simple act of creation. This work of creation is prolonged then into 
the instinctive use of an organ, and into the instinctive behaviour of the living organism which acts as if 
it knows the outcome of its actions. From this perspective, instinct is creative power combined with 
direct awareness of the happening, so that the life of any individual organism shows traits of conscious 
behaviour. Adaptation to the environment - living "at the expense of other animals", or "a tendency of 
soft organisms to defend themselves against one another by making themselves, as far as possible, 
140 For an exposition of Hergson's theory of cognition see Chapter 4, Sections 3-6. 
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undevourable" (CE, p.  137)— resembles a conscious response to external circumstances, 141  and is an 
indication that living bodies are aware of possible dangers or of opportunities to use other bodies for 
food. 
This "knowledge", this quasi-conscious awareness observed in the animal world and beneficial for 
the whole of the species as it develops, cannot be passed from one individual to another via a signalling 
system such as human language. This knowledge that is involved in the living organisms and that has a 
direct effect on the evolutionary process, must be of a different type than that which we have as 
conscious beings and must have a close connection with the ontological structure of the being. It must 
be part of the ontological structure of a living being, if having this knowledge in itself allows the living 
being to maintain or alter the form of its descendents. So, the tendency of life that Bersgon talks about, 
must be a force embedded in each living organism that is knowledge on the one side and the power to 
act on matter on the other, with knowledge directing physical power. 
It is here, more than at any other point in Bergson's philosophy, that he advocates existence merged 
with epistemology where information about the being constitutes part of the being, and the process of 
being includes an element of knowledge, so that the knowledge is passed on through being, itself as 
part of the process of being. This correlates with Bergson's claim that ontology must include 
psychology, and that the true task of metaphysics consists in remounting the incline that physics 
descends, bringing back matter to its origins, and building up "progressively a cosmology which would 
be, so to speak, a reversed psychology." (CE, p.  219) 
This is where intuition originates - in the instinctive knowledge embedded in biological being. 
Bergson indicates how instinct can develop into intuition: "Instinct is sympathy. If this sympathy could 
extend its object and also reflect upon itself, it would give us the key to vital operations." (CE, p.  186) 
Intuition, i.e. instinct taken to a higher level, is a kind of awareness where we, supposedly, immerse 
ourselves in the object and discover its nature directly. Even though we have entered the object from 
outside, we forget the moment of entry and we experience the nature of the object as if it were part of 
"' This resemblance is based on the apparent similarity of their functions: both consciousness and 
instinct provide successful responses to circumstances. But following William James, we can say that 
although an animal acts as if it subserves abstractly understood purposes such as self-preservation or 
defence, its actions lack any understanding and the animal acts simply because it cannot help but 
behave in this way. (See James (1950), pp.  383 -441) If successes of instinctive actions imply 
knowledge, this knowledge is not explicitly given to the acting agency itself because the animal does 
not connect its own effort with the success. This "knowledge" does not have a knowing subject. That 
is why Bergson talks of "resemblence " and of "quasi-consciousness", avoiding a direct equation of 
consciousness and instinct. 
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our being, like pain or thirst. As in instinct, our knowledge then is a reverse side of being, but what 
makes intuition different from instinct, it seems, is that, whereas in instinct one's knowledge is bound 
with one's being in order to preserve and promote it, in intuition our knowledge becomes disengaged 
from our being and is bound with the being of another entity, and this is why intuition is described as 
disinterested instinct: it no longer looks after the biological structure of the organism but provides 
organic knowledge of another thing or being without it being linked directly to the process of 
biological creation. This epistemological faculty, according to Bergson, has not been fully developed in 
man; we only get glimpses of it in art where the artist's genius creates a complex and varied 
masterpiece in a simple act of inspiration, and also in the act of aesthetic contemplation.' 42 
To summarise: both in intuition and in instinct one's attention is directed at the essence of the 
object' 43 to the extent that there isa merging of attention of both the subject and the essence of the 
object, but in instinct, one is already within the object, and in intuition, one needs to place oneself 
within the object. Instinct forms part of the creative process but intuition itself does not create, and this 
is linked to the fact that instinct is bound with one's existence whereas intuition is disengaged from 
one's existence and bound with the existence of the other being or thing. Also, instinct acts 
involuntarily as it is imbedded in the organic structure of the organism, but intuition acts only when it 
is willed, as it is a result of an effort. Even though Bergson limits examples Of the use of intuition to 
artistic creation, he indicates that intuition could in principle give genuine knowledge of any object, 
which would also include knowledge about our self in self-consciousness. 144 
Unlike intuition, analysis is the conceptual approach to knowledge, in which we dissect reality, 
looking at it from the outside, and rearrange it according to our conceptual framework. If in intuition 
we enter into the object, in analysis we move round it. Intuitive data does not depend on a point of view 
nor rely on any symbol, but data received via intellectual analysis depend on a point of view and rely 
on symbols. Intuition gives an absolute knowledge, grasping what is unique and essential, whilst 
142 Simondon, developing the idea of intuition further, suggests placing creative intuition in a wider 
context rather than restricting it to aesthetics, and claims that it is present in manufacturing as well - in 
the form of invention. (Pascal Chabot, La Philosophy de Simondon, Vrin, 2003) 
143 It may be argued that in instinct, attention cannot be directed at all and is passive, receptive atention. 
But any movement, even purely mechanical, is vectorial and in that sense directed at something. Here 
we ignore the fact that intuition is directed in the volitional sense and instinct is not. 
In An Introduction to Metaphysics, Bergson refers to analysis and intuition as "two ... different 
ways of knowing a thing" (Introduction, p.  21), which, we assume, means any object including one's 
own self. Also, one's own "self which endures" is presented as reality which we undoubtedly grasp in 
intuition. (Introduction, p.  24) 
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analysis provides relative knowledge expressed in concepts. In intuition, we coincide with the object by 
means of intellectual sympathy, and in analysis we reduce the object to familiar elements and then 
attempt to reconstruct the original. Intuition thus is a simple act and analysis can go on indefinitely. 
Bergson finds analysis justifiable in natural sciences, but he would prefer metaphysics to use intuition, 
because intuition deals with the real, moving thing, whereas analysis crystallizes and immobilises the 
moving object. 
4. Intuition: knowledge by acquaintance 
Intuition and instinct are more like knowledge by acquaintance than propositional knowledge 
because they do not allow for falsity and are incommunicable. Unable to serve as an ultimate cognitive 
faculty on its own, intuition is integrated into propositional knowledge. 
From the Bergsonian position, the epistemological faculty that is able to provide us with genuine 
knowledge must fulfil the following criteria: 
I. Like intelligence, it must be able to direct its attention at will. 
2. Like instinct, it must embed itself into the object of enquiry and follow it in its entirety - not 
selecting fragments of it for analysis and arbitrary synthesis. 
3. Unlike intelligence, it must not conceptualise, for conceptualisation commits one to regard the 
object in a certain fixed way, whereas real objects are fleeting and changing. 
Conceptualisation also restricts reality to corresponding to concepts whereas real objects are 
richer in their content than concepts can ever be. 
4. Unlike instinct, it must reflect on the object, but not be one with it, otherwise it would 
disintegrate into a pre-reflective mode of knowledge. 
Rational but not conceptual, flexible in the choice of its object and yet rigorous in its grasp of it - 
this is the type of knowledge that Bergson wants us to see in intuition. Can an epistemological faculty 
fulfil features so apparently incompatible? 
Intuition is aimed at reconciling instinct and intelligence, retaining their strong sides and 
overcoming the limitations that both instinct and intelligence entail. The strong side of instinct is that it 
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is embedded in being, but it cannot disengage from the immediacy, hence it is restricted to the pre-
reflective domain. Intelligence chooses its object at will but it always originates from some practical 
point of view and has some purpose to its attention, hence the information it accumulates is a selection 
of raw materials for future action, with many aspects omitted from the picture. Intelligence deals with 
concepts and, having supplied us with a concept, makes us either seek a reality which would match this 
concept and leave other features of it out, or rearrange the reality to make it fit into the concept, forcing 
us to distort reality in either case. 
Despite having strong views about the merits of intuition, Bergson is not clear on many issues 
connected with it. However, our observation that intuition is a fully rational act which is performed at 
will is confirmed by Lacey and Mullarkey: "The ways in which intuition goes beyond instinct are that 
it is conscious, confined to humans, and reflective." 45 Mullarkey observes that Bergson "encourages us 
to 'plunge' and 'insert our will' into perception, 'deepening', widening' and 'expanding' it as we 
do."46 Whenever Bergson talks of intuition he always associates it with an effort to reverse our 
habitual way of thinking and this in itself involves a rational decision, an act of will. Also, we can 
rehearse Bergson's own statement made in Creative Mind: "My intuition is reflection." (CM, p.  88) 
Lacey and Moore describe an act of intuition as holistic: duration cannot be grasped by separate 
considerations of its sections but "must be apprehended as a whole, like a melody." 147 Moore adds: 
"Bergson's holism is ... psychological or experiential, rather than logical." 48 Russell suggests 
qualifying this type of epistemological approach as synthesis: "The essential characteristic of intuition 
is that it does not divide the world into separate things, as the intellect does; although Bergson does not 
use these words, we might describe it as synthetic rather than analytic.' ,149  
One could raise concerns in regard to the claim that intuition grows out of instinct. Bergson's belief 
in the infallibility of intuition should be founded on a belief in the infallibility of instinct: embedded in 
the ontological structure of being, how can it but know the very essence of it? However, observations of 
instinctive behaviour discredit its alleged infallibility. Russell observes: "Instinct, as a rule, is very 
' 45 Lacey,pp. 150-151 
'' Mullarkey (1999), P.  159 
147 Lacey, p.  154 
148 F. C. T. Moore, p.42 
149 Russell (1914), p.  10 
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rough and ready, able to achieve its results under ordinary circumstances, but easily misled by anything 
unusual." ISO 
 He draws on examples taken from various sources which illustrate errors in instinctive 
behaviour: chicks follow any moving object resembling their mother (James); ants tend the larvae of a 
beetle, which eats the young of the ants, with the same care that they tend their own. (Dr. Drever) Also, 
Bergson himself admits in passing that "instinct is, like intelligence, fallible" (CE, p. 182) 
But even if instinct could not be misled by unusual circumstances, it needs to be emphasised that 
Bergson's epistemological views do not accommodate a theory of knowledge in a strict sense because 
neither intuition nor instinct involve the capacity of falsehood. In those examples where instinctive 
behaviour goes wrong, it is not because of a false judgement but rather because of the lack of 
knowledge, ignorance, which both the chicks and the ants demonstrate. For Bergson who emphasises 
the functional, creative power of intluition, true or false statements about an object do not matter. What 
matters to him is whether the organism or the mind knows what to do with the object, and the genuine 
insight into the nature of the object consists, for Bergson, in becoming infected with the specific 
dynamic properties of the object, with the action that is unrolling within it. 
As we strive to uphold the idea of subjectivity of the self, we cannot let ourselves beJed by Bergson 
into the direction of accepting cognitive ability merely as a faculty to continue some work of creation, 
whether as instinctive behaviour or artistic work. We need to look for knowledge as a faculty to 
appreciate and evaluate data whilst remaining on one's own premises, not contaminated by these data. 
From this perspective, Bergson's intuition as it is portrayed explicitly in his texts and as it is 
understood by his critics will not suffice. 
5. Three stages of cognition 
We uphold a three-staged cognitive process in Bergsonism: pre-conceptual intuition, conceptual 
intellection and post-conceptual intuition. 
Looking beyond the explicit in Bergson, we find that intuition appears in two modes: as pre-
conceptual and as post-conceptual. Ike-conceptual intuition of an object occurs prior to our analysis of 
150 Russell (1949), p.55 
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it, and post-conceptual intuition is the result of our attention superseding the conceptual framework and 
reverting back to the original mode of acquaintance enriched, however, by the intermediary conceptual 
reflection. We claim that the cognitive process in Bergson really involves three stages, which we shall 
term pre-conceptual (primary) intuition, conceptual intellection and post-conceptual (secondary) 
intuition. 
This is where some secondary literature ens: critics pick up either one or the other stages of 
intuition, overlooking the fact that there are, in fact, two stages. Kolakowski criticises intuition as 
"incommunicable" 151, 
 reminding us that Rergson describes it as symbol free. He stresses that intuitive 
insight can only be a private achievement, which seems like a dead end for an epistemological faculty. 
What Kolakowski misunderstands here is that such intuition is but a beginning of rationality, pre-
conceptual intuition. 
Herman, on the other hand, thinks of secondary intuition when saying that "far from rejecting the 
intellect and its concepts, intuition has need of them to communicate itself." 52 George Rostrevor 
asserts that intuition must include reflection' 53 , but it is Bachelard who, we think, gets closer to the 
truth: 
We see the relations between intuition and intellect as more complex than a simple opposition. 
We see them as constantly co-operating when they come into play. There are intuitions at the 
root of our concepts: these intuitions are unclear: they are wrongly thought to be natural and 
rich. There are intuitions too in the way we put concepts together; these essentially secondary 
intuitions are clearer: they are wrongly thought to be artificial and poor.' 54 
Our understanding of the three stages of the epistemic process in Bergsonism is as follows. First, 
data of consciousness are received in pre-conceptual intuition which resembles Husserl's pre-
predicative evidence, included in predicative evidence when later conceptualised.' 55 Our primary 
intuition of the worldly phenomena is richer and broader than anything we ever express verbally, and 
the conceptualised versions of our perceptions are selective and hence always incomplete. We are 
consciously aware of more than we are able to communicate. 
Kolakowski, p.  29 
152 Herman, p.  46 
... Rostrevor, pp.  60 - 61 
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For example, if we wanted to give an exhaustive description of an object, saying "I see a black ink 
pen fifteen cm long with an arrow shaped silver logo printed on its side" would be only a start, because 
we would have to find ways to mention each crevice, each deviation of colour, the size and the degree 
of fading of the logo, any damage caused by usage, minute scratches on the surface, visible dust 
particles, dents and marks - in other words, everything that we see and are aware of but what normally 
does not receive attention and is not conceptualised when we talk about pens. What receives attention 
when we talk about pens is their colour, whether they work or not, brand and price, but not minute 
scratches on the surface and the fading of the logo, although these are facts that we consciously observe 
about pens. 
Or we could be looking at an unusual phenomenon and struggle to describe it within the available 
conceptual framework, but this does not mean that we are not accessing it in a rational and reflective 
way. This experience could be memorised and conceptualised later using, say, a specialist language. 
That which is retained and remembered in later recollections is, of course, an image, and we suggest 
that it is images that we access intuitively in our perceptions. Bergson himself uses the word intuition 
to refer to the accessing of images in pure perception: "... instantaneous intuitions, on which our 
perception of the external world is developed..." (MM, p.66) However, he admits that the role of these 
intuitions is limited as the datum of immediate intuitions is "a small matter compared with all that 
memory adds to it." (MM, p.  66) We would say, however, that there is no reason why the pre-
conceptual intuition we are talking about could not include data delivered both by perception and 
memory jointly. For when we perceive images and our immediate perceptions are accompanied by 
memory-images, this joint awareness of the immediate data presents itself to our mind as rational and 
yet pre-conceptual, or that which exceeds conceptuality. We may even suggest that memory-images are 
necessary for pre-conceptual intuition because they facilitate understanding and account for the 
element of rationality there. 
Kolakowski stresses that "intuition is supposed to give us direct, yet not sensual, contact with 
reality, 'direct' meaning that it dispenses with abstract concepts." 156 
 His remark is useful as it prevents 
us from identifying intuitive data with pure perceptions. Pre-conceptual intuition takes place after the 
initial sensual pre-reflective contact but before any conceptualisation of the perceived datum, and 
116 Kolakowski, p.  28 
166 
temporally coincides with the perceived process. As the event unrolls, our mind, in the mode of pre-
conceptual intuition, follows it and coincides with each new phase of the process. 
It is understandable why Bergson, when trying to illustrate intuition, talks of listening to music. 
When we listen to music, we often remain at the stage of pre-conceptual rational intuition without 
moving on to the stage of conceptualisation. Music is hard to conceptualise, and for listeners, it remains 
an undivided flow of sound. A lover of music can, of course, associate particular musical episodes with 
images like cascades and waves, or concepts like love and joy, and a trained musician is able to 
identi& and name musical notes. This conceptualising of music, however, which does not happen in all 
cases, is obviously secondary and obviously superimposed on the initially perceived and consciously 
acknowledged flow. This makes listening to music a good illustration of intuition which is more than 
perception, since it is acknowledgement, albeit not yet conceptualisation. 
The fact that primary intuition is in itself incommunicable is not a problem because it is replaced by 
concepts very quickly. Can's observation helps accommodate intuition and intellect in an 
epistemological act without one excluding another: 
So far as activity is an intuition it shares its character of reality with the whole of experience, 
but the moment it is regarded as a representation of reality which interprets to us the universe, 
it has ceased to be an intuition, and it cannot be said that the intellect fails to comprehend it. It 
may fail to harmonise it, but that is another matter.' 57 
As a process, pre-conceptual intuition presents an intelligent grasp of the object which precedes 
rationalisation. Pre-conceptual intuition is essentially contemporaneous with the event intuited, and as 
soon as our mind wishes to stop following the event and ponder on previous stages of the event which 
may have only just passed, this primary intuition subsides and gives way to intellectual rationalisation. 
However, intuition is not lost forever - Bergson refers to the remainder of it that accompanies an 
intellectual act as "a fringe of intuition", as observed by Can.' 58 
According to Bergson, that phase of intuition which we termed pre-conceptual cannot help but 
provide a genuine insight into the nature of things, because it consists in attention that follows the 
perceived process and coincides with it temporally without relapsing into memory or leaping forward 
into anticipation. We have identified this epistemological accomplishment as knowledge by 
acquaintance, opposed to the absence of knowledge, as in Russell. Pre-conceptual intuition runs 
' Can (1908— 1909), p. 57 
Can (1908 - 1909), p. 60 
167 
parallel to the perceived process and doubles it, reflects it, in consciousness, so we get reflection 
without turning to the past. This attention must keep following the perceived process, and thus it has no 
time to form concepts about it. As soon as concepts emerge, this is a sign that attention has retracted 
itself from the object immediately given and turned to past memories which aid it to elaborate on the 
perceived and retained data. 
Pre-conceptual intuition does not constitute statements orjudgements about the perceived processes. 
It is a prolongation, an extension of this process. The intuition that I have of the event is part of that 
event, with the event emanating, giving away an image that evokes perception in me. In intuition I am 
not an outside observer; I am involved in the all-embracing ontological process of being and 
acknowledgement of being. 
In pre-conceptual intuition one is a passive recipient of excitations which are received via the senses 
and registered in the mind. Bergson insists that this knowledge provides an insight into what is 
essential in the object, and it is in this sense that he claims this knowledge to be genuine. Inevitably, 
intuition crystallises itself in concepts, which are needed for communication, it is true, but not just for 
conveying messages to others. We need concepts to help us understand and come to terms with what 
we have intuited. The being, of which our intuitions are part, needs to be interpreted. We need to 
communicate with ourselves as well as with others, and data received in intuition needs processing and 
evaluating. 
Why do we need this? Should intuitive insight not be enough, at least for our own satisfaction? The 
answer is no. We remember from our study of Matter and Memory that the self needs the materiality of 
the immediate situation to anchor all its phenomena onto one central point. The self needs definition; 
without it, we become disorientated as in daydreaming or, even more so, in our sleep. To defme 
ourselves we constantly verify where we are, when and in what circumstances, by referring to 
immediate data and coordinating them with our memories and plans. To communicate thus with our 
own selves we need to be able to have a mental grip on the objects of our experience, memories and 
plans. If all our psychic events, including past memories, contribute to the nature of our self, we need 
to access them if we want to understand what we are. Concepts serve as cues that evoke relevant 
images, and also substantialise our relations with the world, giving names to times, dates, locations and 
our roles - the process which is evaluated by Bergson as secondary to immediate knowledge, but 
necessary for our sanity. 
'S 
Is the conceptualised picture of the world a false picture, according to Bergson? Not quite. When he 
criticises rationalised knowledge, he does not claim it to be false in the sense that it affirms something 
which is the reverse of the truth about the real. This is not as erroneous as mistaking white for black, 
but it is a translation of genuine data into practically useful symbols which are meant to represent 
reality but which misrepresent it instead. The symbol reflects that side of the object which comes into 
contact with us in our interactions with the world, ignoring its other sides. The role of objects as our 
tools and commodities (or obstacles for our actions) is emphasised to the point that it overshadows 
anything else in the objects and is presented as their essence. We, however, mistakenly believe that 
what symbols represent is the essence of things. For Bergson, the temporality and the being of reality 
are irreducible, hence everything in the real is essential. Pre-conceptual intuition reflects a far wider 
scope of facts than a conceptual account, and, whereas it does not capture the event in its absolute 
entirety, it is the best source of initial data.merely due to the amount of information grasped at this 
stage. 
After conceptualisation, we end up in a virtual world of things and events supposedly set out to 
revolve around men and serve them, the things' essence derived from their referential relation to 
human action. Intelligence modifies the data we receive about the real in order to fit it into the 
anthropocentric world, ascribing to beings and things the view that they are in themselves andJbr 
themselves essentially what is encoded within the role that they play in interactions with us. 
Intelligent approach means a shift of emphasis from decentred to anthropocentric, to incomplete and 
one-sided but not essentially false data. Most of the time, and in line with our human nature, we remain 
at this level of intelligent interpretation of the world, wrapping it around our needs. Only sometimes, 
according to Bergson, do we demonstrate ability for what we term post-conceptual intuition. Whereas 
pre-conceptual intuition is absorbed in the fleeting moment and ignores other reality, post-conceptual 
intuition is far from playing the part of a passive receptacle for everything that takes place. 
apek is another Bergsonian commentator who offers a one-sided view of intuition. He ignores 
primary intuition, but his account provides a useful insight into secondary intuition. apek's 
explanations concern the phase in which intuition supersedes intelligence. Intuition, he says, 
begins with the attitude of distrust for the accepted modes of thought; ... This attitude of 
distrust originates in a vague awareness of certain experiences incompatible with the accepted 
modes of thought; the essence of intuition is precisely to bring these vague and rather 
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implicitly felt data into a clear focus and to show that the new forms of understanding thus 
created are superior to the old ones.' 59 
Theft superiority, tapek explains, consists in a greater flexibility, an ability to explain more aspects 
of experience than the previous forms of knowledge, as well as accounting for data already 
acknowledged and interpreted. 
In apek's interpretation, intuition (post-conceptual intuition, let us remember) 
I. Is a complex process; 
2. Has nothing in common with emotion and instinct; 
3. Does not go on effortlessly and passively; 
4. Beginning as a hazy anticipatory feeling, it is transformed into the clarity of understanding, 
with its content being purged of all parasitic elements. What was previously clear, appears as 
an oversimplification of the data of experience. 
It is the post-conceptual intuition that lies, we think, behind intuition as a philosophical method and 
intuition as artistic creation, for neither a method nor artistic activity can be imagined at the level of the 
pre-conceptual approach to reality. Pre-conceptual, primary intuition is too primitive to be held 
responsible for an intellectual insight. On the other hand, secondary intuition, which supersedes 
concepts, can accommodate them and intuit their multiplicity as something more than just the sum of 
units. It sees beyond the immediacy of each individual concept and observes another kind of 
immediacy - the immediacy of the concealed connections amongst concepts and amongst things. 
To illustrate that post-conceptual intuition builds on concepts, we can recall that in An Introduction 
to Metaphysics Bergson talks about an intuitive insight of a writer who researches his subject and 
makes numerous notes first, and then, by a "painful effort", places himself or herself "at the heart of the 
subject". The writer then achieves an impulse which, 
once received, starts the mind on a path where it rediscovers all the information it had 
collected, and a thousand other details besides; it develops and analyses itself into terms which 
could be enumerated indefinitely. The farther we go, the more terms we discover; we shall 
never say all that could be said, and yet, if we turn back suddenly upon the impulse that we 
feel behind us, and try to seize it, it is gone; for it was not a thing, but the direction of a 
movement, and though indefinitely extensible, it is infinitely simple. (An Introduction, p.61) 
Whereas pre-conceptual intuition seems to involve a passive dissolving of one's mind in the world, 
post-conceptual intuition is active and assertive as it forms part of a creative process, whether it be 
writing a novel or painting. Just like pre-conceptual intuition, secondary intuition involves knowledge 
' tapek, p.  97 
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by acquaintance and cannot be either true or false. It is engaged in creative work, and is bound with the 
new reality that it itself initiates. Just as in pre-conceptual intuition, there is nojudgement or statement 
which could be true or false: knowledge here helps to create being, it does not represent being and does 
not conform to the contemporary idea of what is conventionally understood by cognition. 
Nonnally, pre-conceptual intuition gives way to conceptual acknowledgement of the object which, 
as Bergson observes, facilitates our interactions with the external world. The aim of conceptual 
knowledge is to detach itself from things and create symbols, which point at things and statements, 
which are about things, and which in themselves do not contribute to the structure of things. We could 
say, though, that conceptual knowledge, just like instinct and pre-conceptual intuition, is part of being 
in general because it forms part of our interactions with the external world. Thus conceptual knowledge 
gives us partial, verifiable by experience, propositional and communicable truths about reality, 
understood in terms of our interactions with it: these truths are necessarily anthropocentric. 
Most of the time our epistemological activity remains within the framework of conceptual 
knowledge. It can, however, be superseded by post-conceptual intuition. This happens when a large 
collection of concepts gives rise to a new insight which in turn dismisses the concepts as it has created 
a new vision of things, which is manifested in a creative act. Post-conceptual intuition is part of a 
creative process, just as instinct and pre-conceptual intuition are part of being. The difference is that in 
post-conceptual intuition, the creative subject stops being a passive recipient of data but instead he 
himself or she herself directs the creative process. Just like primary intuition, secondary intuition is 
incommunicable, and must be conceptualised (for example in a critical review of the work of art) if the 
content of this knowledge needs to be communicated. 
Looking at epistemic processes that penetrate the hierarchy of being, we find the foundation of any 
knowledge on the level of basic physicality, in physical proximity, which can develop as physical 
contact. On the biological level, there is instinct which is ontologically bound with being and cannot be 
either true or false. The psychological level of cognition includes three stages: pre-conceptual intuition, 
which is, like instinct, ontologically bound with being, cannot be either true or false and is 
incommunicable; conceptual knowledge, which has referential relation to being and comprises true and 
false statements about it, although these truths are only partial and anthropocentric; post-conceptual 
intuition, another form of cognition that cannot deliver propositional truths because it is ontologically 
bound with being in a creative process. 
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As well as questioning the validity of knowledge from the position of its referential certainty, we 
can look at how it functions as part of being. From this perspective, instinct is a directing force in 
biological life as it directs growth and biological behaviour. Pre-conceptual intuition is an engaging 
force which effects the simultaneous following of things by the mind. Conceptual knowledge is a 
mediating force between various types of being where intelligence binds people and things. Post-
conceptual intuition is a directing force in the creation of radically new man-made reality. 
Bergson's epistemology opens up an attractive possibility of an all-inclusive exploration of the self: 
if any knowledge has, one way or another, an ontological value, then so must the knowledge about 
one's own self have it. Thus we do not have to establish truths which hide behind the beliefs we have 
about our self and which are separate from these beliefs, and failing to find those truths, dismiss the 
beliefs as false and artificial constructions. One way or another, all data that we accumulate through 
introspection in themselves constitute our self so we do not have to attempt to treat these data as mere 
symbols of what the self is. The way forward, deduced from Bergsonism, is to accept that introspective 
data at least represent themselves if nothing else, and not to search beyond the obvious, but to accept 
the obvious for what it is. Our guiding principle in this will be taking for granted the fact that no 
thoughts or feelings we have of our "I" should be dismissed as illusions, because even illusions must be 
taken for what they are, as part of our psychological reality. 
6. The self in introspection 
Rational self-consciousness man jfests itself as a retrospective superimposition of the concept "I" 
on the pre-refiective self As a concept. 7" has a social origin and misrepresents the pre-reflective 
self but as an event of our inner l(fe, the emergence of this concept in itself is part of our self 
In everyday language, "I" refers to the entire eventual diversity of the human being, material, 
biological, and mental, infinitely compressing all concurrent processes as well as the entire 
remembered and unremembered personal history into a singularity with the highest possible density of 
content but the smallest in terms of its peceivability. The search for the "I" in introspection makes us 
recede mentally into the depth of our own consciousness, abstracting ourselves from extensity in favour 
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of higher and higher intensity, assuming that what corresponds to the concept "I" is the ultimate author 
of our words and actions, the most alert and most clear part of our consciousness. 
However, "I" may mean different things. When we say, "I am tall", "I am warm" and "I am sad", 
we are not referring to this ultimate focal point, but to ourselves as either a material object, a biological 
object, or an historical being. "I am tall", for instance, describes my height - my physical size, a 
property of every extended body, not at all something that can be a characteristic of a compressed 
singularity; here we refer to ourselves, to our "I", as a material extended object. 
Of course, "1" in "I am tall" does not signify an inert body. Rather it demonstrates that "I" involves 
extensity and size, for "tall" here is a characteristic of one's self and not merely of some physical body 
to which the self is somehow attached. Equally, "I am warm" discloses the biological component of the 
"1", and "I am sad" indicates that "1" is a rational historical process, with memories of the past which, 
combined with current eventuality, result in a concrete sentiment. 
In our everyday understanding of the "I", the conviction of it being the intense core of 
consciousness co-exists with our using "I" to refer to our basic physicality and our biology, inasmuch 
as our "I" cannot escape or disengage in any real way from our size and our sensations. In our attempt 
to find, to pinpoint, the "I" inside us, we condense, we concentrate all of our being into a nucleus which 
must equal the "I am" in its most compact form but which must also include our body and our history. 
We make everything in our being gravitate inwards, not divorcing our material, biological and historic 
properties but compressing them further and further, despatialising them in the hope of grasping the 
irreducible phenomenon of our conscious "I". 
How does the idea of"l" enter our mind? The rational self is an historical self, an historical process, 
acknowledged and evaluated. Its identity as one is effected by memory holding together temporally 
diverse phases of the self, so self-consciousness necessarily involves looking back and comparing the 
self now and the self at other times. But does the idea of"l" emerge from within one's own being, or 
does it require social interactions with other individuals? 
Suppose the inner movement of biologically derived feelings could supersede itself by becoming a 
generalized acknowledgement of all pre-reflective processes of selthood. This process of generalisation 
would also be a process of infinite compression of the diverse psychological content in the past, present 
and possible future into one idea - that of the "I". The "I" would be the product of consciousness - a 
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kind of a super dense nucleus self-forming out of the fuzzy nebula. Could this process, and the idea of 
"I" as a result of this process, occur by itself? The Bergsonian answer, we believe, would be negative. 
According to Bergson, the brain and, as we understand it, consciousness cannot create anything 
new: whatever the sentient being produces is a modification of the movement existing previously and 
coming from elsewhere (MM, p. 73)0 So, consciousness could originate within one's psyche only if it 
were an ontological prolongation of the pre-reflective processes, if rationality could originate from the 
sensuality alone, and if consciousness could grow out of biology. 
As we understand Bergson's theory, we can assign the pre-reflective sphere and all processes that 
precede it to the domain of the instinctive, and rationality and the reflective self to the domain of 
intelligence. We remember Bergson stressing that in the evolutionary movement, intelligence is not a 
prolongation of instinct but is an independent faculty (CE, p. 142). Therefore Bergson would not accept 
the derivation of the rational self from the pre-reflective self. For him, we guess, pre-reflective self 
would not be prolonged, by some autonomous self-development, into the rational self; the latter is a 
qualitatively different psychological event, a different process. 
There is a lot of passivity in the pre-reflective self: processes such as sensations and feelings happen 
because they cannot help but happen. Self-consciousness, on the other hand, is an effort in which the 
unity of the self turns its attention to itself instead of looking outwards, it looks inwards. Thus self-
consciousness is an effort which the pre-reflective self would not be capable of by itself and this seems 
to be almost a "stop and rewind" of the process that we observe in the pre-reflective self, where 
sensations and moods pass through each other. In self-consciousness the processes do not just pass - 
they are consciously acknowledged, and the experiences of them are deepened and intensified: if the 
pre-reflective self allows feelings to expire, the reflective self keeps hold of them. The pre-reflective 
self involves memory that memorises and recognises, but the reflective self uses memory that 
remembers, recalls and refuses to forget; the memory of the pre-reflective self goes with the flow, but 
the memory of self-consciousness swims against the tide. It would go against Bergsonism to accept a 
process with a tendency to reverse upon itself; this tendency, we assume, should come from an outside 
stimulus. 
° An alternative reading of Bergson, founded on other texts, is possible here: heterogeneity 
continuously creates something new and this novelty which comes from within duration supersedes 
causality as genuine creation. (See CE, pp. 172-173) Also when a free act is compared to artistic 
creation one can understand this as an indication that Bergson talks of genuine novelty that "spring[s] 
from our whole personality" (TFW, p. 172) rather than being incited from outside. 
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Emmanuel Levinas may be of help here because he spells out clearly what Bergson merely implies. 
Levinas recognises the initial passivity of the pre-reflective self as well as the need for the outside 
interference in order for the self to become self-conscious. He demonstrates that the pre-reflective 
processes of selfhood become reversed in the presence of another person. Another person's presence in 
itself has the effect of a demand or, as Levinas puts it, of an accusation.' 6 ' In response to this 
accusation one is forced to turn one's attention in search of the accused, and identifies the accused as 
"self". Levinas stresses that our first encounter with our self occurs through the eyes of another person, 
and therefore is primarily identified in its accusative state as "me" rather than as "I". "Everything is 
from the start in the accusative. Such is the exceptional condition or unconditionality of the self, the 
signification of the pronoun self for which our Latin grammars themselves know no nominative 
form." 62 And: "The word I means here/am, answering for everything and for everyone." 63 
Levinas constructs self-consciousness out of an ethical impulse, ascribing to the latter the divine 
status of that which exists "beyond essence". Without sharing Levinas' excessive preoccupation with 
ethics, Bergson offers a view on social relations which, not unlike that of Levinas, draws on the 
primary importance of one's responsibility towards others. Our first memory, Bergson observes, is that 
of obeying a prohibition that constitutes our first social encounter. 
The remembrance of forbidden fruit is the earliest thing in the memory of each of us, as it is in 
that of mankind. ... What a childhood we should have had if only we had been left to do as 
we pleased! ... But all of a sudden an obstacle arose, neither visible nor tangible: a 
prohibition. Why did we obey? The question hardly occurred to us. (TSMR, p. 9) 
It may be correct to assume that self-consciousness in Bergson has a social origin, and that the 
concept "I" is formed by the response to the outside influence when the child is addressed by other 
people. Bergson links intelligence and sociability in humans, and this also indicates the link between 
self-consciousness and sociality. Effort and concepts indicate intelligence, unlike an effortless and 
indefinable instinctive act. In self-consciousness there is conscious effort to retain and acknowledge the 
processes of selfhood and the concentration of them in the concept "I". In Time and Free Will, we 
remember, Bergson talks of the role that acts of intellect, conceptualising acts, play in our social life: 
"An inner life with well distinguished moments and with clearly characterised states will answer better 
161 Levinas, p.  113 
162 Levinas, p.  112 
163 Levinas, p.  114 
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the requirements of social life." (TEW, p. 139) He explains that social interactions require this 
rationalisation and conceptualisation of reality, and so self-consciousness, the belief in one's definite 
"1" must also go hand in hand with social interactions, inasmuch as "I" is a concept. 
Let us say that our pre-reflective self becomes faced with the presence of another conscious human 
being, and we are forced to consider ourselves from the position of another person, who addresses our 
person as unity. One then looks for that unity, for what corresponds to the "you" in the demand. Of 
course, the social stimulus would not be the only factor that turns the pre-reflective self into the self-
conscious self But if we ask whether the pre-reflective self alone could develop into the rational self in 
Bergsonism, which would account for the continuity of these two stages of selthood, we can now say 
that continuity cannot be established due to the necessary involvement of the social demand, and this 
reveals yet another discontinuity in the Bergsonian duration. 
"Me" is the view we take of ourselves which is imposed on us by others and integrated into the 
stream of our consciousness as "I", the concept which presents to us the ultimate limit of introspection. 
Looking inside ourselves, we fail to find what exactly matches the concept "I", because the concept "I" 
has not merely emerged as a signifier that named some piece of reality waiting to be named. The idea 
of one's selfiiood emerged in social interactions, and in itself became a new reality which did not exist 
on the biological level. The conceptual view of oneself, the idea of our "I" itself, is new reality existing 
in its own right. 
The conceptualisation of one's self is a process that continues the development of psychological 
duration and is necessary for our nature as gregarious beings (we can only communicate with each 
other as definite entities, as centres of selthood), even though Bergson sees it as a mistakenly distorted 
view: "As the self thus refracted, and thereby broken to pieces, is much better adapted to the 
requirements of social life in general and language in particular, consciousness prefers it, and gradually 
loses sight of the fundamental self" (TFW, p. 128) 
Bergson says that the true self consisting in "a confused multiplicity" of psychic states is distorted 
by language which represents it as "discrete multiplicity" of psychic states named, separated and 
juxtaposed. (TFW, p. 129) But as we accept every manifestation of the self to be an addition to its 
existence as duration, then even those elements that, as Bergson states, misrepresent the self in self-
consciousness, are nevertheless part of the self as its content. We could say that what becomes 
misrepresented by the concept"!" is the fuzzy pre-reflective self, but this conceptualised 
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misrepresentation is in fact a new addition to our being made by self-consciousness, which largely 
(albeit not exclusively, of course) consists in ascribing concepts to one's own being. 
it could be argued that Bergson does not need a central agency - an 'ego' or 'I'— to give 
consciousness an identity. Such identity is already ensured by the fact that moving, embodied, 
durational consciousness is particular, and its new content is always specific and conerete." 4 Reflective 
"I" would be for Hergson a secondary form of individuation. However, we still need to include it in the 
duration of one's consciousness - as a component of our duration that cannot be eliminated from it. 
The main question in this chapter was whether rational introspection provides reliable data about 
self-consciousness. Since Bergson favours intuition and opposes it to rational conceptual intellection, 
the revealing of the self in self-consciousness appears to be a distortion of the real self But if we rely 
on intuition for introspective data, we face a dead end, because intuition is not communicable even to 
oneself. On the other hand, conceptual inteilection is part of psychological duration because 
psychological duration comprises all inner psychological events and rational thinking is one of these 
events. Consequently, we decide to accept data of introspection, but with the following reservations. 
There is a conflict between two of Bergson's implicit claims: the claim that all psychological events are 
included in the irreducible psychological duration, and exclusion of conceptual thought and rationality 
in general from psychological duration. Further development of the Bergsonian thought requires 
reconciliation between the above statements. We find that the first one is stronger than the second, and 
that the products of rational thought should be included in psychological duration as a variety of 
psychological events. Also we take into account another Bergsonian claim that data, information, is in 
itself a type of being, and not merely a reference to some other, proper being. From this we conclude 
that the introspective rational datum should be accepted as phenomenon per se, without necessarily 
questioning its relation to other parts of the self which it may or may not reflect. In other words, 
concepts that we form in relation to ourselves exist as legitimate components of the self.' 65 	 - 
"4 Bergson's theory of duration does not deny individuality and personality. In "The Problem of 
Personality" he talks of "a single and identical person" (Mélanges, p. 1055), asserting that 
"[p]ersonality ... is ... a continuity of change" (Mélanges, p. 1063). Also, it is "[tihis  continuity of 
change causes what we call the permanence, the unity, the substantiality of the person" (Mélanges, p. 
1064). 
165 Of course, this does not mean that just because we can form certain concepts, they have any 
legitimacy as concepts. They are genuine as phenomena, but not necessarily in any other sense. 
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An analysis of Bergson's treatment of concepts can be found in Mullarkey(1999), pp. 152-155 
and in Mullarkey (1997), pp  44— 58, where it is emphasised that although Bergson is opposed to using 
concepts representing a fixed referent, he introduces a novel use of metaphors which are part of the 
same process-reality as the process that they refer to, which indicates that the treatment of language and 
communication in Bergson does not amount to a straightforward rejection of conceptuality. Bergson's 
including creative emotion into his theory of language sophisticates the issue even further: when a 
piece of creative writing is inspired by an emotion, and contaminates the reader with that emotion, it 
guides intellect and conceptuality in an act of intuition. (ISMR, pp.45-46) 
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Chapter 9. Evolutionary, historical and biographical continuity 
I. The new within continuity: staggered temporal reality 
Continuity is no! problematic for Bergs on because for him, the new present is the produce of the past 
We claim that, as the present contains new elements, it is richer in content than the past and cannot be 
totally founded on the past 
In this chapter we shall show that the theory of constructive retrospectivity, incorporated in the 
concept of heterogeneous duration in Chapter 5, is necessary for the idea of continuity in evolution, 
history, and biography. Despite our most sympathetic attitude to Bergson, we found that discontinuity 
and discord disrupt the continuity of selthood at different levels. In its pre-history we observe leaps 
from matter to biological organisms and then to consciousness; the existence of a concrete self is 
marked by various inner splits in self-perception, memory and volitions; social existence involves 
confrontation of selves and by no means harmony and continuity. These discords can be qualified in 
more general terms as the failure to account for new elements within continuity. We face a reality in 
which each new temporal phase contains a new additional step added on to the whole. Bergson sees no 
problem with this, as he is ready to equate all reality with time, explaining new reality by the fact that it 
corresponds to the new stretches of time. However we, albeit accepting that time is an essential 
component of reality, refuse to treat it as totally equal to reality. Thus we cannot get away from the fact 
that in each new temporal phase we witness elements which do not seem to be founded on the previous 
phase. 
Bergson is satisfied with the view of temporal reality as portrayed in Diagram 7, where the future is 
non-existent and uncertain, and the past is the source of the present: immense and inexhaustible, it 
increases all the time and out of its own depths produces the present, which is only a thin layer of 
reality. 
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Diagram 7. Bergson 's view of temporal reality. 
Future 
Present 
We disagree with this view. The picture of the temporal reality that we accept is presented in 
Diagram 8. 
Diagram 8. Our view of temporal reality. 
Future 
Present 
\ Past/ 
Diagram 8 shows that, since the reality enlarges, its previous content is poorer than its following 
content, so its past has poorer content than its present, and its more remote past has poorer content than 
its more recent past. The reason why Bergson accepts an image of the infinitely vast past is that he 
ignores the issue of temporal relations. He does not differentiate between earlier and later and the more 
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or less remote past.' Treating temporal relations as ontologically non-essential would break up all 
temporal processes, because each phase of a process can be divided indefinitely into shorter and shorter 
phases, and if their phases are no longer in a strict sequence coordinated by the relations of before and 
after, then they can be in any sequence. We would argue that the past has inherent temporal structure. If 
x happened beforey, then in whatever way the past is preserved, this relation is preserved with it: 
"earlier" and "later" are irreducible ontological characteristics of temporal phases. Replacing the 
Bergsonian picture with a structured sequence, we can see that the following temporal stretches are 
richer in content than the preceding ones, because they inherit a legacy from the preceding ones and 
also contain new elements. The present is richer, "larger" than the past, and this larger, new content 
includes something that the previous phase could not fit in. This expanding reality cannot be 
sufficiently explained by its past. 
It could be said that the picture I have sketched of Bergson's relatively undifferentiated past ignores 
his discussion of planes of the past in Matter and Memory, and illustrated by Bergson's own diagram: 
- Diagram 9. Planes of the past (See MM, pp.  152 and 162) 
P 
Cone SAB 
	
The totality of the recollections accumulated in one's memory. 
Base AB 	 Motionless; situated in the past. 
Summit S 	 Indicates one's present, moves forward and touches the plane P. 
166 See Chapter 6 for a discussion on temporal relations. 
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Plane P 	 One's actual representation of the universe, changing all time. 
Sections A'S'; A"B" 	 Repetitions of one's psychical life 
(B)etween the sensori-motor mechanisms figured by the point Sand the totality of the 
memories disposed in AB there is room ... for a thousand repetitions of our psychical life, 
figured by as many sections A'S', A"B", etc., of the same cone. We tend to scatter ourselves 
over AB in the measure that we detach ourselves from our sensory and motor state to live the 
life of dreams; we tend to concentrate ourselves in Sin the measure that we attach ourselves 
more firmly to the present reality, responding by motor reactions to sensory stimulation. In 
point of fact, the normal self never stays in either of these extreme positions; it moves between 
them, adopts in turn the positions corresponding to the intermediate sections, or, in other 
words, gives to its representations just enough image and just enough idea for them to be able 
to lend useful aid to the present action." (MM, pp.  162-163) 
However, as can be seen from the above, Bergon's planes of the past do not seem to correspond to a 
temporal ordering within past reality and do not refer to more or less remote slices. What they refer to 
is a degree in which our psychic life concerns itself with either pure remembering or embodied 
practical existence. As Worms indicates, this schema refers to psychological life (but not to the 
temporal ordering of reality) and illustrates the double movement of the body at S (situated in the plane 
P of images) and memories descending from AB towards S. The planes, which are closer to the base of 
the cone, correspond to deeper planes of memory (but not necessarily, as we understand it, to a more 
remote past) and the planes closer to the top of the cone correspond to memories which are loaded with 
perception.' 67 Those memories that are mixed in with perceptions are not necessarily most recent ones 
but have been drawn from the depth of memory by the needs of the current situation. As for the pure, 
unremembered, past it apparently remains undivided and un-sliced. 
If we consider reality at different times during its unrolling - as we approach time on a daily basis, 
when referring to a stretch of time already gone - we will see it crudely staggered as in Diagram 10. If 
we compare temporal slices t, t' and t" we can see the lack of continuity between the past and the 
present, or the previous and the following periods of time, as this shows the abruptness with which new 
content is attached to the already existing duration. 
67 Worms (1997), pp.320-321 
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Diagram 10. Temporal slicing of reality reveals leaps between earlier and later. 
Future 
Present 
I 	 I 
Past 
The above analysis confirms that supposedly continuous duration contains leaps and abrupt changes 
within itself. But if we appeal to the intuitive perception of duration from within - say, of our own life 
- we regain the feeling of continuity whereby new events flow out of the previous ones. Why does this 
feeling of continuity contradict the abrupt picture of reality that our metaphysical examination reveals? 
In the next section we will claim that the problem that we discovered lies in fact in the observer's 
position (bringing about spatialization of reality, which even the metaphysical approach cannot avoid) 
and will confirm that the perception of temporal continuity as continuity is possible when one is 
literally immersed in its temporality and shares its history. That confirms Bergson's claim that the true 
picture of duration is only achievable from within. 
2. The observer's position 
The problem in comprehending continuity lies in our observation point whereby our actual position in 
the actual present interferes with our imaginary position in the remote past. Following the real ity from 
the past to the present, we fail to see the connections made retrospectively by the new , with the old To 
capture them, we suggest remaining in the actual present and looking backwards towards the past. 
When discussing temporal continuity and finding leaps within it, we overlooked the fact that such a 
discussion involves an observer - the one who imagines and discusses it. In this we followed an 
implicit assumption that we could in principle adopt a view of reality according to which it unrolls 
from the past to the present and beyond. But the observer's position, itself part of temporal reality, 
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gives a certain perspective of what we observe, relative to our position, and affects the way we perceive 
things. 168 
 This, in turn, indicates that the problems we encountered may be due to this position and not 
necessarily inherent in the observed reality. 
In our analysis of continuity, together with Bergson, we adopted an imaginary position where we 
observed temporal processes from the most remote past, as in Diagram II. 
Diagram II. Temporal reality augmenting as time passes, and our observation positions. 
Reality with ever-increasing content 
Past 	 Present 
X (our imaginary position) 	 V (our actual position) 
By positioning ourselves in this way we gain a projection of reality from the past to the present, 
with its later phases being greater in content than-its earlier phases. 'What follows cannot equal that 
which precedes as it does not contain only that which precedes, and so we find ourselves unable to 
explain the present by the past. Following the order in which events happened seems to be the most 
logical and natural way to view reality, but in actual fact, we do not follow this order. In our 
imagination, we abandon our real position Y and place ourselves in the remote past X, treating that past 
as the present observation point, but we actually still belong to our present, which is the ultimate point 
of the unrolling reality that we observe. Thus we end up with an overlap of two observation points: the 
point of our embodied existence in the actual present (Y) and the point in the remote past (X) which we 
treat as the present. 
When we do not try to be positioned in two different presents simultaneously, and remain in the 
actual present, we observe the unrolling reality of which we are part and find each new phase 
consistent with the old one, immersed in the continuity of temporal existence around us. When we 
observe events whilst living them, there is nothing in them that seems to appear out of nowhere, as if 
by magic, but when we throw ourselves back into the remote past and attempt to follow the track of 
events from the remote past to the actual present, we stumble against abrupt changes. Our point of view 
168 A discussion of the relativity of the observer's position in space-time can be found in S. Alexander, 
p. 77. 
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is split between the actual present and the remote present back in the past, and both positions interfere 
with each other. When we remain in our actual present, we do not know what the next temporal phase 
will be, so we do not focus on searching for the foundations of that next phase. In the situation of the 
split position, the imaginary observer, thrown back in time, is informed by the actual observer in the 
present of the sequence of events which followed that remote position in time. Thus, if we agree to 
treat that imaginary position as present, the future of that present is fixed for the observer, something 
that Bergson strongly disagrees with. Indeed, when that past was present, its future was uncertain,. 
therefore there could not have been a solid foundation for that future because it finalised itself only 
when it became present. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, consequent events affect the nature of the preceding events, transforming 
them into the foundation for the following events. So when, as the present observer, in our imagination 
we position ourselves "at the back of time", we deal with the past which has been transformed by the 
following events, and not with the unscathed temporal reality which was unscathed only when it was 
present. As the observer of past events, we insist on treating the remote past as if it were both the 
unscathed present, unaffected by the future, and the past thundation of the following events, affected 
by those events which were future but have finalised themselves as present at some stage in the past. 
As follows from Chapter 5, when the present reality becomes past, it is not the same reality any more: 
it is altered by its relations with the subsequent events. 
It would have been possible to have had a view of the remote past as the intact present if we could 
have disengaged from our own present and transferred to that time whilst it was present. Then our 
current present would not interfere with the past which we are trying to comprehend. But then we 
would not have been able to set ourselves the task of looking for the past foundation of present things, 
and our aim of trying to establish continuity of the old and the new still could not have been achieved. 
In each case we would get a view relative to the chosen position, and not gain access to the way things 
really happened. We assert that temporal reality centred on the earliest imaginable present is not the 
ultimate ontological truth but merely a possible view of temporal reality, and that we can have different 
views depending on the actual or imaginary position of the observer. 
Now if, instead of placing ourselves behind reality and looking forward, towards our actual position, 
we remained where we are and looked backwards, we would not see leaps from old states to new states 
with richer content: instead of the ever-increasing complexity of reality we would see the ever- 
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decreasing complexity. This view will more readily give us a sense of continuity because instead of the 
addition of new elements we will observe their elimination, and descent from the richer to the poorer 
content, which is far easier to comprehend than the ascent from the poorer to the richer. 
	 - 
A critic will say that the suggested alternative to the view from the past is absurd because it goes 
against the natural course of events: things do not move backwards in time. But we demonstrated in 
Chapter 5 a way in which the present changes the past, whereby following events throw back threads of 
relations which affect preceding events, so that changes in the present cause certain changes in the past. 
These latter changes happen backwards in time, so when we follow the reality from the remote past to 
the actual present, we miss these changes. By missing them, we miss continuity because the temporal 
reality then presents itself to us as a ladder with each new step containing elements unfounded on 
previous steps. If we let ourselves look backwards in time, from the actual present to the past, we see 
that each new step had thrown its light on the preceding step and retrospectively made it its foundation. 
Before the following step emerged, the preceding step could not have contained a foundation for the 
following step, because the following step, being future, was not definite at that stage until it became 
present. It could have had a different content, and then the preceding step would have becomea 
foundation for a different following step. 
As temporal reality changes, some or all new elements of it are not continuous with the previous 
state if looked at from the point of view of the previous state which by itself is unable to take into 
account the consequent state. Whilst present, consequent events are future in relation to it, and we 
accepted that the present cannot have a definite relation with the future because the future itself is 
indefinite whilst it is future. In order to form a relation with the real consequent event, the consequent 
event must define itself by becoming present, but this means that the formerly present state will have to 
become past. From the position of the new present state, the past state is its immediate foundation and 
the source of its being but the relation that maintains the continuity does not originate from the 
previous state but from the following state which emanates a causal link with the immediate past and 
makes it its own predecessor. 
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3. Thecontinuity of evolution 
The continuity of evolution is maintained by causal relations established retrospectively and can only 
be grasped ([we look backwards from the present towards the past The present explains the past and 
in the human being, its evolutionarily later components (mind), albeit dependent on the earlier ones 
(living matter, inanimate matter), are the ones which can account for the bond between all the 
components of the self 
Although we distinguish physical, biological and psychological processes of selfhood, they are 
elements of the heterogeneous duration of selthood and do not exist separately from one another. In 
Chapter 7 we emphasized that the highest, conscious processes of selthood pierce through all three 
levels 169, and so we widened the scope of the Bergsonian heterogeneity: deriving heterogeneity from 
the psychological self, Rergson discussed only heterogeneous psychic states, whereas we, applying the 
notion of heterogeneity back to the self, included in it everything that constitutes the real self, from the 
mineral base of human bones to ideas of the human mind. 
	 - 
Treating mind and body as heterogeneous qualities of duration, we still need to account for their 
unity. If our observation that temporal reality develops backwards as well as forwards is correct, then 
we may be able to comprehend the continuity of the worldly development from basic matter to the 
human soul, but in the reverse order. We assume now that the relation that ensures the continuity of 
cause and effect does not radiate from the cause but from the effect, because by the time the effect took 
place, the event which has become the cause is no longer present. 
In the attempt to comprehend continuity, we can adopt a view allowing us to see the causal links 
between temporal stages which are made retrospectively, remaining where we are, in the actual present, 
and following temporal reality back from the present towards the past. The embodied present is not 
purely present reality which belongs exclusively to the present, did not exist in the past and will not 
exist in the future. The appearance of the present reality alone is an indication that there was the past 
which must have been an immediate foundation for this present, and that there will be the future 
because what we witness now is unlikely to disappear when this present is over. The immediate past, in 
its turn, requires its own immediate past and so on indefinitely. 
169 See chapter 7, Sections 4 and 5. 
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In fact, we ordinarily move backwards in time, because an analysis of something present entails a 
survey of its components, and the pre-existence of the components is ontologically prior to the 
existence of the whole. When we observe an object, we see its present state and its history 
encompassed in that present state. When we want to unroll that history, we naturally work backwards 
from the present state to the past and not vice versa, because our starting point must be something 
obvious, and that can only be the present state available for perception. The remote past is something 
we arrive at after constructing a continuity that takes us backwards. 
The present state, when deciphered, gradually reveals the past to us, and in a present perception of a 
person we acquire his or her latest performance, combined with the legacy of his or her personal 
history and the preceding history of evolution. 170  The dynamic view of the person that we gradually get 
is not that of a progression from minerals to the soul, i.e. from the embodied past to the embodied 
present, but a regression from the soul to the minerals, i.e. from the present to the past. Looking 
backwards, we see that the soul depends on the biological and the physical base even though, 
attempting to work from the past to the present, we fail to see how the soul grows out of the physical 
base. If we start from the begirming of time, we can never derive the soul from the minerals, but by 
looking at the entire person, we can see that his or her conscious existence comprises biological and 
physical existence, and whereas it is not possible to observe in reality the ascent from minerals to the 
soul, we can observe the opposite movement in the disintegration of a living person into a biological 
structure maintained by machines and then to mineralised remains. 
If we accept that our usual way of tracking reality from the remote past to the present is merely a 
possible, not ultimate view, we may as well choose a different position and follow the history of its 
being not from the past to the present, but in the opposite direction, the direction of descent, starting 
from the soul, not finishing with it. Then we get a sense of unbroken continuity, where thoughts and 
desires are dependent on one's bodily states and structures, and which in their turn are founded on 
basic inert physicality, all this being a condensation of the previous evolutionary movement and of the 
total development of being, from its first appearance to forms of the highest complexity. 
Recalling the Bergsonian notion of a qualitative multiplicity with diverse qualities brought together 
in a dynamic unity, we will emphasise the qualifier "diverse". For the qualities that constitute the 
human being are diverse to the extreme, combining inanimate matter, living matter, thoughts and 
170 Contemporary biology does not equate evolution with progress and complication of structures and, 
contrary to Bergson, does not regard humans as an apex of being in evolutionary terms. 
feelings. Although all these qualities exist simultaneously and concurrently in a concrete human being, 
in terms of the history of the worldly development, some appeared and established themselves earlier 
and some later on the scene of being. The human being thus represents a materialised, compressed 
record of the preceding worldly development, and a diachrony of inanimate matter, living matter, and 
mind, where each component can account for itself and for the previous, simpler stages, but not for the 
following, more complex stages.' 7 ' 
Thus the bond between soul and body can originate only from the soul because the soul is in 
principle temporally later than a biological body - not in any concrete sentient being but in general. We 
remember that although in Matter and Memory Bergson equates spirit and matter, insisting that neither 
is derivative of the other (MM, p. 9), he does not dispute the dependence that spirit may have on matter, 
and shows in Creative Evolution that sophisticated mental and emotional activity depends on the 
sophistication of the biological base, which demonstrates that ultimately, life comes before reason, and 
that mind, or soul, depends on the body. 
Since souls cannot exist without bodies but bodies can live without souls, the soul can be considered 
the effect that turns the body into its cause, and we need to look into the soul for the explanation of the 
mindlbody problem. Actually, this is what has been happening all along: attempts to understand the 
mind/body issue have always been initiated by a conscious, not bodily, effort, and the search has 
always been defined by conscious means of collecting and processing data, not by some bodily effort. 
Possibly, the difficulty here (as it has been noted by Bergson in his criticism of intellect) lies in the fact 
that consciousness, wrapped in its own interests and ways of being, such as logic and analytical 
rationality, remains in this elevated realm, failing to descend to the body, reluctant or unable to 
	 - 
consider the body in bodily terms. 
The solution may lie in Bergsonian intuition, i.e. a cognitive faculty that supposedly combines the 
rationality of consciousness and the straightforwardness of a bodily function, regarded as the descent 
from the heights of the soul into the lower levels of biology and physics. Interestingly, Mark Johnson 
offers a theory of the cognitive faculty which underlies all our rational negotiations with the world and 
which is based on our being a physical object and a living body. He talks of"nonpropositional 
awareness" which we have, say, of our "being balanced upright in space", "even though all my efforts 
For a demonstration of the involvement of preceding states in higher stages, where mind comprises 
surrogates of inanimate and living matter, see Chapters 7 and 8. 
to communicate its reality ... will involve propositional structures." 172 
 Johnson claims that rationality 
in general is founded on such nonpropositional knowledge and maintains that "the conceptual/ 
propositional content of an utterance ... is possible only by virtue of a complex web of 
nonpropositional schematic structures that emerge from our bodily experience." 73 
According to Johnson, our pre-linguistic bodily involvement in the world creates models which we 
use when constructing our representation of the outer world. The modes of bodily existence, it being a 
container, a moving object, an agent of force, produce schematic structures which we apply to worldly 
phenomena and to abstract ideas. As an example, we will describe Johnson's schema of balance and 
show its evolution from direct bodily experience to an abstract notion. 
Firstly, we learn balancing with our body as an activity and not by adopting rules and concepts. We 
know the meaning of balance through experiencing body equilibrium, or lack of it. Apart from standing 
upright, balance is conceived (still pre-conceptually) as a harmonious functioning of one's organism, 
with just enough food in the stomach, the right body temperature etc. We learn the lack of balance if 
our hands are too cold, or we have eaten too much. The sense of bodily balance, having produced a 
schematic structure of experience, is then applied to visual perception. Works of art are perceived as - 
balanced if their elements produce a visual equilibrium of space occupancy, imaginary weight and 
mass. When we see an object against some background, we sense immediately whether it is 
harmoniously positioned, or whether it is off centre. The same schema applies when we talk of 
psychological states. Psychological balance, Johnson observes, is understood as equilibrium between 
bodily and mental states. When this correlation is out of balance, one can be overwhelmed by emotions 
or be emotionally drained, and the balance is restorable either by releasing the built up emotions or 
generating emotional energy. In a similar way the schema of balance is applicable to rational 
arguments, justice and mathematical equality, where the concept of equally distributed weight is used 
in a metaphorical sense. 
Nonpropositional awareness does not answer the question: how did body produce consciousness 
during the course of evolution and how does body maintain consciousness in a concrete person? 
Johnson's theory does not explain in full the ontological dependence of consciousness on the body but 
offers a convincing picture of the way in which knowledge both as a process and as content is guided 
172 Johnson, p.  4 
Johnson, p.  5 
IMIC 
by bodily performance. If nothing else, Johnson's theory illustrates how physics and biology guide 
rationality, and this provides evidence of at least partial continuity of body and mind, where the body 
determines not the fact of existence of the mind but the mode of its existence, and where this 
dependence is not manifested by the body but exclusively by the mind. 
4. Historical and biographical continuity 
The content of a historical or a biographical event isfinalised only after the event is complete and has 
become past 
As well as participating in life and being in general, a concrete self comprises the embodied time of 
its historical existence as a social being. The social history of the self, we claim, can be compared with 
the historical continuity of a state rather than an organism: the unity of the self harbours splits and 
confrontation between its different parts, resembling subjects of a historical process. 
Historical events gain their identity when they are complete and past. Going back to the First World 
War example,' 74 the assassination of the Archduke in itself does not entail the necessity of the war, and 
cannot sufficiently explicate it as its consequence. When it took place, it was uncertain whether Serbia 
as a state was to be made accountable for the crime. The Austrian side could have decided to treat the 
murder as an act of lunacy and one could imagine possible reasons for doing so. When the 
assassination took place and the ultimatum to Serbia was issued, Russia may not have announced its 
passing to the "Period Preparatory to War" so promptly, or at least the Russians could have chosen a 
different wording which would have had less aggressive connotation and reflected better the position of 
the Russian government whereby this move was meant to be a "purely precautionary measure". 175  If 
Austria had understood the Russian position as purely precautionary, there may not have been German 
and Austrian mobilisation in response, etc, etc. At any time the powers involved could have made a 
different move and, if the war was still unavoidable, it would have had a different identity. It is only 
after the chain of events leading to the war took place, that we identi&  them as the prelude of that First 
World War. 
'74 See Chapter 5, Section 3 
175 Everett, p.  17 
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We can define the meaning of an event only retrospectively, when all stages of this event have 
finalised themselves by becoming present and the entire event is therefore in the past. For whilst the 
event is still unrolling, at each stage it may change its direction, and eventually have different content 
and different consequences for the events which will succeed it in the future. This is especially evident 
when we are involved in critical events which at the outset indicate significant changes for our lives, 
whose outcome we cannot predict for certain: will we pass that examination, marry that person, get that 
job? There is even less certainty when we live through events that affect an entire society. 
Someone living through a revolution, for example, would be overwhelmed by the sense of 
instability, rapid political changes, rising prices and, disorientated, would find it hard to project his or 
her own future. When the crisis is over, all its phases and episodes become part of the revolution, but 
they were not part of the revolution before because, while they were happening, it was uncertain what 
the entire event would become. It may not have become a revolution but could have prolonged itself as 
a civil war or it could have subsided into an economical recession with limited, not radical political 
changes. Then the episodes that happened, say, at the outset, would have become members of a 
different heterogeneity and themselves would be assigned a different content. 
The same can be said about our personal history, whereby we live our latest present with the sense 
that all previous events have continuously led us to this moment. But from the point of view of 
ourselves, say, ten years younger, if we had known then what we would be doing now, we would have 
been astonished, for the change might have seemed very abrupt and our past life might not have 
seemed to show any predispositions for this later development. 
Suppose, at time tone is introduced to a group of colleagues, and three years later, at time t'he 
marries one of them. Now, if at time : he were told about what was to happen in three years time, he 
would not find it easy to accept this piece of information. To him it may have almost seemed like an act 
of violence, an invasion of a different reality into his actual life, having to accept a complete stranger as 
his closest relation. On the other hand, three years later, such a thought does not seem odd at all, and he 
refers to the first meeting with the new colleague as the first meeting with his future wife. At time I, 
however, he would be absolutely right to reject a hypothetical prophesy of their marriage. Such 
prophecy would not be legitimate because at time this new acquaintance was not his future wife since, 
for a multitude of reasons, their relationship may have not developed in the future. It is only in times 
consecutive to time tthat their liaison arose and strengthened, culminating in marriage at time F'. Now, 
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whereas from the present position at time!, this marriage would seem an unlikely accident, from the 
present time C, when the marriage isa finalised event, the chain of causal links radiating from this 
event towards the past time t and beyond, obviously form a continuity leading to the marital union. 
5. The hypothetical temporality of the sell 
Unlike the historical process which is blind to the future, ones biography involves a view of one's 
hypothetical future manfested as a remote goaL Two futures: real and hypotheticaL Two views of the 
present: real present that affects real past and real future, and the present viewed retrospectively from 
the point of the future goaL Various temporal planes in which the self exists. 
- The future of a historical process appears to be greatly uncertain. Rather than being guided by 
remote future goals, political figures are pressurised by the demands of immediate problems, and have 
little, if any, room for manoeuvre whilst making historical decisions. Also, history involves wills of 
millions combined with unexpected objective circumstances such as a natural disaster or a discovery of 
a new source of oil, so it is hard to plan and even harder to predict. Hence history is synonymous with 
the past of social reality, and historians dare not make authoritative predictions of its future. 
A historical process of the self is more straightforward because, given all its inner splits, it 
ultimately involves only one willing agent, so an individual has a greater control over his or her 
personal future than subjects of world history have over the future of history. Our actions are not a 
mere response to circumstances - we make plans and work on their realisation. 
This complicates the temporality of the self in the following way. We concluded in Chapter 5 that 
with each new present, the entire world or, in the case of a concrete self, the self's life changes, and 
these changes include alterations of the past and of the future. Now we must say that as well as being 
influenced by the past, the self is also influenced by the future - not by the future of real events because 
they are not certain yet, but by the future which we ourselves invent; not by the future which is 
projected by the past and the present and which constantly changes, but by the hypothetical, imagined 
future which is a state that we strive to achieve, which will not happen by itself as a natural 
continuation of our previous life but requires a special, purposeful effort. 
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Thus in our present we negotiate two futures, the real projection of our present and the hypothetical 
future of our goals. Whereas the real future emanates from the present and is viewed from the present 
point, the relation of the hypothetical future to the present is the reverse. When we act in our present 
with the view of the hypothetical future, as an acting agent we remain in the present, but as an 
observing and monitoring agent we place ourselves at the point of the planned achievement in the 
hypothetical future and evaluate our actual present from that position. Our imaginary position in the 
future is treated as the imaginary present, and from the point of view of this present, our real present 
becomes the past of our imaginary present. 
Viewing our actual present from the position of the distant goal, we gain a retrospective view of it 
and modi& it from the foundation of the real future into the foundation of the hypothetical future, with 
the aim of changing the hypothetical future into the real future. Then the present also appears in two 
ways. Firstly, it remains that actual present which is a spindle that turns temporal reality and changes 
the past and the future, but secondly it, whilst being looked at retrospectively, gains for us the 
properties of a reality that is affected by subsequent times and subsequent events. The current day and 
the current hour project themselves naturally into tomorrow and into the next hour, but they are also 
seen as potentially the foundation for the goal in the more remote future. 
The importance of the hypothetical future is especially evident in our relation with death. Typically, 
the knowledge of its inevitability does not cause anxiety, unless we believe that we know the time of 
our final hour. The reason why knowing makes such a dramatic difference to our state of mind is that 
the not knowing means uncertainty not only epistemological but also ontological, given the uncertainty 
of the future in general, and presents us with a potentially indefinite life. 
The knowledge of the time of one's death is more destructive than the event of death itself, because 
when expected, death affects the hypothetical temporality in which we create our plans which can 
stretch beyond our real temporal  limits. We start to suffer from death mentally and emotionally before 
we are dead biologically, because our temporal plane of action is crudely cut ahead of us, rendering us 
unable to live in the hypothetical future. The trauma of such awareness is equally great whether we are 
promised ten years of life or ten days. Someone who will accidentally die the next day is luckier than 
someone who is sure of dying in ten years time. 
However, human beings are sometimes capable of overcoming even the knowledge of death. Wills 
and testimonies, legacies and living gifts allow the self to emanate its will beyond the cut-off date. An 
194 
interesting case of self-therapy when facing death can be found in Boethius' The Consolation of 
Philosophy, written whilst the author was awaiting execution.' 76 Book 5, Prose 6 of Consolation 
contains the view of eternity, which opens up a possibility for the temporal reality to supersede its 
temporal immediacy in an unlimited fashion! 77 The core argument there is that God in one moment 
grasps all events in the past, present and future as non-ceasing. The act of embracing God in faith 
allows the believer to partake to some extent of this vision of time and eternity and thus, ignoring the 
knowledge of the coming end, indulge in the temporal fullness of being. Whilst alive, we are able to 
think of God, and think of the all-encompassing reality, overcoming in our mind the thought of our 
end. Boethius' psychological exercise, we think, is an intensification of the normal human tendency to 
reach out in our thoughts to all possible times outside our own. 
As for our belonging to the actual present time, it is effortless in physical terms, but requires an 
effort when we want to belong to the social present time. The social time is marked by cultural 
phenomena, including the material culture, and fashion awareness can be a means of belonging to the 
social present, which has a different duration for different people. Some may be happy to belong to a 
more extended present and use elements of the material culture which are ten or fifteen years old, 
whereas others regard the present to be a shorter, three to five year long period. But there are those who 
are satisfied only if they belong to a present as narrow as possible, lasting only for a few months. In 
truth, fashion, car and machinery industries often do not offer anything functionally different in the 
latest versions of their goods and what they are really selling is the pass to the ultimate, cutting-edge 
social present, as they understand it. On the other hand, there are people who disapprove of the 
newfangled ways and things, and escape into the past, but both groups consider concrete temporality in 
axiological terms, with the embodied "earlier" and "later" entailing characteristics of better or worse. 
To complicate our temporality even further, we have to account for the time before our birth and for 
the time after our death, i.e. the time, both past and future, that we cannot possibly grasp experientially 
for ourselves. Also, we often follow a fictional or historical narrative, when reading a book or watching 
a film, which portrays events as unrolling now but which are not happening now in reality. 
Interestingly, such layering of an imaginary present on top of one's own present is not problematic and 
76 For a further analysis of Boethius' understanding of eternity see Eleonore Stump and Norman 
Kretzmann, "Eternity" in The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. LXXVIII, No 8, August, 1981 pp.429  -458. 
... is the complete, simultaneous and perfect possession of everlasting life"(Boethius, p. 
163) 
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does not entail confusion of one's identity. The real person, however engrossed he or she maybe in a 
story, remains in his or her real present, and the superficial identification with an imagined character 
can play a therapeutic role giving, so to speak, a vacation from the pressures of the real time. 
Apart from various forms of linear temporal belonging, there is a cyclical, or spiral mode of 
temporal reality, where the content of some events is essentially the same as that of previous events. 
Routine, daily and yearly, also defines our temporality, regulating our sense of stability. In this context, 
the repetitiveness and the originality in the routine are also regarded in axiological terms: routine can 
be judged positively as tried and tested stability, or negatively, associated with boredom and monotony, 
and originality positively as an improvement, or negatively as unproven and unreliable innovation. 
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Conclusion 
Our enquiry, focused on Bergson's philosophy of time, passed through three stages. Firstly, we 
followed the conceptual development of duration - the key concept that applies to all types of temporal 
reality. The goal of this stage was to clari& and discipline Bergson's discourse of time so as firstly, to 
make Bergson's theory of time more accessible for a non-specialist reader and secondly, to 
demonstrate that, despite his worthy contribution to ontology and epistemology, Bergson's theory is 
incomplete and naturally requires further development. 
The second stage consisted of a thorough analysis of the metaphysical terms which emerged from 
the examination of Bergson's texts - duration, heterogeneity, time, past, present, future. The theory of 
heterogeneity which Bergson merely outlined has received further development. We analysed elements 
of this heterogeneity and concluded that the identity and individuality of its elements, albeit not 
detectable ostensively, can be identified via their effects on the world. The nought has been reinstated 
in ontology: Bergson denies nothingness any ontological value, treating it as a quality, but we 
suggested that it participates in heterogeneity as a relation of othemess. It has also been argued that as 
everything affects everything else in heterogeneity, each new addition in the present will rearrange the 
entire whole, including the projected future and the past, and this changes the future prospects and 
gives new meanings to historical episodes. Finally, we explained the unavoidable failure to capture the 
very present of events by a temporal shift between the body which goes through the present phase of a 
physical action, and the conscious acknowledgement which, in its own present, can either anticipate or 
remember the present of the body but not coincide with it temporally. 
As for time and temporal parts, we argued that Rergson was wrong in reducing time and everything 
temporal 10 qualities, because time involves relations as well: temporal processes objectively happen 
earlier and later than other processes. We also demonstrated that the past, present and the future can be 
understood in either qualitative or relational terms: in qualitative terms, if taken as temporal reality in 
general, and in relational, if treated as past, present and future. 
The third stage involved concretising the idea of duration. It was decided that an all-embracing 
duration is best illustrated by the self because the self could either entail or account for the full 
diversity of being. Analysing the structure of rational selthood, we modified Bergson's theory of 
cognition, removing the opposition of intuition and analysis and showing that the cognitive process 
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involves both intuition and analysis as stages of cognition. We also found that on different occasions 
Bergson refers to two different types of intuition, and suggested a three-staged epistemology consisting 
in primary(pre-conceptual) intuition, intellectual analysis, and secondary (post-conceptual) intuition. 
We found that the duration of selthood is peppered with various types of discontinuity, which seems 
to contradict the idea of duration. An attempt to restore continuity in duration was made in the final 
chapter, where we suggested an alternative view on temporal reality - not trying to follow it from the 
past to the present, but from the present to the past, whereby we avoid the overlap of the actual point of 
view in the actual present and the imaginary point of view in the past which we treat as if it were 
present. 
As was pointed out at the outset, we do not insist that Bergsonism should develop necessarily in the 
direction indicated in this study. But we insist that if we want to allow it to exist, it should develop, 
because Bergson's own theory is clearly unfinished. What makes it worthy of the philosophical 
attention is its potential as a system of concepts and insights that expose those aspects of reality, which 
may remain bverlooked otherwise. In particular, as well as bringing in the dynamic dimension into 
being, Bergson's theory of duration affirms the heterogeneous nature of reality, which, we believe, has 
its merits, despite also being problematic. Whilst offering an all-inclusive theory of temporal being 
which includes knowledge, Bergson unites ontology and epistemology. Also, his idea of heterogeneity, 
where the identity of a fragment of temporal process is not exhaustible by its ostensive characteristics 
but involves its relations with other fragments and with the whole, prompts a new theory of identity. 
We hope that this project has succeeded in bringing Bergson's originality to light and showing at least 
one way in which the theory of duration can be developed further. 
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